THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2, 1982. Talking after the battle

Press, 2 June 1982, Page 24

THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2, 1982. Talking after the battle

The British have been very successful. so far in their efforts to repossess the Falkland Islands. If the recapture of Port Stanley is effected with. the speed with which they have made their advances over the islands so far, the British will soon hold the islands again. The Argentine troops captured have proved to be short on rations. Those who surrendered at Goose Green did so after their ammunition ran low. The Argentine force defending Port Stanley is reported to include regular troops who will be reluctant to surrender quickly. In the end, these troops must find themselves in the same position as other Argentine troops. They will run low on food and ammunition and they are isolated from reinforcements. They, too, will have to surrender unless the Argentinians work a military miracle. The question is: what will happen when British troops control the islands? The war will not necessarily be over. Argentina is still making air attacks on the British task force, even in circumstances in which the Argentinian pilots have only a 50 per cent chance of returning from their raiding missions. Argentina is reported to be scouring the world for increased supplies of Exocet missiles, and although the losses of the Argentine air force have been severe, it is still capable of inflicting further damage on the Royal Navy. While there is a battle none of the British ships is safe. Even, if Argentina loses more ships and aircraft, it still has friends who may make good its losses sufficiently to afflict a fleet guarding the Falklands. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, is reported to be opposing the views of the new Foreign Secretary whom she has just appointed, Mr Francis Pym, because he wants negotiations at the . end of the war. Mrs Thatcher is said to want to see a different economy on the islands and to make them less dependent

on Argentina. In the heat of what may be the last battle to regain the islands, Mrs Thatcher may want to show that she has the will to'see . the war through to its bitter end and is wary of saying anything that the British troops might interpret fas making their effort to recapture the islands .pointless. Her firmness against negotiations may be equally intended to impress the Argentinian military at a moment of serious test This is a sound enough attitude ! at a critical moment in the battle; it is not an attitude that will serve when the fighing is over. Britain may not want to enter into negotiations straight away, but at the very least Mrs Thatcher should see the sense of the advice from the American Secretary of State, Mr Alexander Haig, that Argentina should not be humiliated. Defeat is one matter; restoring peace is another. The prospect of Britain holding on to the islands indefinitely against a hostile Argentina bodes ill both for Britain and Argentina but also for peaceful relations between Latin ’ America and the United States. Britain will not want to leave its task force permanently in the South Atlantic. The more; likely solution is that Britain will leave a small force behind and hope that it can be reinforced speedily in the event of further threats. Britain really needs some guarantee of support in this from other countries, particularly its N.A.T.O. partners. Such support’ is not likely to be won until some agreement is negotiated with Argentina. Argentina still has a formidable navy. and would be reasonably well placed to impose a blockade of its own around the islands, if it can assemble air power to protect its ships. Military occupation of the islands is no guarantee of their security, let alone their economic welfare. Mrs Thatcher is bound to come to the conclusion in the end that a settlement will have to be negotiated.