Invasion of a fortified shore

Press, 29 May 1982, Page 16

Invasion of a fortified shore

Victory in Normandy by David Belchem. (Chatto and Wlndus, 1981. 187 pp. Ilins. Index. $27.50. Reviewed by Keith C. Hooper)

The most daring and complicated of military operations is an air and seaborne invasion against a fortified shore. To do this well combining and utilising all the latest weapons to hand and bringing up a vast supporting logistical train necessitates a high degree of imaginative planning, attention to detail, training drive and sheer luck. The Normandy invasion remains the model for this kind of exercise, the very epitome of efficiency and success, testing the ability of planners to blend military art with science. Major General Belchem was one of the planners, on Montgomery's staff and in 1944 a key co-ordinator of the different arms. Well-placed to put on record the history of this great undertaking he remains throughout his book proud of the professionalism evinced by all those involved and staunchly loyal to his autocratic and prickly chief. According to Belchem it was the Montgomery plan which was adopted and which, after fighting off various objectors selected the Normandy site and proposed within 90 days to execute a decisive wheeling manoeuvre: the British being the pivot centred at Caen drawing the German armour whilst the .more mobile Americans were from their beach head positions to sweep in an arc south-east to entrap the German 7th Army between the Loire and the Seine.

Throughout the planning there were bitter arguments for alternative invasion locations, a factor which strained the alliance of imperious commanders and

involved ..nearly everyone against Montgomery. The, latter was in part encouraged’by Churchill with his idea for taking along portable harbours later to be codenamed “Mulberries.” These made it no longer vital to land close to a port. But they were bulky contraptions which the Americans eventually dispensed with, claiming the ability to land more over open beaches without them. However no : one disputed the value of the oil pipeline (PLUTO) laid across the Channel, or the special tanks and other novelties introduced for the occasion. Hindsight revealed Normandy as the correct choice. The Bay of Biscay was too far, the Calais area too well-defended and the coastline of the Low Countries too dyke-ridden to utilise allied mobility fully. On the other side the Germans were overstretched trying to guard a 4800kilometre coastline. They failed to appreciate the Allies' need to land within the range of their air forces based in England. Even in the weeks after D Day the Germans.retained powerful forces in the"' Calais area, misled by all the diversions and dummy runs put on by the Allies for that purpose. Belatedly they fed these panzer formations into the battle piecemeal instead of employing them in one hammer blow as they had originally envisaged. For Belchem the key to the whole Allied success was air superiority. By day the Germans were unable to move their reserves and most of their communications links were wrecked. In 90 days right on schedule the 7th Army was destroyed, half a million men were lost together with 1500 tanks and 43 divisions. The Allies too. had paid a price, losing 200,000 or 10 per cent, but it was a

tremendous victory and with the Germans disorganised they were poised for one powerful thrust towards the Ruhr.

Yet oddly enough, according to Belchem, Eisenhower had had enough of Montgomery's plans and elected for a broad front strategy which slowed the whole Allied advance. Why this occurred is only hinted at, but Belchem makes clear the constant carping at the invasion plan was a feature of the whole operation. When in July the advance inland began falling behind the scheduled time-table a considerable row broke out and worse followed when a major British offensive at Caen was checked. Yet Belchem claims this was in accord with declared objectives: British attacks to be sufficient to draw the bulk of the German armour whilst the Americans, facing only light opposition, would be free for the break-out. Thus a basic mystery remains as to h(§y much other commanders were aware of Montgomery's over-all plan to be continually demanding different objectives. However, it all came right in the end, though possibly Eisenhower sought the opportunity afterwards to keep conflicting commanders well apart in future.

For its detail and lavish use of illustrations — maps and photographs appear on every page - this book provides _the clearest picture yet of a complex undertaking. In spite of the scale of the operation the narrative never loses sight of the main objectives or gets bogged down by trivia. Belchem's account is worthwhile reading both for its historical content, and for its insight into the problems of modern conventional warfare.