Falklands ‘a besieged Antarctic Berlin’

Press, 28 May 1982, Page 12

Falklands ‘a besieged Antarctic Berlin’

By

PETER JENKINS

in the “Guardian." London

Now that it is all over bar the final shooting, let us begin again at the beginning and consider what it is that we — or. rather, “our boys" — must be prepared to die for. According to the Prime Minister (Mrs Margaret Thatcher), they will be fighting to make the world safe for democracy.

Firing on her usual moral two cylinders she said once more, when interviewed on the radio in the middle of the month, that two principles were at stake: the principle of self determination and the principle that aggression shall not pay. She asserted the Falklanders' right to self-determination on the ground that that was what democracy was all about. She warned that if aggression was allowed to succeed in this case, other countries would soon lie invaded with international anarchy resulting and many lives at risk. It is too late for arguing yet again that these are fallacious or simplistic grounds tor war on the disproportionate scale now planned. It remains relevant to point out tnat they provide flimsy foundations for international support as hostilities intensify. Britain's insistence on the Falklanders' right to self-deter-mination. which seems to have become the breaking point of the peace talks, is the part of our case which matters most of latter-day colonialism. The Government's repeated claim to lie making tne world a safer place would be more convincing if our friends and allies were cheering us up the

beaches, but they are not; they await events with misgiving and foreboding. They'll -be happy enough when we have won the war. is Mrs Thatcher’s reply to lilylivered objections of this kind. “If we succeed, as we shall, we shall -have the quiet acclaim and approval of all who believe in democracy." This sense of unique mission, this Joan of Arc talk, rings dangerously in the ears. Does it seem probable that a small island in the North Atlantic is going to make the world a safer place by going to war over even tinier islands thirteen thousand kilometres away in the South Atlantic?

Let us make plain once again that the case for reason and proportion does not rest upon the proposition that aggression should be allowed to prosper or that, in this case, the aggressed are of small concern. It rests, first, upon the proposition that the world is not a simple game of dominoes and that in each case oi conflict costs must be calculated and responses weighed. What happens to the Falklands Islands could have some consequences for. say. Belize but is likely to have not the slightest effect on future Soviet behaviour or Western responses to it.

As for the Falklanders. they are the victims not so much of aggression as of geography and history. They are also the victim of British irresponsibility and self-delusion. They can no more expect to determine a British future for the Falklands than to determine that the map is coloured British pink again.

The right of self-determination, made absolute and abstract, is absurd and worth not a drop of anyone's blood. The Falklanders have the right to the best deal which can be obtained in the circumstances, either under Argentinian rule or repatriated to Britain.

The negotiations to avoid a war broke down on principle. For Argentina her claim to sovereignty was a matter of high national principle. Britain's commitment to punishing aggression and upholding the rights of the islanders required the denial of that claim. Because there was no procedural escape from the substance of the sovereignty issue the negotiations revolved around a — perhaps — insoluble dilemma.

The more willing appeared the Argentines to discuss without prejudice the question of sovereignty, the more concerned became the British with the modalities of disengagement and interim administration. The more insistent were the British on guarantees and safeguards, the more suspicious grew the Argentinians that the sovereignty issue would be prejudiced in Britain’s favour. In fact, both sides wanted to prejudge the issue of sovereignty. Arrangements which migiit allow the islanders a veto would prejudice the Argentinian claim. Arrangements which rendered nugatory that veto would seem to allow their claim and give aggression its reward. Had it been the British Government's policy to negotiate a transfer of sovereignty.

while protecting the interests of the islanders, there need have been no war. But that was not the policy. A re-invasion 'of Falkland Islands in order to make the world safer for democracy might have seemed more plausible had not the great principles. said to be at stake, revolved around a sovereign claim to insignificant and underpopulated islands which, if sound at law. made no geopolitical sense. What is more, the breaking point of the negotiations will look to much of the world suspiciously like an attempt to restore a colonial-style administration. A war fought on these grounds is unlikely to command enthusiastic international support. Moreover, there is too great a symbiosis for comfort in the affair. To be sure. Argentina is a South American dictatorship and Britain a venerable Western democracy: yet when it comes to intransigence there is not much to choose between a Taht.cher and a Galtieri. as the headline writers around the world have been busy noting. Each has achieved 'political popularity through war: each has given more weight to domestic political pressures, whether from officers or backbenchers. than to international good opinion: and each has presided over a cacophony of conflicting and obfuscating statements of policy and principle. The world’ may be excused if it sees two nations in need of war. each struggling to escape from a spiral of decline and in need of heroic respite.

. The recapture of the Falkland Islands, it seems, is to be

an extension of the Prime Minister's “conviction politics" by other means. Beyond that. Britain's war aims' are far from clear. The Defence Secretary. Mr Nott, when interviewed again in the middle of the month, seemed to be envisaging some kind of fight-and-netotiate strategy; but if the islands had to be retaken by force, which was what he was really talking about, then the policy — he said — wouid be to seek a long-term solution for them with the countries in the area.

But what makes him think that others are going to act in accordance with neat British plans" A task force of invading size was dispatched in the rash hope that it would bring the junta to its senses; now it is obliged to invade or come home. The sinking of the Belgrano had the effect of rallying the Argentinian people more solidly behind their disreputable and hitherto unpopular rulers. The most probable effect of military escalation will be to further heighten patriotic fervour. And if the islands should fall to British forces, the obvious course for the junta is not to sue for peace but swear eternal war. Mr Nott talks as if he imagines settling down on the veranda. Union Jack flying safely once more, to discuss fishing limits and communications facilities with friendly, neighbouring Argentina. More likely he. or someone, will be saying. “One more such victory and we are lost." The pre-war problems of sustaining the islands, and discharging British promises to the islanders, will be writ large. They will be-

come a beseiged. Antarctic Berlin without importance or meaning — doomed to wither or. the vine of distance and unconcern.

And this is where we came in. For nearly two decades, successive Governments and Parliaments declined to face the facts of geography and history: politicians, or. ail sides, deluded themselves and others, entering into irresponsible commitments which they had neither the will nor the means to discharge: they put party political convenience, and the importunings of lobbyists above the national interest and. indeed, the longer-term interests of the Falklanders themselves. Let us remember, therefore, as "our boys” go in to die for principles, that none of this might have happened had Parliament not been summoned on that fateful Saturday. April 3. and had policy been made in reason and not hot blood. Nor need the mission have continued to its bloody end had our leaders preached proportion in place of patriotism and passion. Blood will now be shed, not for true principle, but to expiate false and broken promises.

Our sailors and our soldiers, no doubt, will do what England expects. Our friends and allies will look on with bemused concern. Our people have closed ranks and the Tories are singing “Rule Britannia ” The Establishment. meanwhile, goes into this war with an uneasy conscience. There is an awful feeling that it has been too serious a business to have been left to Margaret Thatcher.