Judge tried to clear pilots — Mr Chippindale

Press, 4 February 1982, Page 13

Judge tried to clear pilots — Mr Chippindale

PA Wellington The Erebus Disaster Commissioner (Mr Justice Mahon) tried as hard to clear the DClO’s pilots from blame for the crash as he claimed other organisations had tried to condemn them, according to the Chief Inspector of Air Accidents (Mr Ron Chippindale). In a lengthy commentary on the report of the Royal Commission, Mr Chippindale said that Mr Justice Mahon’s findings conflicted “with the accepted views of the international aviation fraternity around the world.” The commentary was prepared early in May, last year, days after the Mahon report had been publicly released. and was released yesterday after a Cabinet decision last Monday. In a statement yesterday, the Minister of Transport (Mr Gair) said it should be emphasised that the comments predated the current controversy, which have included further trenchant criticism of the Mahon report by Mr Chippindale, but a strong defence of it by Air Chief Marshal Sir Rochford Hughes. The commentary lists 66 specific areas of disagreement with the Mahon report, ranging from differences of opinion, to disatisfaction with phases used, to allegations of factual error. Concluding his detailed criticisms of the Royal Commission report into the circumstances and cause of the disaster in which 257 people were killed, Mr Chippindale said he did not believe the Air New Zealand crew had made “the immaculate preparation for the descent euphemised by Judge Mahon.” “But even if they had, this does not absolve them from colliding with cloud-covered high ground particularly when the aircraft was fitted with such sophisticated navigation equipment,” Mr Ghippindale said. "There was no direction by Air New Zealand requiring Captain Collins (the chief pilot of the DCIO flight) to attempt to descend to 1500 ft or even to a low, altitude . , he said. “The passengers had seen every variety of scenery that the Antarctic had to offer while in the Victoria Land area, with two exceptions which were the active volcano of Mount Erebus, which was known to be in cloud, and the dry valleys to which the crew were advised to go by local D.S.I.R. personnel as that area was clear of any cloud.”

Mr Chippindale said he had never believed that the pilot would fly his aircraft deliberately towards high ground while at low altitude and he suggested reasons in his own report, which might have led him to believe he was flying down McMurdo Sound.

Mr Chippindale’s report placed most of the blame for the disaster on the crew,

while the Mahon report exonerated the crew and blamed errors made by the airline in programming the aircraft’s navigational computers. “My significant difference of opinion with- the report of the Royal Commission is that the crew’s assumption of where they were going was not sufficient excuse for descending without establishing the position as accurately as possible with the navigational aids available to them,” Mr Chippindale said. “The errors in the briefing (given by Air New Zealand) were serious but not an absolute excuse for the accident when the means were readily available for the pilot in command to make certain he knew where he was.”

Mr Chippindale said he was “sincerely doubtful” that Captain Collins had accurately ascertained his position.

.“Whilst it may appear to the judge that the pilot in command took sufficient steps to ensure the safety of the aircraft, he was not sufficiently familiar with the practices of aviation to appreciate that much more was expected reasonably of the pilot in command, despite the inadequacy of his briefing.” he said. Mr Justice Mahon's analysis in his report had branded pilots in command of large airliners “as unthinking automatons who when programmed to fly on a track take no steps to find out where that track leads or more importantly to maintain a continuous surveillance ... in order to ensure the safety of the aircraft at all times,” he said.

“I consider it manifestly misleading,” Mr Chippindale said, “for the Judge to state as fact so many assumptions on the conduct of this flight which were deduced from the statements, not subject to the rules of evidence, made by so many interested parties, and information gathered in private but not tested by experiment or crossexamination.” His own report, he said, was in contrast “the considered assessment of a group of extremely well-qualified DC 10 experts, pilots and accident investigators who decided this accident could have been avoided if the crew had conducted the flight in accordance with the briefing in relation to minimum safe altitudes.” In what he called his “catalogue of errors” of the Mahon report, Mr Chippindale took strongest exception to Mr Justice Mahon's interpretation of exactly what words were distinguishable from the cockpit voice recorder recovered after the crash. Mr Justice Mahon asserted that important sections of the transcript made by Mr Chippindale and reproduced in his report were in fact unable to be heard clearly enough to be translated. To an assertion that at least two words reproduced in the transcript could not be gleaned from the tape, Mr Chippindale said ... “I know they were (spoken) from many hours spent listening to this tape.” The section of the report dealing with the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was “the most disappointing” of the Judge’s findings, he said. “Irrespective of evidence

before the Commissioner I believe now, as I did when I wrote my report, that my readout of the CVR was correct . . .

“One thing I will state solemnly is that no attempt was made by me to tailor the CVR readout or to insert comments which were not clear to me,” Mr Chippindale said.

The experts involved in the preparation of an assessment of the official report on the accident issued under his name had spent much time “considering the actions of Captain Collins and his crew in an endeavour to place themselves in their position,” he said.

“We refrained from stating our hypothesis on the captain’s reasons for descending early and certainly never considered stating it as a factual account, but I believe it to have been equally plausible (with Mr Justice Mahon’s hypothesis).” Mr Chippindale also disputed Mr Justice Mahon’s acceptance of evidence that Captain Collins plotted his course using co-ordinates which were later changed, on an atlas and on a map at home before the fatal flight. He said it was “remarkable" that Mrs Collins had not told him of this when he visited her before the Commission hearings, that he had been unable to find from where Captain Collins might have procured a suitable map, and that he seriously doubted if Captain Collins would have drawn a track on a page of a limited edition, collectors’ item atlas retailing at $250. The crew should have been told of the change in destination but it was not the “appalling error” described by Mr Justice Mahon, he said.

“There was no brief on this flight requiring the captain to descend on track to 1500 ft

Even if there had been, Mr Chippindale said, the responsibility for the maintenance of a safe altitude remained that of the captain. The Air Accident Inspector also disputed that the Air Traffic Control Centre and the United States Antarctic Base at McMurdo Sound had “invited" the DCIO to descend to 1500 ft.

. “They stated that if he wanted it they had a radar let-down that could take him to this altitude," he said.

Mr Chippindale also accused Mr Justice Mahon of leaving out some matters which did not support his contention.

Reacting to the report, he said: “Justice Mahon has described his version of events clearly but has not refrained from expressing as facts his hypothesis of a sequence of events which should have happened, but arguing strongly against material which did not conform to this pattern, and on occasion omitting evidence which supported a contrary view.”