Kampuchean groups ‘coaxed’ into uniting

Press, 11 December 1981, Page 12

Kampuchean groups ‘coaxed’ into uniting

A news report which arrived after yesterday’s article and this article had been written gives what appears to be an important clue to the puzzle of why the Khmer Rouge has dissolved the Communist Party within its ranks. The Association of South-East Asian Nations is holding a strategy session on a call to arm the Khmer resistance-groups. This makes it likely that the Khmer Rouge knew of the planned session and hastily dissolved its Communist Party (at least in name) so that it could take advantage of any arms being offered by A.S.E.A.N. countries. All A.S.E.A.N. countries have had or still have insurgencies led by Communists. It is improbable that they would be inclined to arm a group which professed communism or in which a communist party was known to be strong.

This is the second of two articles by STUART McMILLAN on recent developments among Kampuchean resistance groups.

The moves to’ form a coalition of the main Khmer resistance groups would probably have come to nothing at all without pressure from other countries. ;

After the Singapore meeting in early September, a series of nine meetings has been held, most of them, it appears, in a house somewhere in the suburbs of Bangkok. Officials from Thailand, and from other contries in the Association of South-East Asian Nations, whose four other members are Malaysia, Singapore. Indonesia, and the Philippines, waited rather anxiously to be advised of the outcome of the deliberations, but apparently were not - told- much.

Eventually some coaxing was done. Son Sann, the leader of the Khmer Peoples National Liberation Front (K.P.N.L.F.), a non-communist grouping, seemed to need most persuading. All of the groups were vulnerable. They exist, as it were, by the grace of Thailand; Just what threats were made has not been announced publicly. But there are plenty of privileges that the . Thais could withdraw even if they refrained from interfering, with the food or medical supplies to the refugee camps dominated

by one or another faction. The easy access to the camps is through Thailand. When visiting the K.P.N.L.F. camp on the border of Thailand and Kampuchea, the car I was in had to have clearance for the numerous Thai Army check-points. Permission for diplomats, journalists or others to visit the areas, is completely in the hands of the Thai authorities.

I was offered a journey inside Kampuchea (which I did not take) by Democratic Kampuchean officials. Again it was going to be necessary to get clearance from Thai Government officials.

Major-General Dien Del, commander of the K.P.N.L.F. forces said that he maintained communication with the embassies of all the Western countries in Thailand. Mr Marshall Green, a senior United States diplomat, then President Reagan’s special representative on refugees, had visited the K.P.N.L.F. camp only weeks before. Access of visitors to these camps is important for the groups. The ability to leave the camps is also important for the leaders of the groups. Son Sann was still at the July New York conference on Kampuchea when I was in Thailand. Gen-

eral Dien Del was untroubled about the thought of travelling to Bangkok or elsewhere. For the Khmer Rouge, their arms . supply comes through Thailand. (This was once described io me delightfully as being on a “deniable" basis, that is the Thais would be able to deny that this was happening.) However, those who received the arms which come from China through .Thailand could have their arms supplies cut completely, which again, is a fairly effective bargaining lever. Then there is the international travel itself, considered to be very important by groups wanting international support, This too is largely by the grace of Thailand.

If there were hints of sticks used in the coaxing to form a coalition government, there were also hints of a carrot. Singapore, lending a hand to Thailand .in the matter, started talking about supplies of arms. Although the main pressures for the Khmer Rouge, the K.P.N.L.F. and Prince Shihanouk to form a coalition came from the A.S.E.A.N. countries, various other countries, including the United Sates, made encouraging noises. ■

A great many countries in the world not only take a lead, but even, like New Zealand, take their entire foreign policy towards Kampuchea, from A.S.E.A.N. They do this to

support A.S.E.A.N.' which groups the countries most affected by the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. This accounts for the support that Democratic Kampuchea receives in the vote in the United Nations each year on who will represent Kampuchea.

The fear that the international support will eventually fade accounts for the attempt to scrub Democratic Kampuchea clean from its crimes, in the ways discussed in yesterday's article. Of all ttie countries deeply involved in Kampuchea, China is the one which cares least about the scrubbing clean. It takes the pragmatic attitude

that the Khmer Rouge have the strongest forces and thus should get the support. China argues that the Khmer Rouge form the only group likely to take any effective action against the Kampuchean and Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea.

Much of the rest of the world, including New Zealand, justifies the vote for the Democratic Kampuchean representatives as keeping them there in case the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin Government gets the seat. For this to oappen would be to grant a legitimacy to the Vietnamese invasion di Kampuchea. Thailand's position in all this is the least enviable. The inva-

sion of Kampuchea removed Kampuchea as a buffer State between Thailand and Vietnam. Worse than that, because Vietnamese forces are also present in Laos, the whole of Thailand’s eastern and northeastern borders are open to the Vietnamese.

Part of Thailand’s strategyin ' allowing refugees to clash with Heng Samrin and Vietnamese forces is to prevent Vietnamese consolidation in Laos and in Kampuchea. But the rest of the world does not escape a profound dilemma. With the best intentions in supporting A.S.E.A.N.'s view of Kampuchea and casting votes for Democratic Kampuchea in the United Nations, there is a sense in which much of the world is assisting a group of proved murderous capacity back to power. The Kampucheans are unlikely to thank anyone for that.

Perhaps the moves to form a coalition grouping of the three main Khmer resistance factions will upstage the Khmer Rouge. But tell that to Son Sann with his outnumbered forces and he may not be persuaded. If the result turns out to be that Democratic Kampuchea has been helped back to power in Phnom Penh then it will not be a matter of the Pol Pot people having been scrubbed clean but of the spot spreading to much of the rest of the world.