Questions about Sinai force

Press, 26 November 1981, Page 16

Questions about Sinai force

The Government’s decision to participate in the Sinai peace-keeping force raises more questions than it answers. The most startling aspect, of the announcement was why it should have been made now rather than later. Within a few hours the Foreign Ministers of Arab countries will hold the first session of their meeting in Fez, Morocco, and they may reach a common position on their attitude to the Sinai peace-keeping force. It would have seemed prudent at least to wait until they had met. Nor has Israel made up its mind about whether to accept the participation of Britain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands in the force. This decision is likely to be made on Sunday. If, as early reports suggest, Israel finds the conditions attached to the European participation unacceptable, New Zealand would have excellent cause to reconsider its own role. As it is, the New Zealand decision follows quickly on the Europeans’ decision and, should they not take part, New Zealand would be in the embarrassing position of dogging European steps twice. The New Zealand announcement was made soon after the Australian announcement and Australia is likely to find itself in the same position as New Zealand.

In making the announcement, the Prime Minister, (Mr Muldoon), emphasised the serious threat that the Middle East had been to world peace. “Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai,” he said, “is one step towards peace. It is no more, but it is no less.” Here he has advanced the one strong argument for the Sinai peace-keeping force, whose function will be to patrol in areas of the Sinai from which Israel will withdraw next April. It is clear that the Government would have been much happier had the force come under the control of the United Nations — a move upset by the Soviet Union. The force is being set up by the United States. It is clear that the New Zealand decision to participate, like the Europeans’ decision to participate, was because of pressure from the United States. Presumably the New Zealand decision will please the United States; that is about all New Zealand will gain from it. New Zealand’s trade interests may, indeed, be harmed.

In spite of the decision it is not absolutely certain that all that remains to be done is to select and dispatch the New Zealand force. Just as there is considerable Israeli hesitation over accepting the European participation, there may be some Israeli hesitation over accepting New Zealand participation. The Israeli

hesitation is because it sees the participation in the force as support for the Camp David accords and insists that it is nothing more. The Europeans said that their joining the Sinai force did not imply anything else about the Camp David accords and added a clarifying, but separate, statement on the view of the European Economic Community about the Middle East. This is the declaration issued in Venice last year, which sees a role for the Palestine Liberation Organisation in arriving at a Middle East settlement; The Israelis, when they make their decision, may choose to pick up one statement from the Europeans and ignore the other; So far, however, it seems that they are reading both statements together.

New Zealand’s view is carefully stated too. Mr Muldoon said that the New Zealand participation was not an endorsement of any particular approach to the search for peace in the region, nor should it be seen as prejudicing the principles on which New Zealand’s even-handed approach to the Middle East question has long been based. In the next sentence is a reference to “recognition of the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination.” The absence of any reference to the P.L.O. will please the Israelis and just might make the New Zealand statement acceptable. The statement also denies that New Zealand participation implies any endorsement of Camp David, though it does not mention it by name. This may make it unacceptable.

The Israeli opposition to the Europeans may evaporate once the hard decision has to be made. The Americans would be in an impossible position if the Europeans agreed to take part in the peace-keeping force after strong American persuasion and Israel then refused to accept them. Such a reaction would damage Israel’s relations with the United States as well as cause further strains in the Atlantic alliance. The damage might not end there. American initiatives for peace in the Middle East would suffer a severe setback, leaving the region floundering for new initiatives. The region would become even more difficult to deal with than it is already. New Zealand, because it has made a curiously precipitate announcement about joining the force, could be involved in the mess that remained. Unless it is clear that the plan to patrol the Sinai will ensure greater harmony, New Zealand should be prepared to withdraw its support for the plan.