Secret U.S. report reveals how N.Z. was ‘lured’ into Vietnam war

Press, 3 November 1981, Page 17

Secret U.S. report reveals how N.Z. was ‘lured’ into Vietnam war

By

GARRY ARTHUR

The role of the United States propaganda machine in luring New Zealand into the Vietnam war is revealed in a secret United States Information Service report from Wellington for 1965 which has now been disclosed under the post-Water-gate Freedom of Information Act.

The document, and an older National Security Council report on American long-range policy interests in Australia and New Zealand, were obtained by the New Zealand peace researcher Owen Wilkes, and sent by him to the Campaign Against Foreign Control in New’ Zealand (C.A.F.C.1.N.Z.) “It quite clearly shows massive interference in New Zealand's internal affairs by the American Government,” a C.A.F.C.I.N.Z. spokesman, Mr Murray Horton, said yesterday. • He said that the U.S.I.S. document was not only invaluable in helping to tell the true story of New Zealand’s involvement in the “sordid adventure” of the Vietnam war. but it was also relevant today in the light of the Reagan Government’s efforts to. get New Zealand to send troops for its Sinai peacekeeping force. The U.S.I.S. report describes American propaganda aims in New Zealand as "psychological objectives.” It boasts about the effect of the “torrent” of propaganda material sent to Prime Minister Keith Holyoake and other politicians, and tells abouts its activities at Canterbury University, its support of the R.S.A., and “indoctrination” of New Zealand journalists visiting Saigon on United States Government trips. Mr Holyoake is portrayed as an avid reader of material emanating from the U.S.I.S. office.

The report is stamped “SANITIZED COPY” and six large paragraphs have been blanked out.

The first named psychological objective of the. United States in New Zealand was to encourage “the continuation of New Zealand’s alignment with the Western

Democracies and active support of United States Foreign Policy positions.”

Mr Holyoake had announced in May 1965 that New Zealand troops would be sent to Vietnam, and the U.S.I.S. "modestly submits” that its efforts to influence New Zealand attitudes had more than a little effect on the decision. It says that it was part of a ’ "Country Team" working towards that goal, but the rest of the "team” is not identified. “It w’ould be naive to believe." says the report, “that the torrent of United States Vietnam policy material, background, information, etc, which U.5.1.5./Wellington kept flowing across the desk of the Prime Minister, Members of his Cabinet, and Parliamentarians, had no influence on the positive position taken by Prime Minister Holyoake."

The next two large paragraphs have been deleted. The report goes on to detail the extensive publicity in favour of the United States position in Vietnam which resulted from seminars held for university student leaders and faculty members, and visits by Dr Clinton Rossiter of Cornell University, who strongly defended the United States position. Henry Cabot Lodge, the United States Ambassador to South Vietnam, and the National President of the American Legion.

Even support for academic pursuits is shown by the report to have had Vietnam war propaganda purposes. "One of the post’s most fruitful pursuits in the long run may well be the assistance it is granting to Canterbury University’s new American Studies Program.” says the report. One of the U.S.I.S. moves in this direction was to award a 75-day international Visitor grant to professor N. C. Phillips, chairman of the university’s American Studies programme, who had previously never been to the United States. (Professor Phillips went on to become Vice-Chancellor of Canterbury University.) Two more large para-

graphs have been deleted, before moving on to “psychological objective No. 2”: "To create a greater awareness of New Zealand’s participation in political, economic.

and security measures designed to resist Communistpenetration in South-east Asia. In this connection to encourage New Zealand’s full

support oi S.E.A.T.O. and A.N.Z.U.S.” The report claims that there had been “innumerable Communist-led ‘sit-ins.’ marches, strikes, ‘teach-ins,’

and many other manifestations of Communist pressure aimed at discouraging New Zealand from co-operating with her A.N.Z.U.S. and S.E.A.T.O. partners."

After another deletion, it says the U.S.I.S. had continued to provide support to “Review," the Returned Services Association’s monthly magazine. “Almost all of it has forced its way into print." the report adds. The material supplied attempted to show New Zealanders the might and capability of United States power in the' Pacific.

"Psychological objective No. 3” was to convince. New Zealand "target audiences” that A.N.Z.U.S. was a treaty with "both purpose and muscle.” and that New Zealand and the United States had "much-to gain and nothing to lose by membership in this exclusive treaty.” This is an extremely difficult objective to achieve, the report says, and will continue to be important as long as A.N.Z.U.S. remains in force.

“Visits of United States’ statesmen and top military figures are used as a device to make subtle references to A.N.Z.U.5.,” the report says. “In the year just past these opportunities were made possible through the visits of members of Congress and numerous generals and admirals attached ■ to C.I.N.C P.A.C.” In a section entitled “Adequacy ot agency support." the report praises the U.S.I.S. in Saigon for “the hardhitting photographic material they furnished Wellington during a critical period here which were used with telling effect.” It also commends U.S.I.S/ Saigon “for the facilitative assistance and indoctrinations of New Zealand journalists sent to Saigon under U.S.I.A. aegis.” It says: “The journalist program continues to pay dividends, and will far into the future."

Mr Holyoake is portrayed as an avid reader of material supplied to him by the U.S.I.S. A messenger from External Affairs collected its wireless file every day “whereupon it is faithfully rushed to the Prime Minister’s office for his immediate attention.” The author of the report, Public Affairs Officer Thomas T. Driver, adds: “I

am reliably informed that he reads it ’ thoroughly each day.” The only mention in the report of New Zealand resistance to the United States propaganda campaign refers to schools. ‘The school system of New Zealand, which is rapidly installing ‘American studies' at all educational levels from primary grades through university, places heavy demands on us for good classroom motion pictures on America devoid of propaganda and American flag waving." the report says. The U.S.I.S. found that sort of material “difficult, if not impossible, to supply." In a secret evaluation of the U.S.LS.'s work in New’ Zealand, the report says: “It has been a difficult year for U.5.1.5./Wellington with the Communist Front Committee on Vietnam strewing our path with propaganda boobytraps. However, despite the all-out New Zealand Communist Party effort to keep New Zealand" out of Vietnam, to intimidate the electorate. • to discredit the Prime Minister and the government, the final decisions gave no comfort to the Committee on Vietnam. "The significance of S.E.A.T.O. and A.N.Z.U.S. outweighed a thousandfold the best nam’ campaign that the Communists and anti-Gov-emment forces could muster.” American Government help for a mysterious “AntiCommunist Committee” is mentioned at the end of the secret evaluation. “U. 5.1.5. Wellington believes that its close support of the AntiCommunist Committee and various other similar groups with every form of material assistance’ available to us helped to tip the scales in the right direction.” it says, “m the greatest divisive issue that has disturbed New Zealand politics and philosophy in the past thirty years.” The Holyoake Government’s election to office is welcomed in the other document, a secret United States National Security Council report on “Long-range United States Policy Interests in

Australia and New Zealand," dated January 16. 1961. After noting American concern at Prime Minister W’alter Nash’s praise for Soviet leaders, their objectives and achievements” on his visit to Russia in April, 1960. the report sees in the National Party’s election ■ victory "promise of closer, more understanding relationships between the United States and New’ Zealand.”

The United States had also been concerned that Labour would implement its election policy of recognising Communist China, and although New Zealand was a full member of S.E.A.T.O. at the time, under former Prime Minister Nash it “did not always agree with United States views on the nature of the Communist subversive threat in the Treaty Area and especially questioned the

desirability of S.E.A.T.O. planning to counter such a threat.” New Zealand is described in the Security Council report as being economically vulnerable because of its high dependence on agricultural exports, and the prospects for selling New Zealand more United States products are limited by its policy of protecting manufacturing. But New Zealand is seen as having potential tor strengthening the tree world in the Pacific area. United States objectives include ensuring that Australia and New Zealand have sufficient political, military and economic capabilities to help strengthen free Asian states, and to be secure "fallback positions” from which free world security operations could be conducted in Western Pacific Indian ocean areas.”