Making Japan see sense on its defence

Press, 6 June 1981, Page 14

Making Japan see sense on its defence

From “The Economist.” London

There is a time and a place for wishful blindness in international relations. In the Japan of the 1960 s it was probably fair enough for an insecure Japanese government to indulge popular illusions about the mutual side of mutual security: in those days Japan's opposition parties were loudly hostile to the newly signed mutual security treaty with the United States. But a lot has happened since then. Japan has grown up. not only into the world's third largest industrial power but also into the world's besteducated and best-read society with the longest-ruling democratic party. A country mature in every way except'in its unwillingness to confront certain palpable, if unpalatable, facts. The row that has been shaking the Government in Tokyo these past few weeks will be a blessing in disguise if it shakes out a few Japanese illusions. Illusion number one is that Japan's relationship with the United States is not an alblance. (The insertion of this word into the communique last month about President Reagan's meeting with Japan s Prime Minister. Mr Suzuki, led to the resignation of Japan’s Foreign Mininster.) The everyday definition of alliance is a" formal pact between nations in a common cause. The commonality of the cause in which Japan and America are joined has become much more compelling

in the past few years, as a result of the expansion of Soviet armed strength in Japan's neighbourhood and elsewhere. Today the security pact is supported not only by the noncommunist opposition parties in Japan, but also by Japans adversary-turned-almost-ally in Peking. But to will the end is not yet. in Japan, to will the means. That would mean Japan taking over a larger share of its own defences and playing a bigger part in the democracies' foreign policy. The Japanese have moved some wav in this direction since the’ 19605. They raised defence spending by more than 7 per cent a year in real terms throughout the 1970 s and have recently started using aid money in pursuit of strategic as well as commercial objectives — in Turkey and Pakistan. for instance. But the defence budget is still tiny and the emergence into the world mouse-like. Many Japanese. including many powerful politicians, still cling to the belief that as an island Japan can restrict its involvement in the confusing outside world to trade and holidays. A related illusion, which Japanese cherish even more ardently, is that they can rest secure under Americas nuclear umbrella while keeping your actual nuclear weapons at a far remove from Japan. This issue was forced to the

surface in April, when an American submarine equipped to carry nuclear missiles rammed and sank a Japanese freighter. It dominated the news again last month after a former American Ambassador. Mr Edwin Reischauer. casually revealed that a 1960 verbal agreement allowed American nuclear-armed ships to call routinely at Japan's ports. Both the Americans and the Japanese have since been rushing to restore the clouds of equivocation around their nuclear dealings. They should be rushing instead to pump in some clear air. Japan's nuclear allergy, and its constitutional ban on "introducing" nuclear weapons into Japan, bear respecting. But so does the logic of nuclear defence. which requires a nuclear presence near the territory to be defended. For years. Japanese have been evading American requests for higher defence spending with the excuse that public opinion was unready — that the famed “Japanese consensus" had not been reached. The latest controversies suggest that this feeble argument is self-fulfilling. Even in a society that operates. through consensus, il is the responsibility of government to lead public opinion rather than hide behind it. Few Japanese leaders, and certainly not Mr Suzuki, have even attempted this. One consequence of the unseemly squabble in Tokyo is

that the Reagan Administration will have to lower its immediate expectations of Japanese burden-sharing. The postponement of Mr Alexander Haig's visit this month will allow' a cooling-off period. ■ If Japanese taxpayers are to

take on wider responsibilities in an interdependent world, it is only Japanese politicians who can persuade them to do it. But the Americans can ease their way by remembering to

treat Japan, not as a loyal samurai, but as a fully consulted partner. No more sudden surprises on China, gold or grain embargoes. Japan has to contribute its proper share to the defence of a free world it leels properly a part of.