Lawlessness ‘a new dilemma’ for Poland

Press, 30 May 1981, Page 20

Lawlessness ‘a new dilemma’ for Poland

The upsurge of lawlessness which has been reported in Poland this week could indicate a change in her present crisis. the Christchurch branch of the Institute for International Affairs has been told. Addressing a meeting of lhe branch was a visiting professor of history from the University of Bremen in West Germans’, Professor Immanuel Geiss. Professor Geiss is considered a leading authority on German involvement in World War I. and has just spent the winter term of 1980-81 at the University of Gdansk, in Poland. Outlining his observations of recent developments in Poland. Professor Geiss said that the atmosphere in Gdansk when he was there in January was “one of utmost discipline and calmness; there was no anarchy or chaos.’’ He therefore viewed with concern this week’s reports of -cases of hositilitv towards locally based Soviet troops as well as anti-Com-munist statements and leaflets.’’ Poles were very conscious of their history, he said. They had witnessed several violent outbursts against the Government in the past bv isolated groups of workers, and students. The Polish Solidarity

movement. which now claimed support of up to 90 per cent of the population, including members of the Communist Party, had learnt two valuable lessons from the. country's past experiences: political and organisational discipline was preferred to violence, and an effective coalition between intellectuals and workers was crucial. The workers and intellectuals had recently been joined in the coalition, by the peasants, and all three groups had the blessing of the Catholic Church, which acted as a mediator between them and the Government. Professor Geiss described . Poland as. essentially a, "Western” country. Culturally, it looked . more to France than the -Eastern bloc. Nine but of 10 Poles were Catholic and therefore non-Communist. The country was ruled by the Communist Party, but that was all. He said that 35 years of Marxist orientation had been counterproductive in Poland. Although anti-Russian resentment had become stronger within Poland, they had learnt to respect four key elements of Soviet policy: leadership by the Communist Party, nationalisation of key industries, continued membership of the Warsaw Pact, and censorship. While accepting these four

“essentials’’ of Soviet policy, Solidarity sought to introduce as much economic and political freedom as possible. Professor Geiss said that the Soviet Union was mistaken if it thought Solidarity was a reactionary force. “The movement is really a subtle compromise between the dreams of Polish society and Soviet control.’’ he said. Solidarity, reflecting a "rebirth’’ of Polish society, sought to introduce farreaching reforms in as many aspects of public life as possible. Above all, Poles wanted autonomy: the right to elect their own representatives in public life. For. the-first time, discussions were going on in fami-. lies, universities, and factories about the basic problems of Polaind. Gdansk, the headquarters of Solidarity, had become the “unofficial’’ capital of the country. The , new spirit of encouraging independent criticism and national values was also reaching the Communist Party. Professor' Geiss warned, however, that such support could have grave consequences for the Poles. "The more the Communist Party becomes acceptable to the Polish people, the less it becomes acceptable to the Soviets. This is the new dilemma facing Poland, and it raises the question of Soviet intervention.”

, Poles were ‘jreallv wor- - Tied” about Soviet iriterven--1 tion. Professor Geiss said that during his term in ; Gdansk, he had been often ■ asked if- he thought the Rus- - sians would move into Poland. 'His reply: “Judging bv historical precedent, the Soviets will come. . . if they are intelligent thev will not come.” Poland had a tradition of “resistance,”., and if Russia did intervene, there would be trouble, he said. .If Russia attempted indirect political intervention, there would probably be a : general strike, which, would lead to direct Soviet? military , intervention. ,’J. ’ Although the odds would be against them, part of the Polish Army would fight against direct Soviet , intervention. and when that resistance was crushed, Russia I would face protracted guer- • rilla-type. resistance, similar to what it was now experiencing in Afghanistan. "I hope the Soviets realise that they cannot wage two such wars at the same time,” Professor Geiss said. He was encouraged bv suggestions that Poland might become a "pilot project” for reform in the Eastern bloc. He hoped recent reports of an upsurge of violence would not destrov these new possibilities.