Keeping Britain at Europe’s top table

Press, 15 April 1981, Page 20

Keeping Britain at Europe’s top table

By

PETER JENKINS

in ‘The Guardian,” London

The European Economic Commmunity is once again in a woebegone state. Fish and steel are the chief causes of the latest despondency. At the Maastricht summit last month, while Poland smouldered, the leaders of the now 10-member Community quarrelled over fish and steel. No need to rehearse those arcane disputes again here: in the case of fish there is a dispute between Britain and France which cannot be resolved until after the French presidential election; as a result the Germans have been deprived of their Canadian fishing season and the fleet is laid up in Chancellor Schmidt’s home port of Hamburg. This is not a state of affairs which endears heads of government one to- another and the wonder is that they were fool enough to talk about it at all at the meeting of the European Council. More alarming from a British point of view is the resumption of allegations of bad faith. Chancellor Schmidt, addressing his Parliament last week, accused Britain of breaking a “gentleman’s agreement” which was his way of saying that Mrs Thatciier is no gentleman. The agreement was her commitment to settle a fishing policy by the end of last year which she gave as part of the May 30 truce in the bitter row over the British contribution to the E.E.C. budget. Similar accusations came from France as President Giscard d’Estaing entered the last lap of his election campaign. He said that 1981 would be the ’‘year of truth”’for the Community, by which he meant the year in which it became apparent whether Britain intended to play by the rules or not. This deterioration in AngloGerman and Anglo-French relations is not according to plan. With the budget row settled for the time being, the British

Government set out to give a more positive emphasis to its European policy. Mrs Thatcher behaved sweetly to President Giscard when she visited Paris in September and returned with hope of yet another rapprochement between the traditionally rival nations. In November, visiting Bonn, she reaffirmed Britain’s total commitment to the E.E.C. At the same time her Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, put forward constructive proposals for the Eighties (in a speech in Hamburg) while her Agricultural Minister, Mr Peter Walker, signalled that there would be no more fundamental attacks on the Common Agricultural Policy. The idea was to be nice for a change, in the hope of loosening up the Franco-German duopoly and with a view to building up some credit for the battle to restructure the E.E.C. budget which could not begin until after the French elections. It became more and more obvious to all concerned that the E.E.C. in its existing form is fundamentally unsuited to perform the functions now expected of it. What did for the original Six no longer worked when the British and others came in to make it Nine, and will work still less now that the Greeks have made it 10 and when the Spaniards and Portuguese will in due course complete the round dozen. The budget will have run out of money by next year if not by the end of this; it is becoming increasingly difficult to proceed on the basis of the unanimity rule; the agrarian enlargement into the Mediterranean at a time of industrial stagnation and decline only compounds these difficulties. When some of these matters were discussed at the annual Anglo-German Koningswinter conference earlier this month •there was a greater willingness

than ever before to accept the Labour Party's explanation of the reason for Britain's disaffection with the Community, although not the Labour Party’s conference decision to withdraw.

According to some of the Labour Party participants, who included Mr Peter Shore, Britain had been forced into an “unequal treaty” which had failed to take account of major and legitimate national interests. Moreover, the E.E.C. had failed to bring about a convergence of the member economies and failed signally to. respond to the challenge of the 0.P.E.C.-induced economic crisis which engulfed the industrialised world from 1973.

Some of the pro-Europeans present agreed, including some who had played a leading part in the entry negotiations: the “European bus” had seemed to be disappearing farther and farther down the road; the only hope had seemed to jump on •and negotiate the fare later; the overriding reasons were (and remain) political; but — it was conceded — no political advantage could be obtained from a Community which did not work economically, or which could only work unjustly, Reform of the Community, which nearly everyone now believes necessary but which nobody can be quite sure is possible, could take one of three directions. There could be a strenghtening of the Community’s institutions; an extension of their supranational competence; a restructuring of the budget so that some 75 per cent of it no longer has to be spent on agriculture; and a reform of the C.A.P. so that national governments take over more of its social policy functions. That is what the European unifiers would like to see, but it seems an ambitious programme in present conditions.

A second possibility is the “two-tier” Europe. There would

be town and country membership, or more likely Nordic and Mediterranean membership. The idea would be that some members could proceed, if they wished or were capable, to closer .integration, while others could continue as members of a much looser free-trading and political association. There would be the risk that Britain, for this purpose, might find herself reclassified as a Mediterranean country; certainly there would be no guaranteeing a place in the inner political counsels while failing to fit in with them economically.

A third possibility would be a looser arrangement all round. This is what many in the Labour Party, including the deputy leader. Mr Denis Healey, would like to see, and probably what the Prime Minister would like to see too. It would be recognised that a Community of 12 would need to be a much more flexible association: its supranational aspects would be reduced; and it would become more like the free trade area for which Britain has long hankered, with the emphasis on political co-, operation between nation states. In addition, there is the

possibility that under/a Labour Government, Britain might actually leave. The participants at Konigswinter were urged by all shades of Labour Pary opinion to take this seriously as a prospect. If Mr Tony Benn were in charge it would mean leaving. The Left's “alternative strategy” with its emphasis on general" import controls would rule out a working arrangement with the E.E.C.

If Mr Shore's policy prevailed. Britain would be in a kind of halfway house, more out than in or more in than out depending on what could be negotiated. Mr Shore is determined to “repatriate the British Constitution,” as he likes grandly to put it, and that means repealing at least Section 2 of the European Communities Act of 1972. This would restore the sovereignty of Parliament over the Commission and all other Community institutions. "The recent irritations over fish and other matters show how easily the reform of the budget, which in truth is a fundamental challenge to the whole community, could degenerate into another exasperating British “renegotiation.” Because the Community is in a

state of financial and institutional paralysis does not mean that Britain will be able to reconstruct it in her own image or to suit her own convenience;

Nostalgic delusion and folly had a good deal to do with the uncomfortable position Britain now finds itself in. In the seventies Britain negotiated and renegotiated from weakness; today Britain is weaker still. The weakness of that position is as relevant to the terms of exit as to the terms of remaining.

For two decades British foreign policy has tended to underestimate the strength of the Franco-German relationship. In spite of all the difficulties in the way of reform French and German leadership may yet hold the Community together and carry it forward. After his election, if he is reelected, the French President will have a year or so of manoeuvre. He may well make an initiative towards a two-tier Europe. Britain’s best policy remains to pursue her interests from within, seeking to assure herself a full role'in the inner circle of an enlarged Community.