Pacific Basin concept dies

Press, 25 March 1981, Page 20

Pacific Basin concept dies

By

BRUCE ROSCOE

■ in Tokyo Nobody in Tokyo these days is talking much about the Pacific Basin Co-opera-tion Concept ■— in the grand design for Pacific nations that the late Japanese Prime Minister. Mr Masayoshi Ohira. took to New Zealand and Australia in January last year. The Japanese scheme to form a community of Pacific nations which would work to cement closer economic and cultural links among initially New Zealand. Japan. Australia. the United States.' Canada. and the five A.S.E.A.N. nations, has become, at least for now, a cause without a leader. The logic behind such a grouping was dear: more than half of the trade of the Pacific market economies (even excluding Latin America) is among themselves. A Pacific community working in concert to expand trade, investment and tourism, and improve trans-Pacific communications, could only make, its members more •prosperous.

Why now? Some proponents argued that the “’Age of the Pacific” was in fact already upon us. Community or no community, the mainstream of world activities had moved from the Atlantic to the Pacific, just as Western civilisation earlier had deserted the Mediterranean for the Atlantic. A Pacificcivilisation. a trans-Pacific

culture, was being hatched and needed incubation. In a report issued in February; in Wellington by Mr Kiichi Saeki, a chairman of Japan's internationally renowned Nomura Research Institute, the concept is described as a “policy priority” held by Mr Ohira. It ’is apparent that Mr Ohira’s views and approaches toward the concept are not shared by his successor, Mr Zenko Suzuki.

In Diet (Parliament) policyspeeches, .the Japanese Prime Minister has not mentioned the concept at all. Policy priority has shifted from the philosophical to the immediate: the need to build a working relationship with Mr Reagan's Administration, and lessen trade friction with the United States and Europe. Foreign Ministry spokesmen appear to be uninformed of Mr Suzuki's intentions for the concept and, even after briefings, their comments are scant. “We are not sure about this idea; at any rate it is progressing very slowly.” said one diplomat at a recent press meeting. He spoke as though embarrassed that interest should be expressed in a former Japanese Prime Minister's policy. As Mr Saeki says in his report, “It is not clear what role Japan should play or what it can do to promote this concept . . . The concept must be clearly related to

Japans comprehensive national strategy, but Japan does not have such a strategy.”

Not a whisper was heard from Mr Suzuki on advancing the concept during his January visit to the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. Rather than use the visit as an opportunity to expound the scheme, Mr Suzuki dealt with economic aid to A.S.E.A.N.. a settlement of the Indo-China problem, improving bilateral ties, and Japan’s deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union.

Neither is any momentum expected to develop as a result of Mr Muldoon's visit to Japan next month. New Zealand's Ambassador to Japan, Mr Roderick Miller, says: "It is fair to assume that New Zealand will not have any new approaches to offer. The subject may be canvassed in terms of a review of discussions held to date, but no political steps forward are anticipated. There is recognition in Tokyo of the need to proceed fairly cautiously on this topic.” This cautiousness is seen to stem largely from opposition to the concept from smaller Pacific nations and also from some A.S.E.A.N. members, a stand which perhaps evidences not so much the concept's immaturity as. it does the political unreadiness of its opponents. Based on fears that the initiative resembled a possi-

ble revival of the thinking behind Japan's dreaded Greater East Asia Co-pros-perity Sphere of pre-World War ll,the reservations, although no doubt genuine, are probably misconceived.

The economic reality of Pacific trading, and principle central to the concept, is interdependence: nations trade with Japan to its benefit and to their own. Japan depends heavily on imported food, energy, and raw materials. Effective trade is as necessary for Japan's survival as it is for other Pacific traders. Lack of economic co-operation inhibits trade's effectiveness.

Yet this opposition appears to have thwarted Japan’s enthusiasm to act as international broker. It is a Catch 22: Criticism is levelled at Japan for not assisting its allies with political roles comparable with its economic strength, yet when it does — and campaigning for a Pacific community is a recent example — the initiative is construed by some as economic hegemony. Hence the question: How can Japan obtain a consensus for the scheme among the would-be member nations without being seen as the leader?

The United states, in spite of the earlier enthusiasm of some of its Congressmen, is now less keen. The United States Ambassador to Japan, Mr Mike Mansfield,says that it would be “too hasty to

move for a Pacific community organisation on the government level.” Instead he emphasises that “private organisations are the best venues for continued discussion of the community.” Non-gov-ernmental activity would be less likely to arouse fears of diminished sovereignty which several nations have voiced.

But if neither Japan nor the United States opts to be the prime mover in establishing the community, who will? Without at least a degree of political leadership, there can be no progress. Private-level or academic discussions producing plans for action are not action.