Iran having second thoughts about’ revolution

Press, 18 March 1981, Page 21

Iran having second thoughts about’ revolution

By

IAN MATHER,

“Observer,” in Teheran

The deserted American embassy compound at Teheran was supposed to have become a hostel for the victims of the revolution and the war. That it has not is one sign among many of a growing pragmatism among •Iran’s rulers — a pragma-, tism that was obscured while the spotlight was on . the American hostages and the , British Anglican prisoners. ! Iran has not yet gone so far as to recognise the Vienna Agreement governing diplomatic property, under which the United States embassy should come under the protection of Switzerland, the country representing American interests. However, Ayatollah Khomeiny has reversed his previous instructions about the embassy. He has told the Martyrs Organisation, which cares for the victims, that they must not move in. Khomeiny preaches as fervently as ever the original message that the revolution is for the benefit of the poor and the dispossessed. This is not a mere demagogy. No 'impartial witness can fail to record the real efforts being made to help the poor. The Construction • Crusaders, youthful volunteers, who are the Islamic equivalent of the United States Peace Corps although they would abhor; the comparison, are hard at . work building rpads to isolated villages in poor areas, village schools, and mosques. An unsolicited visit to a Martyrs Organisation office in central Teheran revealed lines of families of victims being given financial and other .assistance by kindly officials seated at trestle' tables. .

. ; The revolution has been - i able to tap much genuine - ; altruism, Yat-tbara has been

a perceptible change of mood. Purges of “unIslamic” officials in Government departments have virtually come to a standstill, and it has been announced that those who think they have been unfairly dismissed can appeal. New judicial rules have been drawn up, which have virtually ended the reign of terror under which summary executions were carried out at the whim of local Islamic judges. All capital sentences now have, to be referred to the Supreme Court in Teheran for review, and the qualifications of all judges are being investigated by a Supreme Court committee. Executions, however, for so-called moral offences — drug-trafficking, brothelkeeping, and sodomy — continue, although at a reduced level. Practical experience of administration has brought a growing awareness of what is possible and what is not, even to the most obscurantist of Mullahs. As a result uncertainty has replaced firmness of purpose. The regime is having second thoughts, for instance, about the redistribution of land to peasant farmers, in accordance with the revolutionary slogan, “land to the tiller.” There is no problem about parcelling out unused land, but Khomeiny has halted the - redistribution of large estates because of the present “critical situation” in Iran.

The revolution, like other classic revolutions, ' was brought about by a coalition of forces which on achieving victory began to fragment, discovering they had no unity of purpose other than the downfall of the Shah. The resultant power struggle is of keen interest to

the West, as well as to the people of Iran, because it will determine the political alignment of a strategically important nation. It is not simply, a struggle between the clergy and the “moderates” who follow President Bani-Sadr. The clergy-dominated Islamic Republic Party, which controls most of the institutions of State, is not even supported by the majority of the clergy. Among the clergy there are wide divergencies of opinion. Numerically the biggest group, though not the most active, are the “quietists.” They believe the role of the clergy should be primarily pastoral not political, and there are thousands of them "in the villages. Their spiritual leader is Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who has a second

power base as leader of the Azarbayjanis, Iran’s most numerous ethnic minority with strong links to the economically powerful bazaar. Shariatmadari is under rather genteel house arrest in Qom, and prefers to stay silent rather than risk provoking civil disorder. It is by no means certain he will do so indefinitely. There is even a small group of clergy which supports President Bani-Sadr and the so-called “progressives.” This group has recently been singled out for vilification and physical attack by “stick wielders,” groups of thugs owing allegiance to the I.R.P. but per-

haps not sponsored by it.. The leading figures are Hojjatoleslam . Lahouti, whose meetings have been broken up, Hojjatoleslam Golzadeh Ghaffouri, who lived in Canada . before the revolution and even spoke in . the Majlis to explain the separation of the judiciary ; and the executive in the .. United States during the hos- * tage crisis, and Ayatollah Eshraghi, Khomeiny’s ; brother-in-law who acts a gobetween for Khomeiny and Bani-Sadr. V Most of the progressive ; clergy were tortured during the Shah’s regime and have subsequently been handir capped by ill health. Their

spiritual leader, Ayatollah Taleghani, one of the most severely tortured, died last September. The originator of many of the revolution’s more liberal ideas, he was universally popular, winning two million votes as a deputy for Teheran, twice as many as the next contender. Much of the in-fighting between the I.R.P. and the Bani-Sadr supporters takes place in secret -- and it can be dirty. The LR.P.’s refusal to ■sanction a major arms deal recently on the grounds that it would help Iran win the war and so bring glory to Bani-Sadr as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is a recent example of Machiavellian thinking. Yet a surprising amount of the argument goes on openly and healthily. The streets of

Teheran resemble Hyde Park Corner. There are arguments on street corners; leaflets are handed out; walls are daubed with slogans. There is no fear of talking politics as there was during the Shah’s administration. A political pluralism now exists, albeit an imperfect one. While Bani-Sadr does not have his own party, the Iranian Liberation Movement, headed by a former Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, and a former Foreign Minister, Dr Ebrahim Yazdi, is an embryo opposition to the 1.R.P., supporting Bani-Sadr. In the Majlis, Bazargan’s party can muster about 40 M.P.s compared with the LR.P.’s 140, consisting of 70 committed members and 70 sympathisers. The Majlis have approved a Bill permitting political parties to function provided they were not “anti-lslamic.” Those permitted will probably include the Tudeh (Communist) Party, which has formed an alliance of convenience with the LR.P. Other left-wing parties, particularly the secular Marxist Fayadar-e-Khalq, are outlawed and function only in a clandestine manner. Opinions differ as to their strength, and ultimate prospects, although it seems that they have good organisations. The stalemate also derives from Khomeiny’s increasing unwillingness to use his moral authority to give clear verdicts on dispute issues as his role as leader implies he should. While Ayatollah"Khomeiny appears in reasonable health and his “sermons” delivered from the roof of his small house in North Teheran are lucid and carefully argued, his death could unleash a dangerous* period *

The formal provisions for choosing his successor, a new moral leader (Velayat-e-Faghihi), are imprecisely worded in the constitution. Already the battle lines for the succession are being drawn. Ayatollah Mohammad Montazeri, a former pupil of Khomeiny and out of the stable at Qom, is being heavily promoted by the fundamentalists of the Islamic Republic Party as their .choice. Montazeri, leader of. the Friday prayers at Qom, has long been a familiar figure on Iranian TV, preaching to the-multitudes, one hand resting on a rifle.: Some doubt, however, whether he has the intellectual vigour and the dominant personality necessary to succeed Khomeiny. These qualities are possessed in abundance by Ayatollah Seyyed Beheshti, who combines the roles of Chief Justice and I.R.P. secretary, making him one of the most powerful men in Iran. Unlike Montazeri, Beheshti has a cosmopolitan background, having led the biggest Shi-ite community in Western Europe, in Hamburg. The Bani-Sadr group will fiercely resist any I.R.P. candidate, hoping to produce a deadlock and a three or fiveman council. However, unless Khomeiny dies gracefully and is able like President Tito to hand over the succession, Iran could be plunged into chaos. This could provide opportunities for the reorganised army to step in and restore law and order. Groups in exile would also seek to take advantage of the situation. Yet it is hard to find much support for the former, and ‘the latter severely damaged their cause by publicly supsporting Iraq in the jwar >4y