Europe’s disenchantment — what alternative?

Press, 9 February 1981, Page 13

Europe’s disenchantment — what alternative?

By.

ROBIN SMYTH

At'.the turn of the year a cold wind of despon- . dency ‘ was blowing through France. West Ger,, many and Spain —.<* m ood diagnosed by “Le Monde" .as . “constraint, rancour, , and. moroseness," and summed up ■: by the • conservative . “Le -Figaro” as “la France s’en fiche,” — “France could riot tare less.” ■ ■

If the source qf. Western Europe’s disenchantment was distilled into a' single sentence it might come out as "the alternative is unthinkable.” At a time when Europeans are being teld that they have no choice but to face economic facts and tighten their belts, they are being faced with, political contests in which choice is

also severely- . circumscribed. .. Because Franz' Josef ■ Strauss- is ..clearly, impossible,’ it has to be Helmut Schmidt in ’ Germany agajn; Because the French Socialists, tinder the eter-nal-runner-up Francois Mitterrand,; will not, be able to govern' alone and the Communists hate them too much to govern with them, there is nothing for it but seven years of Giscard. . .. . .... . ■

The result of these impossible choices is that a section of the public is now beginning to break away from its usual allegiances. It slumps into aoathy, or looks for adiversion, a new face, any chance to avenge itself en the all-too-indispensable man in power.

Even the most secure political . prospects are now called into doubt. Chancellor • Schmidt has seen the . laurels of ; his election' victory wither-in a' matter of. weeks under the blast of quarrels, inside his coalition and his own party. Public opinion .' and the press'seem'intent on pouncing on" Schmidt’s; every error, and observers in Bonn wonder whether the alliance of the Chancellor’s Socialist Democrats and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s Free Democrats will comeapart long before its fouryear term is over. Only a few weeks.ago President Giscard iobked certain to win a’ second seven-year term in the Presidential election in the spring. Now the Bokassa diamonds-scandal and the

charges that .Mr-Giscard •rules France <■ like , a monarch have, taken their toll. Within a month his. safe I*. per cent lead over Mitterrand in the opinion polls, has beenLwhittled down te a mere 4. per cent. ■ ,•■-■■■ / Mr Giscard, has to fight for his re-election with no break in the economic bad weather in sight. Unemployment has reached 1.600.000 and is Climbing steadily. ■ Inflation stands at 14 per. cent and the commercial balance continues ,’to deteriorate. In Mr Raymond Barre, Mr Giscard has a Prime Minister who does not believe in relaxing necessary austerity • for electoral advantage. In spite of signs of disagreement, it appears that the President, has decided it would be top damaging to drop Mr Barre before the-election. Even so, when Mr Giscard- wades into battle in February .he is still expected to .he able to secure ■ a narrow second round .victory. Once he. ik. in re-installed,. -■ the Schmidt-Giscard partnership will become more important than ever before. The two leaders will face the task of hacking out an independent living space for Europe between a more demanding United States and a more pugnacious Soviet Union. As Europe’s agricultural policy goes bankrupt they will want to avoid a collision between their very different views about how Europe should be extended and reshaped.

In their attitude to the Reagan Administration,

Germany and France are driven by different reasoning towards an attitude of qualified agreement, of cordial stand-offishness. ' In France, independence from the United States is traditional Gaullist policy — a policy which Mr Giscard could not renounce, even if he wanted, to, without great political risk. Bonn will continue to be torn in contrary directions — towards Washington by the United States nuclear umbrella and towards the East by the need to keep communications open to beleaguered Berlin and the fear of millions of Germans of seeing the barriers finally go up between them and their relations in East Germany. Mr Schmidt will never want to put as much distance between himself and the White House as Mr Giscard does. But though both are giving the Reagan Administration a hopeful welcome, they are drawn together by fear of the damage a heavier American hand might do to the delicate balances in the Arab world and EastWest detente. Soon the great Siberian gas pipeline will move across the Continent to form a vital energy link between the Soviet Union and France and Germany. Will threats of European economi c sanctions against Moscow then have any credibility? And is that something Reagan will accept as one of the inescapable facts of life in an energy crisis? Copyright — London Observer • s Service.