Can the West hold the Khyber Pass?

Press, 26 September 1980, Page 12

Can the West hold the Khyber Pass?

By the British member of Parliament, JULIAN AMERY, writing in the “Daily Telegraph,” London.

Western opinion has fastened on the worldwide indignation aroused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and on the mauling of the Soviet army by the heroic freedom fighters. .We tend to think that Moscow has blundered. But, seen from the Khyber Pass, the invasion is already paying Moscow. handsome diplomatic and military dividends. Not least in India.

At the recent Commonwealth Conference in Delhi, Mrs Gandhi was forced , to condemn the Soviet action, but she did so with unconcealed reluctance. India, indeed, has become almost an undeclared ally of the Soviet Union.

A more fundamental indicator is - the $1.6 billion arms deal concluded between Delhi 'and Moscow at what Pakistani Intelligence claims are heavily discounted prices. Nor is this pro-Soviet trend in Indian policy surprising. The Soviet army in Afghanistan is now only 300 miles from the Indian border. If • India proved un-co-operative, the Soviets, would be well placed to exploit its almost insoluble social, economic and minority problems. But, if Delhi will work with Moscow, the Kremlin can offer security against China and support against Pakistan. ■ Two thirds of the Indian army is stationed on the

Pakistan border. The new Indo-Soviet arms deal provides for tanks and other weapon systems scarcely suited to a confrontation with China in the Himalayas. Not unnaturally, ‘ the Pakistani leaders ask: What are these weapons for? Against whom are they directed?

The Pakistan army is much smaller than the Indian and its equipment largely obsolete. But until recently it had only the Indian' front to defend. Now it Fas to face a Soviet front as well. It is widely believed in Islamabad that many leading Indians aim to bring the whole sub-continent under - Delhi’s control: and internal difficulties feed this ambition. Mrs Gandhi could scarcely hope to annex the Punjab and Sind, with their

predominantly Moslem populations, but she might try to turn them into separate satellite States under Indian control. This would leave the Baluchi and Pathan provinces of Pakistan to fall, into the Soviet sphere. The Soviets, for their part, are well placed to promote an independent Baluchi State drawn from the Baluchi provinces of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. This would give them access to the Gulf and control of the eastern shore of the Straits of Hormuz. Seen from Islamabad, the

second and final partition of Pakistan seems a distinct possibility. . The occupation of Afghanistan has also greatly increased .the Soviet leverage over Iran. No .one in Pakistan believes that the present Iranian regime can outlast Khomeini’s. personal authority, if, indeed,, it can last that long.’ With separatist movements gaining ground in Kurdistan, oilbearing Khuzistan, and other minority provinces, the break up of what was the Iranian Empire is already far advanced. This could lead to a race between the East and the West for the succession.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has already sent shock waves through Pakistan itself.

President Zia commands the obedience more perhaps than the affection of his countrymen, though the man himself is very- different from his public image. Gentle in manner and restrained in talk, he is anything but the military bully his detractors make him out to be. A sincere Moslem himself, his stress on Islamic values is probably popular ' with the masses and helps' , to , win financial support from the more fundamentalist Arab States. Nevertheless, the martial law regime is resented by many. . Mr Bhutto’s,'party is still strong. His sons, I -was told, have recently; visited Kabul, Moscow and Damascus. Bhutto supporters have also strongly denounced any suggestion of Pakistani help for the Afghan Freedom. Fighters.

Given the new ascendency of Moscow in South-West Asia and spurred on by personal vendetta. Pakistani opinion could divide into pro and anti-Soviet factions. In the circumstances President Zia is unlikely to ■ risk early elections. He will, no doubt, be criticised for this. But considering Pakistan’s isolation in face of the Soviet army to the north.- a covetous India, as he sees it, to the east, and a disintegrating Iran to the west, he has little choice.,

Even now, opinion in the West has Scarcely begun to hoist in the immeasurable change in. the balance ;>of power brought about , by the revolution in Iran, the Soviet take-over of Aden and Ethiopia and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan;' The Gulf and its oil are all but encircled. The situation could still be ■ saved by the build-up of a Western military presence in ■ the area strong enough to confront any Soviet advance. But it must be done quickly. The Americans, indeed, are actively developing: the base at Diego Garcia. But Diego Garcia . is 2000 miles from the Straits of . Hormuz. American negotiations with , Kenya, Oman; Somalia and . now Egypt formilitary* facilities are well advanced./ But Congressional approval' of the necessary approp'ria-. tions can .scarel'y, be completed before the end pf ’the year. ' ‘ . Yet, if the Americans are moving slowly. Europe and Japan have scarcely moved

at all. We. should, all of us f have embarked oh a crash rearmament programme far beyond anything so far contemplated for the defence of South-West Asia and the Gulf. But a rearmament programme takes time. Meanwhile there are some things that should be done and could be done quickly. Pakistan is now the only friendly power in the area with substantial armed forces. No amount of military aid can make these a match for the Soviet army, but small armies can give a good account of themselves as Finland and Greece showed in World War 11. A strengthened Pakistan would be less vulnerable to Soviet subversion and might hold up a Soviet advance long enough for the West to come to the rescue.

The Pakistan Government would welcome Western military aid and would almost certainly co-operate in a joint defence of SouthWest Asia, but it would first need to be convinced that the Western effort would be swift enough and big enough to deter Soviet aggression, not to provoke it. Compared to the Soviet offer of $1.6 billion of military aid to India, the American offer of $2OO million to Pakistan seems derisory — “lollipops, not serious” was how one very senior Pakistani official described it to me.

It is, indeed, hardly surprising that there is a growing body of opinion, not just in Pakistan but throughout the Gulf that the West

either intends or may be forced to accept a division of South-West Asia into Soviet and Western spheres of influence. Exactly where the dividing line would run is a matter of speculation, but for Pakistan. Iran and Iraq — the northern tier — the perspective could be grim. A substantial and urgent rearmament of Pakistan should have a high priority in Western plans. No less important is to take active steps, now, .to head off a Soviet take-over of Iran, once our main bastion in South-West Asia. Most urgent of all. we should join with friendly Islamic countries in providing humanitarian and military support for the Afghan Resistance. Their most immediate needs are for anti-aircraft and antitank weapons: and only the. industrialised countries can supply these. It is about time we paid the Soviet Union back in its own coin. •

The main task is to build up a powerful Western presence to plug the gap between N.A.T.O. and the Pacific. All the countries concerned should make their contribution, military and financial. Meanwhile our immediate aims should be: to help the Afghans make the Soviet invader increasingly insecure; to encourage our friends in Iran; and to make Pakistan as hard a nut to crack as possible. In the past Britain has been tire architect of alliances against Powers that have sought hegemony. Now is the time to resume this traditional role.