Misconception on flight route, says witness

Press, 17 July 1980, Page 3

Misconception on flight route, says witness

PA’ Auckland The crew of Air New Zealand flight TE9OI were “under a misconception”, as to where their* route was taking them, the . inquiry into the Mount ..Erebus ..crash was told<yesterda.y. z . , ■ ■ Cross-examination of the Chief Inspeptqr of Air Accidents (Mr R. Chi] jindale) by Mr P. J. Davison, counsel for the estate < " the DCIO pilot, Captain Collins, and the Airline Pilots’ Association took up tlie whole day. Mr Chippindale also defended his conclusion that the probable cause of the crash, was Captain Collins’s decision to fly at low level towards poor conditions. Mr Davison suggested that the probable cruse of the accident given by Mr Chippindale “just did not hold up.” For a decision f' be made to continue flying into an area .of poor visibility the crew would have to be aware of the existence of such an area, the counsel said. >. Mr Davison said the only time - - the cockpit voice recorder gave an indication that the captain was aware of the poor conditions was just 44 seconds before' the captain made the decision to climb. But Mr Chippindale said he believed the probable cause he proposed was a reasonable one. He said Captain Collins had evidently been unable to see anything When he descended from 2000 ft to 1500 ft, because right.ahead '..as a mountain of over 12,000 ft. There was also an ice cliff 300 ft high in front of the plane yet Captain Collins perceived nothing. Mr Chippindale said that to him this indicated the area was one of poor definition. Mr Davison said that during an audio-visual session about the trip, aircrew were shown a slide of a mountain accompanied by words which included the phrase “Mount Erebus, almost 13,000 feet ahead.” In answer to " question, Mr Chippindale said the ground'shown in the slide was Cape Adare. Mr Chippindale, agreed that the slide could have a misleading affect on the viewer.

I Mr Chippindale agreed . that the longitude co-ordi-nate given at a briefing, the ■ passenger information map, i and the misleading slide ( could have given the impres- . sion that the flight would be over the sea o a point west > of McMurdo base. Asked by Mr Davison ( whether the crew should [ have had a map in front of ) them and plotted their posi- [ tion on this, Mr . Chippindale . replied that they should have used all the available j information, and that a map t was one way of keeping » track .of their position. , The weather radar on the 1 DCIO would have depicted the mountainous terrain t ahead, said Mr Chippindale. , If the crew had used the . weather radar in preference to their own eyes and as a . result there had been an aci cident, the crew would still , have been criticised, said Mr j Davison. “They can’t win f can they?” he said. 1 Mr Chippindale said, ‘‘l believe they can,” . • - ■ j All he was saying was } that there was another aid j available to the crew.'. The > cockpit voice recorder indic- , ated the crew-were descend--3 ing from 2000 ft to 1500 ft bej cause using their eyes was inadequate. ■ j Mr Davison said Mr Chip2 pindale was suggesting the j crew should have been look- . ing for visual cues, monitorj ing the weather radar, using , radio equipment, and plottj ing their position on a map B all at the same time. 1 “Aren’t you just being wise after the event?” he f asked. » Mr Chippindale said it 5 was not unreasonable, and . actually quite common, for 5 one meiuber of the crew to g monitor the instruments and ~ cockpit devices while the _ other looked for visual cues j outside the plane. o Mr Chippindale said he 1 understood the flight crews s were not formally trained in 2 using the weather radar, but t many crew-members had assimilated some experience of the device. e , Asked why the transcript e of the voice recorder in the - final accident report omitted e some items included in the g orignal draft, Mr Chippindale said he had tried to edit

the transcript to include only items relevant to the crash.

In doing this he said he had borne in mind the sensitivity of the Airline Pilots’ Association about disclosing the contents of such recordings, and their co-operation in using the device. His accident report was a summary not a complete record of the investigation into the crash.

To a question by Mr Davision, Mr Chippindale said his inquiries revealed that at a briefing n the route of the flight, Captain Collins had had ah atlas with him. Mr Davison said that using the longitude given for the flight destination at the briefing, it would have been a simple matter for anyone with one of the maps in the New Zealand atlas to find out where that longitude actually was, with some degree of accuracy. At the point thus indicated on the map, there was a significant margin of clearance to the west of that point. Mr Chippindale agreed. _■ v He also agreed that it was possible Captain Collins could have made a quick plot of the terminal position of the flight plan during the briefing, but no-one ' who was at the briefing, whom he had spoken to had seen Captain Collins do this. However, Mr Chippindale agreed that to someone of Captain Collins’s experience, even a glance at the map would provide a mental plot of the final position given in the flight plan. In answer to another question by Mr Davison about Captain Collins’s ability to make a quick visual plot of where the flight plan would take him, Mr Chippindale said that while Captain Collins may well have appreciated his destination, that gave to him no indication of the approach to that destination.

Mr Chippindale agreed that on one of the atlas maps an approach line to the destination could be drawn.

Mr Davison said further evidence would be produced to confirm that Captain Collins had such an atlas.