Doubts about nuclear war abilities

Press, 12 July 1980, Page 14

Doubts about nuclear war abilities

By

IAN MATHER

defence correspondent

for the “Observer”

Serious doubts about whether the super-Powers could fight a nuclear war are voiced in the latest issue of ‘'Strategic Survey,” published annually by the London-based International Institute for' Strategic Studies. The institute says that strategic thinking is moving away from the doctrine of massive retaliation towards the idea of a limited nuclear war using the smaller more accurate nuclear weapons now being produced.

But such a doctrine depends entirely on the ability of national commanders to know what is happening, and to give orders accordingly.

The institute concludes: “It is unlikely that political and military leaders would receive sufficient, information to enable them to exercise

full control over events once a nuclear exchange had escalated beyond 50 to 100 nuclear detonations.” The weak link comes in what is known as C 3 — "command, control and communications.” These are very large, complex and diverse systems designed to enable the super-Powers’ strategic forces of nucleararmed missiles, submarines and aircraft to be ordered what to do.

Despite great technological advances on both sides in cables, land lines, communications satellites and radios, the survivability of C 3 is questionable, the institute says.

It also claims that the National Military Command Centre in the Pentagon is not specifically protected against nuclear attack. An Alternative National Military Com-

mand Centre near Fort Ritchie, Maryland, which could immediately assume control of United States forces, is underground but might not survive a direct hit.

As a last resort the United States ensures that some of a group of speciallyequipped Boeing 747 s are permanently in the air. forming what is known - as the National Emergency Airborne Command Post, and this is regarded as having a good chance of surviving. But there are question marks over the airborne commander’s means of communication. Though there are no less than 43 different communications systems provided. many of these would not survive the first nuclear onslaught. The others are regarded as highly vulnerable. No less than 70 per cent of United States military communications now involve the use of satellites, and the Soviet Union is developing “hunter-

killer” satellites, which can attack enemy satellites and destroy them.

Secondly, electronic and electrical components are vulnerable to nuclear effects, even when not attacked directly. For example, a onemegaton burst at an altitude of 200 miles in daylight hours would disrupt high frequency radio up to a distance of 1500 miles. Thirdly. electromagnetic pulses (F.M.P.s). short, intense, electrical bursts generated near nuclear detonations. can disrupt electronic systems thousands of miles a wav.

Thus radio, the only means of communicating with submarines and aircraft, could prove unusable. Like the United States, the Soviet Union has a very extensive network of C 3 systems for its strategic forces.

However, since the 1950 s the Soviet Union has paid much greater attention than the United States to the pro-

tection of the national command authorities in the event of a nuclear war.

Shelters have been built for about-110.000 members of the leadership, including party and government officials from national down to citv level. There are 75 underground command posts within . the Moscow ring road system for senior government members and military top brass.

The Russians also operate specially-configured aircraft,' some of which are always in the air. to act as emergency command posts. But they are thought to be inferior to those of the Americans. "Air Force Magazine.” a well-informed United States journal, estimates in its latest edition that "the Soviets appear to be significantly ahead of the United States forces in deployed command control and communications capabilities.” Soviet C 3. while technologically less sophisticated

than that of the United States, tends to be rugged and “survivable.” the magazine says.

The Russians are also helped by their obsession with secrecv and because their radio and radar silence is much more rigidly enforced.

But. the Soviet “top-down” concept, according to which control is centralised and directed from Moscow, is considered a major weakness. It . would be likely to produce rigidity and lack o' initiative by individual commanders. One cut in the chain of command would produce paralysis. In the light of these doubts about the C 3 capabilities of both super-Powers the doctrines of gradually escalating nuclear exchanges directed against specific targets are virtually invalid, the institute says. —Copyright. London Observer Service.