Are U.S. policies consistent?

Press, 10 May 1980, Page 14

Are U.S. policies consistent?

By

STUART McMILLAN

The Soviet Union and Iran are the objects of much American attention and. anger at the moment. Yet there-' is a fundamental contradiction in American foreign policy in the way that these two countries are being treated. In the case of the Soviet Union the policy makes sense. The United States is angry because .of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It may be said that the policy has three main aims. The first is to stop the Soviet Union from doing the same thing again. The second is to keep the-Soviet Union away from the Gulf and posing a threat to the flow of oil. The third is to get the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. The three aims are sound. They are consistent with long-term American foreign policy of wanting'to contain the Soviet Union. It is possible to quarrel with the tactics used to achieve the aims — the boycott of the Olympic Games and the reduction of trade with the Soviet Union. From New Zealand’s point of view the trade boycott could have disastrous results. But it is hard to fault the aims. It is even possible to take the view that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had many more elements of a defensive action than of an

aggressive one (which is my own view) and still consider that it is-in the interests'.of a great many countries in the world to see that the SoViet Union does not do it again, does not get control the Gulf, and if possible takes its troops out of Afghanistan. . It might have been expected that the same over-all aims would have governed American policy towards Iran: Yet American attention appears to have wandered from the point of the Soviet Union. In its heart-breaking ' task of trying to get the American Embassy hostages released, the United States is running ’the risk of jeopardising policies it has long held dear. The trade boycott . of Iran is meant to punish Tran and help to cripple its economy. It is difficult to believe that if there is any effect-it will be other than to increase the turmoil in Iran. • The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan occurred when there' was turmoil there largely caused by Islamic people. While there are differences between Iran and Afghanistan, prodding the bear to the north again in near enough the same opiate does not sound like a safe game. Even if the Soviet Union

did not try to take the whole of Iran it might attempt to seize part of the north, as it tried to once before. Either way it w.ould -be disastrous for the people of Iran and have untold consequences for. the rest of the world. If Iran came . under Soviet domination, the whole north shore of the Gulf might be considered hostile:to the interests / of the. .Western worlds ji ■ ' : • / But even if the-.bea.r-stayed on his side- of the border, the

effect’ of continued turmoil in Iran could have another outcome. The strength of the communists in Iran is difficult to judge,' At the moment, while the ■lslamic revolution is in progress, the ground is not receptive to communism. Yet the communists, have an ability to organise and Iran might get to a point at which organisation would seem- to have the answer to everything. Many people might decide that -they had given an Islamic republic a

go and why not try communism? Although the varieties of communism which exist are so diverse that it becomes difficult to generalise about them, countries that are communist and share a border with the Soviet Union have particular difficulties. Iran would be in that position. The possible outcome of a trade boycott.w.ould become progressively more likely if stronger measuers were taken — as have been threatened. If the boycott were enforced by a blockade, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe generally, would no doubt tryto supply Iran with food while the blockade lasted. They would thereby earn Iranian gratitude and their record is not such to give them the benefit of the doubt about taking advantage of tlie situation - if the opportunity offered. A blockade would involve the use of force in the Gulf. The Soviet Union, .out of pride if nothing else, would put on its own show of force there (unless it thought it was getting on splendidly by supplying Iran overland in any case). The result of active displays .of force in the Gulf is incalculable, though a reduction, even a cut-off, of the world’s oil simply from the Gulf would be likely. But even if the super-

Powers did not come to blows or the world lost its supply of oil from the region, the effect could still defeat the purposes of the United States and the rest of the Western world. Any marked use of force either in a blockade or in attacks — losing helicopters at night on desert airfields may not count — is bound to turn the anger of other Gulf States against the United States. When the Islamic conference was held in Januarv, it condemned Soviet agression in- Afghanistan. That reaction appeared to astound the Soviet Union and might be the greatest restraining force on the Soviet Union should it consider doing the same thing again elsewhere. The United States cannot afford to throw all that away. It would if it used force. Until the American hostage crisis is resolved, American foreign policy may remain disoriented or even downright dangerous. How far Mr Cyrus Vance was sacrificed to the interest of those in the White House ■who want to see President Carter elected, and how much Mr Edmund Muskie, as the new Secretary of State, will be able to decide where tjie true interests of the United States lie, must remain, for the moment, questions. Much depends on ths answers.