THE PRESS FRIDAY, APRIL 18, 1980. Iran and Iraq

Press, 18 April 1980, Page 12

THE PRESS FRIDAY, APRIL 18, 1980. Iran and Iraq

Reconciliation between Iran and Iraq looks less likely with each day that passes. Ayatollah Khomeiny, the Iranian religious leader, has made the overthrow of President Saddam Hussein’s Government in Iraq a condition of reconciliation; more moderately, but nevertheless provocatively, President Hussein has described the Ayatollah as a “turbaned Shah.” Border clashes are frequent and an all-out war cannot be ruled out. The clashes have spilled into Lebanon where Syrian forces have intervened between supporters of Ayatollah Khomeiny and President Hussein. Should open warfare break out it seems doubtful whether it could be confined to border areas and it might involve other countries of the region. Soviet military exercises, north of Iran, are a constant reminder of the dangerous possibilities:

The points at issue between the countries have three underlying causes. An old rivalry exists between Arabs and Persians. Iranians have been reported as being deported from Iraq. When the Shah was in power, the increased strength of the Iranian forces was regarded with some dislike by the Arabs, particularly the Iraqis who share a long border with Iran. Before the issue was settled in 1975, the Iranians supported the Kurdish rebels in Iraq.

Interwoven with the Arab-Persian rivalry is a difference between Islamic sects. The Iranians are mostly Shi’ites; the Iraqis are divided between allegiance to the Shi’ite sect and to the Sunni sect. The Iranians who have settled in Iraq are mostly Shi’ites. Although no country shows more ideal-

ism about being an Arab nation than does Iraq, only 80 per cent of Iraq’s population is Arab. Socialism, not Islam, holds the country together. The third cause lies in the territorial disputes which have long marked the relations between the two. Of most moment is the Shatt-al-Arab Estuary. The demand by Iraq for the abandonment by Iran of the Greater and Lesser Tumbs and another island in the Strait of Hormuz is probably an indication that Iraq considers that the Gulf ought to be controlled by Arabs. The difference in size between Iran and Iraq may not be the determining factor in any war. Iraq has less than a third of the population of Iran and its forces are nearer a quarter of those of Iran. But Iran is in a divided state with no clear centre of power. Iraq, on the other hand, has a highly centralised Government and power structure. The idea of an external threat may bring Iranians together to forge a unity, but it would probably require the emergence of a new political leader able to do that—an impossibility at the moment. Rather more likely, if war comes, will be a breaking up of Iran into separate regions which may be carved up among neighbouring countries, including the Soviet Union. The very weakness of Iran may stop this happening because no-one in Irap might have the authority to declare war. Without that, Iraq, which has made its calculations of what could happen in the region, is likely to do little more than defend its territory in the border clashes and try to seize a sector of the Shatt-al-Arab at the head of the Gulf.