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Russia gives U.S. alarming lesson in troop mobility

By DREW MIDDLETON, military affairs correspondent of the “New York Times” (through NZ.PA) New York The primary military lesson for the United States and its allies in the Soviet Union’s swift airborne movement into Afghanistan is that the Russians have the capability of moving significant numbers of troops in a relatively short time into situations they consider critical to their policies. The lesson can be applied to other regions and situations around the periphery of the Soviet Union. The Russians, according to military analysts, have the capability of moving two or more divisions by air into East Germany, Iran, or the Pacific maritime province. Military analysts in Washington and West European capitals emphasise the development and deployment of advanced transport planes and heavy helicopters. Earlier this year, one specialist said, the Russians airlifted almost 100,000 soldiers half way across Russia to participate in a large exercise. The reinforcement last week of Soviet forces in Afghanistan by as many as 3500 troops hardly strained Soviet airlift resources, the military sources said.

The arrival of the Soviet reinforcements was followed in a matter of hours by a' coup d’etat that installed Babrak Karmal as the country's leader in the place of Hafizullah Amin.

The first impression among analysts consulted was that the Soviet troop movement had been made to assure success of the coup.

Other sources in Washington and abroad said it was too early to determine the origins and objectives. Intelligence sources agree on the strategic importance of a strong Soviet military presence in Afghanistan in furtherance of Moscow’s policies in the area.

Soviet troops could be established within striking distance of Iran’s eastern, and least defensible, frontier and thereby increase the vulnerability of the present Government, or its successors, to Moscow pressure. Soviet presence could also raise the threshold of danger for Pakistan.

An Afghan rebel leader in Pakistan has said that the Russians had been buying loyalty of some of the warlike tribes in the Khyber Pass area and had turned them against the Muslim forces that had rebelled against the Amin Government.

The same process could be used to direct the tribes against the rather weak Pakistani forces defending the Peshawar plain. Soviet possession of airfields in Afghanistan could have a critical effect on American and Western interests in the region. The presence of Soviet aircraft on Afghan airfields would decrease chances of surprise in any military move in Iran. Operating in conjunction with Soviet fighters based in southern Yemen. Soviet planes in Afghanistan would more than balance fighters and attack bombers on the two American, aircraft caririers in the Indian Ocean, i An intelligence report ifrom Kabul two weeks ago

said that the Soviet Union had contracted to build three air bases in Afghanistan. The assumption among analysts was that this building programme would be accelerated as a result of the I Soviet military reinforceiment. One official remarked gloomily that while the United States was weighing the establishment of a big base in the Middle East, the Russians had acquired at least a half-dozen. Soviet aircraft based in south-western Afghanistan, it was said, would be closer to sea routes through the Arabian Sea and the exit from the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz than they would be if they were at Teheran.

Afghanistan’s strategic importance to the Soviet Union and the scale of the airlift led specialists to believe that the Russians would continue to reinforce their success.

Their principal vehicles will be Anl2 and An 22 transport. The former, the smaller of the two, can carry 100 paratroops and the latter about twice that number. There are 560 Anl2s in the Soviet Air Force.

Analysts have reported a recent increase in military activity in Armenia, Georgia, and Uzbekistan, including the movement of troops toward the Afghan frontier. This max’- have been caused by the threat, as perceived in Moscow, of American military intervention in Iran. Or it is more likely, the specialists said, that the movement was a preliminary to the reinforcement of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

The next move, they said, could be the recall of reservists to the understrength divisions in the border regions and the arrival of weapons and equipment to raise tables of organisation to something approaching war strength. In addition to the reinforcement of ground forces in Afghanistan, the Soviet Air Force dominates the Afghan Air Force. The majority of the approximately 160 combat aircraft in the Afghan inventory are flown by Soviet pilots and there are reports that at least two squadrons of fighters have flown in from the Soviet Union to reinforce air action against the rebels.

All the M 24 heavy helicopters used in attacks against the rebels are flown by Soviet crews. All command. control, and maintenance functions are in Soviet hands.

Afghan rebels and some American analysts contend that by entering Afghanistan in force the Russians are committing themselves to a struggle that will prove as unrewarding and costly as was the United States involvement in Vietnam.

The rugged terrain of the country, the xenophobia of Afghans, the availability of rifles and light automatic weapons throughout the country, and a belief that the Russians intend to replace Islam with common-; ism could turn the Soviet | intervention into a long J struggle requiring increased, investments of men and sup-i plies.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19791231.2.63

Bibliographic details

Press, 31 December 1979, Page 6

Word Count
892

Russia gives U.S. alarming lesson in troop mobility Press, 31 December 1979, Page 6

Russia gives U.S. alarming lesson in troop mobility Press, 31 December 1979, Page 6

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