Renewed criticism of electoral system

Press, 18 June 1979, Page 16

Renewed criticism of electoral system

By

CEDRIC MENTIPLAY

Comment from the Capital

It is difficult to tell how much dissatisfaction there is with the “first past the post” system by which we elect our members of Parliament —but the belief is growing that there is room for improvement.

Hardly a Parliamentary sitting day goes by without a reference by an Opposition member to our “Minority Government.” This is based on the fact that in last November’s General Election the National Party secured only 39.8 per cent of the votes, but gained 54.35 per cent of the seats in Parliament.

Social Credit, with 16.1 per cent of the votes recorded, and only 1.08 per cent of Parliamentary seats, is particularly bitter about this. In the booklet “Better Democracy” the Social Credit League’s Parliamentary research officer (Mr L. W. Hunter) suggests that in the New Zealand voting system votes which should be equal have differing values.

This is obvious. One of the votes which turned the balance in Kapiti had more

power than one of those which merely added to the already - large Labour majorities in one of the Maori seats.

But how can we correct this imbalance? If all electors simply voted for a party, and members were allocated according to that party’s percentage of the total vote, the personalities of candidates would be lost, as would the individual power of electorates. There is no one system which is perfect. For many years Australia has used a preferential system. No candidate is declared elected until he or she has more than 50 per cent of the total vote. But how logical is the process by which this result is obtained?

In this so-called “preferential system,” the voter numbers the candidates in order of preference. After voting, the returning officers are confronted with stacks of papers, on each of which the candidates are numbered from one to the total number of candidates. If no one candidate has

achieved the magic 50 per cent, the second preferences of the least-successful candidate are distributed to the other candidates, and so on until one candidate has a majority. But is he really the people’s choice?

The claim is hardly valid, if the successful candidate had to rely on voters’ second, third or fourth preferences. There is also the practice, honoured in Australia, of parties agreeing to exchange preferences. Many New Zealanders would prefer to stay with our “first past the post” system, with its racing connotation.

Today, however, it seems that “the one to watch,” in racing parlance, is the single transferable vote system (known as S.T.V.). This envisages the use of larger electorates, plus the numbering of candidates in order of preference. What is at stake is the value of a single vote.

Mr Hunter, as an unsuccessful Social Credit candidate last November, shows some bitterness in stating:

“The 1978 New Zealand election is one of the worst ever recorded anywhere for the low effectiveness of votes. At the electorate level, Hastings was the extreme example. Labour won this seat, capturing 37 per cent of the effective votes, whilst the remaining 63 per cent were non-effective.

“The result in Hastings underlines the situation which regularly arises under the simple majority singlemember electoral system, wherein people live in a society which is only a little over one-third democratic.” Are these remarks by Mr Hunter valid? If indeed we admit this, we are casting doubt on the whole democratic concept. Democracy accepts the will of the majority — but it is accepted that the successful candidate under this system

represents, and acts for, not only those who voted for him, but the whole electorate.

Mr Hunter is saying here that a Labour member of Parliament works only for the Labour voters in his electorate; a National member for the National voters. If this were so, New Zealand would be a poor country indeed. Happily, there is plenty of evidence to the contrary. . . Mr Hunter postulates: “What is indicated is that any electoral , system involving single-member electorates can give a distorted result.” There is no doubt about this. It is also true that in a multiple-member electorate the minor parties would have a greater chance of representation. The single transferable vote system is used in Tasmania and in Ireland. The smallest Australian state has five electorates, each of which has seven seats, the whole making up a 35-seat

House of Assembly. An elector has one vote, but marks his ballot paper according to his preference. In normal conditions no one electorate could be expected to produce seven members all of the one party. In Tasmania and in Ireland the numbers of seats in the House closely approximate the percentages of votes for the various parties. In New Zealand it would need a substantial change in public opinion before a change to the S.T.V. system was implemented. An essential ingredient of any change would be the setting-up of an impartial body manned by members independent of Parliamentary rules and pressures. This could happen only as a result of sharp and widely-expressed public dissatisfaction. In the meantime, however, the Social Credit League recommends a schedule of public instruction in the whole problem of electoral reform.

The great enemy of such an educational system would not be any one political party — but rather the kind of lethargy which has surely led us into our own 1979 political slough of despond.