Unpalatable predicament for Zambia

Press, 8 June 1979, Page 12

Unpalatable predicament for Zambia

By

MICHAEL HOLMAN

of the

'■‘Financial Times,'’ in Lusaka

As President Kenneth Kaunda considers his strategy towards Zimbabwe Rhodesia in the crucial time ahead, he has to bear in mind two unpalatable facts. The economic health of Zambia during the next six months or more depends on the continued smooth functioning of a railway run by a country whose new administration he rejects and denounces, and some of whose avowed enemies he harbours — more than 10,000 guerrillas led by Joshua Nkomo. Also, by the end of the year, many of Dr Kaunda’s countrymen may be eating maize, in addition to other consumer goods, carried on this very railway and supplied in part by Africa’s “Public Enemy Number One” — South Africa. Many observers in Lusaka believe that if the southern railway were closed or crippled — by political decision in Salisbury or guerrilla action — every calculation on which Zambia’s slow path to recovery is charted would become meaningless. Shipments of copper — the source of 90 per cent of Zambia’s foreign exchange earnings ■ — would be cut by up to half. A serious maize shortage would occur by the end of the year, in a country where 40 per cent of the 5.5 M population live in the towns. Supplies of essential commodities from the south, including heavy fuel oil, fertiliser, coke, wheat, milk powder, and spare parts for the mines, would be reduced to a trickle, via the Botswana road and across the Kazungula Ferry. Zambia would be almost entirely dependent on the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (Tazara) and road to Dar-es-Salaam. The incapacity of this route to handle Zambia’s trade forced the reopening of the southern railway last October.

The west z coast outlet of Lobito, reached by the Benguela Railway, has been inaccessible since the line was closed in 1975, and U.N.I.T.A. guerrillas in Southern Angola are keeping it closed to through traffic. The Mozambique ports of Beira and Nacala could not handle more than the tiny proportion of Zambian trade that goes through at present. Zambians already suffer sporadic shortages of basic commodities such as salt, cooking oil, washing powder, soap and flour. But it is the need for maize imports which is most worrying. Poor rains -and late fertiliser deliveries reduced the 1978-79 maize crop by about 40 per cent, and Zambia must import over 200 tonnes to make up the shortfall. The country will run out of home grown maize — the staple diet — by the end of the year, according to most forecasts. The origins of this present predicament go back some years. In November, 1977, after nearly three years of depressed copper prices which reduced Government mineral revenue from 54 per cent of State income in 1974 to nil in 1977 (and nil in 1978), President Kaunda declared: “If we don’t take action, we will perish.” He was speaking shortly after talks with an International Monetary Fund team, which prepared the way for an I.M.F. credit effective from April, 1978. An austerity programme which began in January 1978 — with Zambia’s toughest budget since its independence in 1964 — continues. The I.M.F. — whp arrive this month for talks on new programme criteria — are broadly satisfied with Government’s handling of internal issues. A series of controls and austerity measures were implemented during 1978.

But everything comes back to copper and routes. Zambia and the I.M.F. have been basing their projections on copper shipments of 56,000 tonnes a month (putting 1979 production slightly above 1978’s 660,000 tonnes). It will be hard to reach this level. Tazara, already plagued by bad management, limited skills, a shortage of spare parts and inefficiency,

was shut down for eight days in March during a strike by the 3000 workers. This was followed by line washaways in April ’ after heavy rains, which closed the line for a month. It reopened last month, but is operating only during the day under weight and speed restrictions. The southern route is not without problems. Goods are

starting to pile up at South African ports. This is partly due to limits on operating hours in Rhodesia for security reasons. In short, the needs of the Zambian economy appear incompatible with Zambia’s role as a guerrilla base. President Kaunda has not so far allowed the price of this role — applying sanctions against Rhodesia has cost more than SI2BOM durinv the

past six years — to divert him. His public pronouncements during the past year show a growing impatience with the West and an increasing commitment to a military solution. But never before has he had to measure so carefully the vulnerability of his landlocked country against his personal convictions and the ambitions of guerrilla leaders.