N.A.T.O., aged 30, feels political strains

Press, 17 April 1979, Page 16

N.A.T.O., aged 30, feels political strains

Bv

JOHN PALMER,

Brussels, in the “Guardian,” London

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 30 years old this month, faces political and strategic questions which would have been unthinkable at its birth in 1949. They are taxing ’ N.A.T.O.’s ideological and intellectual resources to the limit and are leading to considerable self-questioning about the purposes of the alliance.

Typical is the current pressure from one world Communist power — China —- for N.A.T.O. to step up its military preparations and be ready to act outside Europe, particularly in Africa, to counter the plans and designs of another world Communist power — Russia. The ideological intricacies of some problems are considerable. Should N.A.T.O. encourage Rumania or any other “dissident” East European member of the Warsaw Pact to pursue the path of neutralism? Some N.A.T.O,

strategists are tempted to answer “certainly.” But others fear that such a course by Rumania would internally de-stabilise the ostensible enemy in such a way as to make the chess game of nuclear manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre more difficult to plot and control.

There are those in the organisation who also fear “Rumanian tendencies” in their own ranks. France is still not fully integrated into the military side of the alliance, and there is little doubt that the sometimes perversely independent foreign policy pursued in Paris causes no little irritation and occasional dismay in N.A.T.O.’s Brussels HQ. The thirtieth anniversary finds the alliance with considerable internal problems quite apart from the uneasy relationship with France. The southern flank is in a state of open disarray, with Greek and Turk — theo-

retically alliance partners — eyeing each other’s moves with suspicion.

Not surprisingly Turkey, following the revolution in Iran, is now seen as a zone of crucial strategic significance not only for the southern flank, but the West as a whole. There is little evidence that N.A.T.O. strategists yet understand or know how to react to the phenomenon of Islamic revival which fits so uneasily into classical cold war categories. The situation elsewhere in N.A.T.O. is hardly more reassuring. Although the threat of Communist participation in the Italian Government receded last year, it could re-emerge again after the general election in June. There is already embarrassment at the disclosures that one N.A.T.O. member — the U.S. — spies on the internal security operations of another member — Italy — as

confirmed before the recent withdrawal of an American diplomat in Rome. If the Italian Government does move further to the left and to the Communist Party there is no doubt that. N.A.T.O. will keep some of Italy’s military and diplomatic representatives in Brussels even more at arm’s length from its most sensitive nuclear secrets. Although there is little direct challenge to N.A.T.O. membership in Belgium, Holland or Norway, the public mood in these countries has changed markedly in recent years, particularly where the deployment of nuclear weapons is concerned. It is, however, in West Germany that subterranean stirrings may have the most important impact on N.A.T.O.’s evolution. The Federal Republic remains a bastion of the alliance. But the disillusion of its Government with the leadership of the United States is encouraging a revival of debate about future West German

policy towards the East. Important Social Democratic politicians have made it clear West Germany can no longer be taken for granted as N.A.T.O.’s unprotesting nuclear battleship.

The reluctance of the West Germans to accept deployment on their soil of new medium-range missiles, designed to counter the Soviet SS-20 missiles, may further complicate the next round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between Washington and the West. . More than this, some West Germans are voicing suggestions that their country explores the limits of detente with the Soviet Union, with or without the United States, to see whether it might be possible to negotiate the beginnings of reunification with East Germany.

What frightens some N.A.T.O. top brass is the prospect that Moscow, anxious to detach West Germany from N.A.T.0., might be willing a closer unity of

the two Germanys and to create a formidable "buffer state” in central Europe. The thirtieth birthday speeches being made this month by N.A.TO. commanders predictably concenrate on the alleged military gap being exploited by the Warsaw Pact. There is no denying the build-up of arms spending by the Soviet Union and its allies. But it is equally clear that the period of decline in Western arms spending has also come to a halt. In all N.A.T.O. countries, above all the United States, spending on N.A.T.O.’s military hardware, including the next generation of its nuclear armoury, is proceeding. But with enough nuclear firepower in both military camps sufficient to destroy human life on this planet several times over, there is no evidence that increases in spending will better equip N.A.T.O. or the Warsaw Pact to tackle the political and strategic complexities of the modern world.