A Japanese view on 200-mile zones

Press, 22 January 1979, Page 14

A Japanese view on 200-mile zones

This translation of an editorial from a Japanese newspaper, “Nihon Keizai Shimbun,” was made for “The Press” by BRUCE ROSCOE. The editorial appeared on December 19, 1978.

Fishery negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union have ended and the framework for the third year of the 200-mile zone era has, for the most part, been determined. From the beginning of December, the United States’ 1979 fishery catch quota for Japan was, in comparison with previous years, decreased by six per cent. At about that time, although not directly relating to 200mile zone restrictions, the Japan-China Committee for Fishing Industry Co-operation reached agreement, in accord with the Japan-China Fisheries Pact, concerning restrictions on Japanese fishing boats operating in the East China and Yellow Seas.

In the Southern Hemisphere, negotiations with Australia are still in progress and the fisheries negotiations with New Zealand, which became entangled with livestock product trade, were, after more than six months of difficulties, settled this autumn. Although unfinished negotiations remain with the Forum of South Pacific Nations, it can probably be said that the outline of the posture Japan’s fishing industry will assume has become welldefined by 200-mile zone restrictions.

What can be said first is that Japan has lost approximately 1,000,000 tons in volume with the fishery catch quotas allowed for the 200-mile zones of the Soviet Union and the United States. Before the 200-mile zone restrictions were established, Japan’s distant waters fishing industry took 1,400,000 tons of fish each from the Soviet Union’s and the United States’ zones, thus raising the volume of fish caught to 2.800.000 tons.

However, with respect to the ouota for 1979 from the United States, the previous 1.090.000 ton quota has been decreased bv about 300,000 tons. In the case of the agreement signed with the Soviet Union on December 15. Japan’s catch quota for Soviet waters has been reduced by 650,000 tons from '■ hat it was before the Soviet 200-milq zone restric’ions

were set up. The quota now stands at 750,000 tons. Furthermore, several thousand tons of fish have been lost from New Zealand waters and, compared to past years, catches of salmon and sea trout from international waters in the North Sea have decreased by 32 per cent.

It has become clear that the principle among coastal nations of first and foremost consideration for one’s own country has dominated when the opportunity has arisen to allocate catch quotas to foreign fishing boats. The socalled surplus principle, whereby excesses are released to foreign fishing boats, is disappearing from sight. At the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the basic line of thought concerning the management of fishery resources in 200mile zones was that after a nation’s catch from its own waters had been deducted from the “permissible catch volume,” which is decided on to ensure protection of resources, the remaining surplus was to be allocated to foreign fishing boats.

In actual fact, however, hardly any nation is making the effort to estimate its “permissible catch volume.” Instead, negotiations with the Soviet Union advanced along the line that the Soviet catch quota for Japan would equal the Japanese catch quota for the Soviet Union. And the United States, in disregard of the permissible

catch volume idea, is generally reducing the quotas for foreign fishing boats and, at the same time, holding in national reserve its surplus of fishery resources in an attempt to attract joint operation ventures. Looking at the results of the negotiations during 1978, whether in the case of the United States or the Soviet Union, or in the case of the South Pacific nations, New Zealand in particular, the virtually agreed upon outlook of the parties concerned in international fishing is that there is little hope for any sharp increase in future quotas for Japan. Even in relations with the Soviet Union, as was made clear through the i ecent negotiations, in order for Japan to have quotas increased and operations inside Soviet waters expanded, Japan has to offer something in exchange. However, even if Japan does attempt to expand the catch quota for cod while allowing the Soviet Union to catch plenty of sardines and mackerel, the adjustments required of Japan’s coastal fishermen will be increasingly delicate. There is the aspect, too, that the importance of everyday fishing industry diplomacy has increased, as in Japan’s relations with the United States. But going by the course of events last year (1978), Japan will not be able to hope for very much. The Government, starting from the outcome of 1978 negotiations, should take a new, across-the-board look at official policy for the fishing industry which would include organisational reform.