Linemen 'ignored orders’

Press, 12 August 1978, Page 3

Linemen 'ignored orders’

PA Wellington Two power board employees who died in an explosion in a Hutt Valley switchroom on June 15 had been told to stay out of the building, says a report of the accident. The report, from a committee appointed by the Minister of Energy (Mr Gair) says that the accident in a Hutt Valley Electric Power Board and Gas Board switchroom pointed up weaknesses in the control of the board’s linemen-fault-men.

It says that the two men killed, Frederick - Marshall Boxer and Richard Hoani Kurunui, were not allocated to deal with the fault, but turned up to help a colleague. They did not advise their control room and ‘‘in view of Mr Saunders (a lineman faultman) already having been dispatched to the scene, they may have been advised to keep away.” Mr Saunders, who had inspected the equipment, was told by the control room operator, after he reported his findings, to stay outside. “Mr Boxer disregarded Mr Saunders’s repetitibn of the control operator’s instructions and entered the switchroom at River Shingle and Sand, Ltd, Belmont, followed by Mr Kurunui. Mr Saunders remained outside looking in,” the report said.

Mr Boxer was examining the equipment when the explosion occurred, flinging Mr Saunders across the road, said the report. Meanwhile, another report released simultaneously said that the explosion in a metal-clad switch fuse did not imply that the type of equipment was unsafe. This report, completed by Bond and Partners, consulting engineers, and presented to the power board and Electrical Workers’ Union, says many thousands

of the type of unit were in satisfactory use in various countries. “In this accident, there occurred the extreme and virtually unheard of circumstance of a fuse exploding longitudinally and breaking out sections of the fuse carrier.” The report says that the exploding of the fuse and breaking out of sectors of its carrier released so much debris into the oil in the tank that the insulating oil was severely contaminated.

“And, with the carrier partially removed, previously shielded live contacts were dangerously exposed.” The recognition that no equipment was 100 per cent secure made it necessary to ensure that linemen, faultmen and others were in a position to recognise conditions which were outside the scope of their training, the report said. Allied to this was the further requirement that the authority and effectiveness of control operators should be improved.