Ambassador replies to comments on Israel

Press, 18 February 1978, Page 12

Ambassador replies to comments on Israel

An editorial article in “The Press” on February 2 has drawn complaint from the Israeli Ambassador to New Zealand, Mr Yaakov Morris. The article said that Israel’s intransigence in the Middle East negotiations seemed puzzling to the extent that it suggested that Israel had lost touch with world opinion. Mr Morris replies:

Not "Israel’s intransigence” but your editorial is "puzzling.” Its call for “major Israeli concessions” to enable President Sadat to "appease other Arab nations and to secure his own domestic support,” totally ignores the vital security interests of Israel. It lacks even the pretensions of that "evenhandedness” which traditionally has become a Western code-word for unilateral Israeli concessions of a substantive nature in “exchange” for nothing more substantive on the Arab side than acceptance of Israel’s right to exist or preparedness to cease belligerence. To Israelis, of course, such rights are not Arab, but Godgiven to every nation, while the cessation of hostilities is of mutual benefit. Tne most alarming, if not biased, aspect of your editorial is the "warning’’ that unless Israel does what Sadat demands, or needs, it will cause “a damaging loss of world support," of "public sympathy” and “governments will take even sterner attitudes to Israel.” However valuable such public support may be. it cannot determine Israel’s own conception of its baste security needs. When the world condemned the Arab invasion of 1948. the United Nations did not lift a finger in Israel’s defence: the ’•eimposition of the maritime blockade against Israel by Egypt in May. 1967. which triggered the Six Dav War. found Israel perilouslv alone notwithstanding the “undertakings” of the Western Powers of 1957 to break any such blockade.

In short, Israel’s struggle is not for popularity, but survival, however much that survival may be unpopular or appear as the last consideration of “The Press.” Public opinion in New Zealand, and other countries of the Western world, is not as one-sided or forgetful; nor is it as despondent as the editorial. Sadat’s maximalist demands of back-to-the-1949 armistice lines and for a second Palestinian State, between Jordan—the existing one—and Israel, are univer sally understood to be inimical to Israel’s security. It is no less clear that Israel’s preparedness to return all of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty in exchange for special security arrangements for the tiny area on which are located the settlements close up to its Negev region and a few airfields is a major Israeli concession. Egyptian agreement to this would be but ,a comparatively minor concession on that country's part. Likewise. Israel’s preparedness to yield autonomy to the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians—itself a risk of a “Sudeten German” problem being created in its midst—is far more reasonable than the demand that on this non-viable 2300 square miles of land an artificial “state” be created from which the P.L.0., Syria, and others can launch war on Israel’s (and Jordan’s) remaining existence. The very appeasement of the Syrian. Iraqi. South Yemen. Algerian, Soviet and P.L.O. stand you advocate at Israel’s expense has resulted in Egyptian intractability and the ab upt withdrawal of its

delegation from the political negotiations. It is not Israeli flexibility that has been lacking, but Egyptian independence of extremist Arab (and, behind it, Soviet) pressure. The settlements and the Palestinian question are not the main obstacles in the negotiations, but Arab extremist exploitation of both. Threats to kill Sadat, the poisoning of Israeli oranges, the large-scale Soviet arms’ deliveries to Syria and Iraq are all part of this pressure.

The Arab extremist demand that the West Bank be “independent” means open to the infiltration of the Syrianofficered Palestine Liberation Army, P.L.O. terrorists and the Syrian Army proper. Who would, or .could, stop this other than the Israeli army? This is precisely what happened to Lebanon, which lost its independence and sovereignty as a result of similar intervention. It happened to Czechoslovakia in the 1930 s at the hands of the Sudeten Germans. Only the most naive could have believed that peace would immediately and easily follow Sadat’s historic journey to Israel. After 30 and more years of conflict, it can only be reached after tedious negotiations, periods of ups and downs, and above all compromise by two sides and not unrealistic demands on one.

[Mr Morris seems to have misunderstood the argument about world opinion. The point being made by “The Press” was that, if Israel loses public sympathy, many governments will take a sterner line on Israel. World opinion will not offer Israel security: all nations need some sympathy. In any event “The Press” is relieved to note that since the editorial, and since Mr Morris wrote his letter. Israel has announced that the settlements are negotiable.—Editor, “The Press.”]