U.N. resolution crucial

Press, 31 August 1977, Page 40

U.N. resolution crucial

By

DR RONALD MACINTYRE,

senior lecturer in political science at the University of

Canterbury, where he specialises in Middle East politics.

Today the debate over the meaning of Security Council Resolution 242 (5.C.242) of November 22, 1967, continues with unabated intensity. To some it stands as a ■‘guideline" for peace, for others the ‘‘framework” for peace, and for others even the “antithesis” of a just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nor are all these views simply diplomatic hairsplitting, as they underline partisan positions rigidly held and defended by the adherents of this well-in-tentioned but ill-fated resolution. What is it about 5.C.242 that frustrates all attempts at meaningful peace negotiations? 5.C.242 was a Britishsponsored resolution that sought to move the parties from the cease-fire to substantive peace negotiations after the Six Day War of June, 1967. If the substance and form of 5.C.242 were suggested by the changed strategic circumstances of the Six Day War, its failure to break the deadlock might be attributed to partisan interpretations of the reasons for the conflict. In the Six Day War involving Israel and the Arab confrontation States (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq), Israel extended her 1949 armistice frontiers threefold, occunying the Golan Heights (Syria), the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Jordan), the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula (Egypt). The nature of the Arab military defeat was enormous, as was the ensuing political humiliation. When Israel and the Arab States met at the United Nations after the war both explained the reasons for the outbreak of hostilities in contradictory ways. Israel argued that for many years it had been intimidated by Arab para-mili-tary forces, that its fron tiers were extremely vulnerable to surprise attack, and that in view of the large Arab military buildup on its frontiers in May-June, 1967, it had no other option but to go to war in the interest of selfdefence. The Arabs argued no less plausibly that since 1949 Israel had failed to live up to its obligations to the United Nations with regard to the “right of return” of the Palestinian refugees, that it had repeatedly violated the provisions of the Rhodes armistice agreements (1949), and in May. 1967, had threatened an armed invasion of Syria. Hence the Arabs had' no option but to mobilise their armed forces in the interests of self-defence. Since both parties insisted that they were acting out of self-defence — the only legitimate form of warfare permitted under the United Nations Charter (Art.sl) — it was by no means an easy task for the world body to adjudicate on the rights and wrongs of the case. The issue was further complicated by big-Power partisan involvement in the conflict. At the emergency sessions of the General Assembly the Soviet Union (June 19) called for condemnation of Israel coupled to, firstly, total withdrawal of her armed forces from the occupied territories and. secondly, compensation to the Arab States for damage to civilian property sustained in the recent conflict. The United States (June 20) refused to level criticism at any one party, believing in the principle that it takes two to tango. As such, the United States called fcr a negotiated peace embracing withdrawal of armed forces and secure and recognised frontiers for all the parties. Latin American and Afro-Asian States were at the time trying to build a procedural bridge between the hostile camps based on a negotiated political settlement within the framework of the United Nations Charter and an Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in the Six Day War.

For Israel a negotiated settlement within the framework of the United Nations Charter, implying the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, was completely unacceptable. It insisted that peace should be negotiated by the parties within the principle of “secure and recognised frontiers.” And, as if to pre-empt the situation for the United Nations, Israel made it quite plain that certain of the occupied territories henceforth would not be negotiable. These included the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and Shann al-Sheikh, at the strategic southern tip of the Sinai peninsula. Bitter Arab reaction to Israel’s “prior conditions” for peace was in evidence at the Khartoum summit conference (August-Sep-tember, 1967) which resolved in the mood of the moment: “No recognition, no negotiations, no peace” with Israel. By the end of October, 1967, tempers in the Middle East were reaching boiling point. Egyptian Soviet made missiles sunk the Israeli destroyer Eilat on October 21: on October 24 Israel replied with the shelling and destruction of the Suez Oil Refinery. The possibility of another Middle East war, this time involving the big Powers, loomed as large as ever. In the wake of these events the Security Council on October 24 was called into urgent session. Despite the urgency of the moment, deadlock continued in the Security Council. There had been some movement in the Soviet-Arab camp, but the gap between the contending parties remained as wide as ever. A draft resolution by India. Mali, and Nigeria (November 7) held that peace must be achieved within the framework of the United Nations Charter, and recalled that since the charter expressly denounced military conquest, “Israel’s armed forces should withdraw from all the territories occupied ... in the recent conflict.” An American draft resolution (November 7) meanwhile did not mention the important point of the Afro-Asian resolution that occupation or acquisition of territory by military conquest was inadmissible. It stated that “the charter principles require the achievement of a state of just and lasting peace. . . embracing withdrawal (i.e., unspecified) of armed forces from occupied territories.” By contrast, a Soviet draft resolution (November 20) urged that “the parties to the conflict immediately withdraw their forces to the positions they held before June 5, 1967 in accordance with the principle that the seizure of territories as a result of war is inadmissible”. Here lay the crux of the matter. Israel wanted to determine the position that would succeed the cease-fire through negotiations with the Arab States. The latter simply demanded total Israeli withdrawal from their territories within the framework of peace negotiations as determined by the United Nations Charter. How was the Security Council to square the circle? Lord Caradon, British Permanent Delegate to the United Nations (196470) rose to the occasion with a brilliant piece of diplomatic casuistry — which, amazingly, was adopted by all the parties on November 22, in the form of S.C. 242. Instead of including the principle outlawing territorial conquest in the substantive parts of the resolution, Caradon inserted it in the preamble. In effect, a substantive principle became an “ideal” for which the parties must strive. This met Israel’s objection since its principle. “secure and recognised frontiers,” was contained in the substantive part under Article 1 (ii). Caradon’s attempt to remove the ambiguity

from Article 1 (i) by in serting “the” before “territories,” denoting the scope of the withdrawal, was resolutely opposed by Israel as being at variance with the principle of “secure and recognised frontiers.” In short, Israel was insisting that the preSix Day War frontiers were no longer valid and hence non-negotiable within the framework of peace: war had changed everything. In addition to these reservations, Israel insisted that 5.C.242 should be no more than a “guideline” for subsequent peace negotiations. But how did Caradon “sell” his resolution to the Afro-Asian, Arab, and Soviet camps? They chose to read the preamble as a directing principle influencing the course of subsequent negotiations for peace. Thus since the preamble testified to the illegality of territorial conquest by war, Article I (i) should be read on the basis of a complete “Israeli withdrawal . . . from the territories occupied in the recent conflict.” The remaining parts of S.C. 242 were understood to constitute the “framework” of a future Middle East settlement. After withdrawal from public life Caradon said in an interview about S.C. 242: “I defend the resolution as it stands. What it states ... is first the general principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. That means that you cannot justify holding on to territory merely because you conquered it.” He continued, that in his belief the armistice frontiers of 1949 were “rotten” and impermanent. Hence in the interests of both sides it W'as necessary for a certain redrawing of frontiers commensurate with the principle of “secure and recognised frontiers” for all parties. In a sense, Caradon seemed to be implying “painless surgery” where both sides, through negotiated “mutual concessions” would neither gain nor lose in the territorial deal. This formula closely approximated the views of the Americans in the 1969-70 peace proposals, who referred to the need for “insubstantial” frontier changes. S.C. 242 has not weathered well with the change of events in the Middle East and wider international system. For example, S.C. 242 referred to the Palestinians in November, 1967, in terms of a “just settlement of the refugee question” (Art. 2 (b)). But since then the Palestine Liberation Organisation has emerged as a powerful international organisation, with observer status at the United Nations, seeking national self-determination for the Palestinians. Such a resolution (General Assembly 3236) was adopted by the United Nations in November, 1974. As might be expected, the P.L.O. is vitally opposed to S.C. 242 since it makes no mention of Palestinian national rights. Since 1967 Israel has established over 90 "illegal” settlements (i.e. in the view of the United Nations) in the occupied Arab territories. These settlements tend to point to the future Israeli frontiers in the region, and thereby, pre-empt any meaningful negotiations between the parties based on S.C. 242. There seems to be no immediate hope of breakthrough on the diplomatic front to bring the parties to a negotiated settlement. The abortive sessions of the Geneva peace conference in December, 1973. based on S.C. 242 and S.C. 338, clearly indicated that the parties were unwilling to move on vital principles. In addition, the claims of the Palestinians to be “heard” at Geneva heightened an already existing impasse. And since the parties still adhere rigidly to their basic inter-

pretations of S.C. 242 — with the exception that the Arab States now include the Palestinians in any peace reckoning — there seems to be very little chance that the Geneva peace conference will make much progress, should it convene this year.

Why does the Security Council not amend S.C, 242 and give more direction to peace initiatives in the Middle East? From time to time, there have been moves mainly by the Soviet Union — to amend S.C. 242, but these have failed because of the threat of a United States veto. Partisan commitments of the big Powers still frustrate hopes of a settlement based on S.C. 242. But clearly if the spiral of conflict and war in the Middle East is to be broken the Security Council will have to refurbish S.C. 242. But how?

In my opinion agreement by the big Powers on the following operative principles for peace might break the deadlock and forestall further war : (1) inadmissibility of the acquisiton of territory by war; (2) secure and recognised frontiers; (3) recognition of the national rights of the Palestinians. Big-Power security guarantees, use of demilitarised zones, United Nation mediation within the framework of the charter, these, and other such provisions, might, further stablise the region until political accommodation generates its own political good will.