Guarding against the evils of bureaucracy

Press, 17 August 1977, Page 16

Guarding against the evils of bureaucracy

Behind the 37 departments of Government in New Zealand stands another department which the public seldom sees and only rarely hears about—the State Services Commission. This is the first of a series of articles in which OLIVER RIDDELL, of “The Press” Wellington office, looks at the work of the State Services Commission. The articles will examine the strengths and weaknesses of the commission which is responsible for “reviewing the efficiency and economy” of other Government departments.

The Public Service and State Service between them employ about 240,000 people with an annual wages bill of SIBOOM — two-fifths of the Government’s net expenditure. All these people are part of the responsibility of the State Services Commission, which has the responsibility to “review the efficiency and economy” of the other Government departments.

The commission is not well known to the public. Anyone not employed in the State Service or Public Service will probably never encounter it.

Further, it is easy to get confused about the State Services Commission because, although it is responsible for the “Public Service,” its responsibility for the “State Service” is much less. Its main responsibility is for the “Public Service” and it shares respsonsibility for the “State Service” with other bodies. Its share is growing, to the dismay of some other parties involved. The Public Service denotes some, but not all, Government departments. It embraces 37 departments, including - most of those traditionally considered

Government departments, and about 79,000 people are employed within it — 59,558 permanent, 1939 temporary and 17,702 wage workers (many of whom are part-time workers.) The annual wages bill is SSOOM for some 61,000 permanent and temporary employees. Outside the Public Service are other Government employees, and together they comprise the State Service. This includes employees of the Railways, Post Office, the enormous Government-funded health and education services, the Armed Forces and the Fire Service. Outside this again are other Government agencies such as the Accident Compensation Commission, the Consumers’ Institute, and the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council. Tne commission used to function under the Public Service Act, 1912, and was known as the Public Service Commission. But the report of a Royal Commission of Inquiry in 1962 recommended that its name be changed to the State Services Commission because, as well as responsibility for the Public Service, the Royal Commission felt it should have increased responsibilities for

the wider State Services as well.

Legislation in 1962 — the States Services Act — gave the commission its new name, but it has yet to assume fully many of the responsibilities over the State Service that the Royal Commission wanted for it. It is now assuming more of these. The commission’s main function is to be responsible for “reviewing the efficiency and economy” of the Public Service. It acts as the agent of the Government (as employer of the Public Service) to fulfil this main function and has ' grown over the years into a managerial elite behind the general bureaucracy.

To carry out its main functions in industrial matters — grading and salaries, hiring and firing — complicated administrative structures have had to be devised to cope reasonably fairly with the large numbers of people involved. Few members of the Public Service fully understand these structures and their accompanying proceedures, and almost noone outside, but they have been designed to guard against the four evils of Government bureaucracy — favouritism, corruption, nepotism, and political jobbery. In this they have succeeded.

For decades the commission wielded great power in the Public Service. Jobs within the commission were keenly sought by those following a career in administration, and promotion sometimes seemed to depend on the opinion held of an individual by the commission.

There were appeal procedures, but the odds were

stacked against an individual seeking to change the commission’s decision. The Public Service Association (the union of Public Servants) helped solidify the career structure within the Public Service.

It was partly because the commission was seen as a remote elite by the departments that the 1962 Royal Commission sat, but also because the system the commission was administering made the departments a “closed shop” to outsiders (except at the bottom levels) and unresponsive to outside pressures. The Public Services Act, 1912, made provision for appointment on the grounds of “efficiency” — with “seniority” applying between equals — but the 1962 Act changed this to “merit’’ and what constituted “merit” was defined much more clearly. However, there are still "closed shop” aspects to the system. It was also recommended lhat the commission delegate some of its powers to the departments and, although this has taken time, it has now largely been done, to the benefit of administrative competence within the departments.

The commission is still in some respects an administrative elite, but it is no longer an elite to the same extent with regard to the departments, which have their own administrative cadres. This has affected the ability of the commission to attract staff from within the Public Service; whereas 10 years ago it got dozens of applications

for every job advertised, today it gets few, and has been obliged to recruit lower-level staff directly from the universities.

Training of staff has been one of the commission’s most important functions, although it seems to have been less successful in explaining the complex administrative systems and procedures to incoming staff. The commission’s own staff may understand what they are administering; it is doubtful if many public servants fully understand.

There is not a high turnover of staff within the Public Service — an average annual turn-over of 9 per cent for males and 20 per cent for females, which compares favourably with 26 per cent and 33 per cent (respectively) in the private sector. However, annual turn-over increased significantly last year and the commission is trying to discover why the leaving rate has increased. No-one really knows how satisfactory’ or adequate the induction of new public servants is, or how clearly they understand the system and procedures under which they work. This is one aspect of staff training to which the commission ought to devote more attention. As well as having specific responsibilities for the Public Service, the commission also has specific functions for the State Service — such as chairing the State Services Co-ordinating Committee, the combined body of the Government’s employing agencies. The commission is seeking uniformity within the State Service as well as in the Public Service, and has adopted various procedures for achieving this — such as similar grading and salaries for similar functions. There is a trend for new bodies (such as the Accident Compensation Commission) to

have to get the agreement of the commission to salaries and grading, whereas previously such bodies had only to consult. Inevitably, there is criticism of the commission’s spreading obligations and assumption of authority. This stems mainly from employee groups, such as the Post Office Assocation, who see the commission interfering with their traditional right to deal directly with their own employer — the Post Office.

The commission says it is not keen to bring the entire State Service under its wing, as the Public Service already is. It does not believe in changing | things just to make them look tidy and considers the systems are functioning reasonably well as ’ they are. But this spreading uniformity is arousing . some alarm, and the commission is spending more and more of its time on State Service rather than Public Service matters.

Its relationship with the Treasury has always been a restraining factor on the commission. On any matter decided by the commission that involves money other than staff ap- J pointments, the Treasury f must have its say. This i has given the impression i that the Treasury has the ’ power of veto over the commission, and thus sits in ultimate authority over it. I

This is so where the commission and the -Treasury hold conflicting opinions, but on most matters any potential conflict is resolved between them so that no public conflict occurs. A relationship which could be very difficult seems to exist reasonably .harmoniously.

(A second article in this series will appear next week.)