Who will take Brezhnev’s place at the table?

Press, 10 June 1977, Page 12

Who will take Brezhnev’s place at the table?

By

VICTOR ZORZA

The abrupt dismissal of President Nikolai Podgomy from the Soviet Politburo last month shows that the struggle for the succession to Leonid Brezhnev as Party Secretary is beginning to weaken the inner core of the Kremlin leadership. All the previous dismissals of Politburo members under the Brezhnev regime were designed to remove from the leadership the younger officials who might challenge the supremacy of the Brezhnev generation, now in its seventies. So long as this inner core held together, there was a good chance that the pressure from the

younger leaders could bi held in check.

preservation repeatedly led the older leaders to compose their policy differences, instead of fighting it out to the point at which one of them would have to be removed. The senior member of this inner group. Mr Mikhail Suslov, who is 75, has often taken a harder line than Mr Brezhnev on foreign policy, and has occasionally given signs that he opposes the stress on “consumerism which is the hallmark of Mr Brezhnev’s domestic policies. The signs which usually emerge from between the lines of official speeches have also made it possible to trace, over the years, the disagreements between Mr Brezhnev and the Premier, Mr Kosvgin, now 73, on questions of economic policy. As the manager of a vast Government bureaucracy, Mr Kosvgin has often had to fight to presene its

autonomy against the encroachments of the party bureaucracy led by Mr Brezhnev.

The day-to-day management of the party is exercised on Mr Brezhnev’s behalf by Mr Andrei Kirilenko, his closest associate and, at 70, his equal in age. Mr Podgorny was. at 74, most unlikely to challenge Mr Brezhnev for the succession. But, as President, he held a post which could become of crucial importance in the struggle for the succession. One analyst. Christian Dueval of Radio Liberty, who has traced the struggle between Mr Podgorny and Mr Brezhnev as it developed over the years, when others paid little attention to the signs of conflict, speculates that Mr Brezhnev wants the post for himself. But another possibility is that the

vacancy is required for a younger man whom Mr Brezhnev wants to groom for the succession.

There is something to be said for both these eventualities. If Mr Brezhnev’s health is as poor as recent reports suggest, the assumption of the presidency would enable him remain in the limelight without carrying the heavy burden which goes with his present post as party secretary. If the transition is carried out while he is still the effective leader of the party l , he could try to ensure that the presidency carries with it more of a policv-making role than it has.

But Mr Brezhnev held the post of President for a time under the Khrushchev

regime, and he certainly used it to great advantage as a stepping stone to the position of the party’s First Secretary after he overthrew Mr Khrushchev. The presidency did not give Mr Brezhnev the power to challenge Mr Khrushchev, but it gave him an opportunity to act on the national and international stage, to get his picture in the papers and on television, to become a more familiar figure than he had been previously — to be seen, in short, as the heir apparent.

This made the transition to Ihe Brezhnev regime much easier. The dirty work at the crossroads involved in securing the removal of Mr Khrushchev — who was enjoying a carefree holiday in the Crimea while his colleagues in Moscow were preparing the announcement of his dismissal — could not have been accomplished so easily if there had been no heir apparent. Mr Khrushchev’s opponents would have had to agree on a successor before they took steps to remove him, which would have been difficult at the best of times, and particularly difficult when several ambitious politicians suddenly saw the chance of rising to the top. It could even be argued that Mr Khrushchev, bv designating Mr Brezhnev as his preferred successor, sealed his own fate. It was a lesson which Mr Brezhnev has certainly learned, for not onlv has he avoided designating a successor, but he has taken steps to ensure that none of the younger members of the Politburo are in a position to grab the limelight as he did under Mr Khrushchev.

Some of Mr Brezhnev’s policies have certainly been strongly opposed by his associates. and he probably owes his survival at least in part to the absence of a “natural” successor.

But if that is so. would Mr Brezhnev designate a sue-

cessor now by appointing a younger man to the presidency, and thus endanger his own chances of political survival?

He certainly wants to stay on top long enough to earn his niche in history b’y arranging for the formal adoption of the “Brezhnev Constitution,” which is due to (be passed at a special session of the Supreme Soviet in October. By that time, too, if. all goes well, a new S.A.L.T. agreement may be signed, to meet the deadline imposed by the expiration of the present agreement, which would fulfil another of Mr Brezhnev’s ambitions,

There may, therefore, be

some substance to the speculation that Mr Brezhnev Was really grooming himself to take over the presidency, later in the year, Mr Podgorny’s dismissal maywell be due to the fact that he refused to acquiesce in an arrangement that would have, required him to vacate his post in the fall to make room for Mr Brezhnev. But the departure of Mr Podgomy now makes it necessary for Mr Brezhnev either to take over his post much sooner than he might have intended, or to appoint someone else to it. Both courses carry a risk, for they open up the whole question of the succession and thus make his own position less secure.

Mr Brezhnev would certainly have preferred Mr Podgomy to stay as President for the time being. By forcing Mr Brezhnev’s hand, and bringing about his own abrupt dismissal, Mr Podgomy has given a sign to the younger men in the Politburo that it is time to begin actively campaigning — or, in Kremlin terms, intriguing — for the top post. He has also shown them that the unity of the Politburo’s inner core is no longer inviolable, and that they stand a good chance of breaching it if they work at it with sufficient determination. — Copyright 1977; Victor Zorza,