Test Soviet intentions — Senator

Press, 9 April 1977, Page 14

Test Soviet intentions — Senator

Senator John Sparkman, of Alabama, is visiting Christchurch this week-end. Senator Sparkman holds the powerful office of chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. The following extracts from his recent annual report to the Senate are taken from a text supplied by the United States Information Service.

For reasons ranging from good luck to the solid accomplishment of the Ford Administration. the new American Administration faces many problems, but few crises in its foreign relations. Most of these problems — including the arms race, the Middle East. Africa, and uncontrolled population growth in the Third World — have ample potential for becoming crises of the first order if they arc not acted upon intelligently and in a fairly short time.’ But because they do not require the instantaneous response of a war or confrontation. they allow us time to develop sound and rational policies — and little excuse for failing to do so. The conclusion of a new strategic arms agreement qualifies as one of the two or three top priorities of our foreign policy. Specialists in Soviet affairs are hotly debating the scope and intentions of the current Soviet military buildup. Some say the Soviets are striving for strategic and conventional military superiority: others say that they are merely trying to catch up with the United States. Surely the way to resolve this issue is not’ by assuming the worst and plunging into an accelerated arms r ce. thus assuring that the worst will indeed come to pcss, but rather by putting the Soviets to the test of

their own conciliatory words, as President Carter has indicated he intends to do.

If it becomes evident that the Soviets are not serious about a new 5.A.1..T. agreement. or seek an agreement so loose and limited as to leave them free to bid for a politically intimidating strategic superiority, we will of course have to respond in kind.

Conventional military strength and tactical nuclear forces in Europe pose a different set of problems. The current Soviet conventional military build-up may be no more than the culmination of a long-term programme, or it may have more to do with unrest in Eastern Europe than with the specific intent to threaten N.A.T.O.

Another possibility is that it is designed for. the political intimidation of Western Europe, or more specifically, for strengthening the hands of communist parties in such countries as France and Italy. The motives of the Soviet build-up are uncertain, but the fact of it apparently is not. Under these circumstances. and with the marathon talks on 'mutual and

balanced force reductions” stalled, it would seem most unwise for the United States to consider any unilateral reduction in our present force level of 300,000 troops in Europe. Vice-President Mondale was right, in my judgment, in advising the N.A.T.O. Council that the United States will sustain and even increase its commitment to N.A.T.O. and will withdraw troops, or otherwise agree to reducing N.A.T.O. defence capabilities, only through a negotiated agreement with the Warsaw Pact nations for mutual force reductions. I would add two important qualifications: First, the United States cannot be expected to sustain — nor could Congress be expected to support — a high or increasing level of support for N.A.T.O. unless our European allies make a commensurate effort. Second, even'-if we do find it necessary to increase our support for N.A.T.O. for the time being, let us never lose sight of our broader object, which is to create the condi tions in which we can safely reduce, and not expand, our military effort. The new administration

has aiso taken a strong early lead toward curbing the spread of nuclear weapons capacity. President Carter has called for international controls to stop all exports of fuel enrichment and reprocessing technology which can produce weaponsgrade plutonium. But it is probably too late to prevent the’ further spread of nuclear weapons in the world. The genie is out of the bottle, and the technology can be developed even when it cannot be purchased. We must try, nonetheless, to conclude an international agreement prohibiting the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology to countries which do not possess nuclear weapons. If we cannot realistically hope to prevent altogether the further spread of nuclear weapons, we must still do all we can to restrain and retard it. Another problem confronting the new Administration — as complex in its morals as in its political implications — is the problem of economic and military assistance and arms sales abroad. Two basic dilemmas are involved: One is that some of the countries to which we sell or give arms and economic assistance, although friendly to the United States, are hostile to each other. The other dilemma is that certain of these countries. although conducting foreign policies which are

compatible with Our own, engage in internal practices which are offensive to our standard of human rights. The new President has said that he will seek to curb arms sales and that he will review proposed sales personally. Beyond that, the President and Congress must co-operate in devising means of resolving the two basic dilemmas.

Proposals to stop certain arms sales to Arab countries, for example, have been based on an entirely proper concern for the security of Israel, but have shown insufficient concern for the security of the Arab countries concerned — countries whose friendship is important to the United States. Similarly, objections to our military sales to Iran have been made on grounds of reported violations of human rights in that country as well as of extravagance and excessive American involvement.

All of these objections may be well-founded in one degree or another, but they fail to take account of Iran’s genuine security needs as a neighbour of the Soviet Union and also of Iran’s value to the United States as an ally.

I hope — and trust — that in its evaluation of these difficult issues, the new Administration will avoid the extremes of indifference to human rights on the one side and sanctimonious meddlesomeness on the other.