Efforts made to boost the cult of Hua

Press, 23 November 1976, Page 20

Efforts made to boost the cult of Hua

By

VICTOR ZORZA

in Washington

The position of Mao’s successor, Hua Kuo-feng, is by no means as secure as his propaganda machine would have us believe. He has got rid of Mao’s wife and her allies, but his attempt to gather all the power in his own hands is being challenged by some of his associates in the leadership. On the surface, they have closed their ranks after the purge of the four radical leaders. But while the world is being regaled with colourful stories about the radicals’ supposed crimes, under the surface a new struggle is taking shape. The first Peking statements which acclaimed Hua as Mao’s successor were models of restraint, leading Western analysts to conclude that the Mao cult would not be followed by the cult of Hua. It was ridiculous to imagine that Hua could step into Mao’s shoes, they reasoned — and the Peking politburo, which drew up those early statements, was obviously of the same mind.

The first speech by a Politburo member, the mayor of Peking, Wu Te, who presented Hua to the nation as Mao’s successor, was designed to show Hua as a member of the collective leadership, certainly the leading member, but no more than the first among equals. The speech was reinforced by a joint editorial in the three leading papers, including the “Army Daily” — a convention which is

used in Peking to tell the nation that an article repre’ sents the agreed views of the whole Politburo as well as, the Army leadership. But a week later a major effort to boost the cult of Hua became evident in a Peking press article. The defeat of the four radicals was now said to “prove the great role played by the leader of the party.” The recent events, it said, had demonstrated “the remarkable quality and outstanding ability, the revolutionary boldness and far-sighted vision” of Comrade Hua as — guess what — “the leader of our party.”

The article seemed to be arguing the case for personal rule by Hua as against the case for collective leadership which was being argued by others unnamed. First it discussed the theory of political leadership, drawing on Lenin to show that a Communist party “must have a leader.” To students of Communist leadership struggles these passages from Lenin have an eloquence all their own. They were used by both Stalin and Khrushchev to reply to their associates in the Kremlin who were challenging their attempts to build up their personal rule. Now it was Hua who was telling his own challengers that for Communists “to deny the leading role” of the party’s leader was to disarm the party. Who was it that dared to “deny” Hua’s leading role?

The purpose of the article was stated in its conclusion: “We must defend the leader of our party.” But who was attacking him? Certainly not the “gang of four,” which is safely in prison. The evidence suggests that Hua’s opponents are to be found within the Politburo itself. If the article had received the full approval of Hua’s associates in the Politburo, it would have been published as a joint editorial of the three papers. But it appeared only in the “Army Daily,” under the signature of its own editorial department. The Army had been instrumental in securing the succession for Hua. Now it was telling Hua’s Politburo associates that they had better forget about collective leadership, and knuckle under to him.

The next major article on the subject, after another week, showed that the opposition to Hua was coming under increasing pressure. It was no longer just Lenin, but the whole history of the communist movement that was used to show that the party must have its “own Marxist leader.” Now Hua’s opponents were being warned that when there is no “revolutionary leader” who could unite and organise the nation, “the revolution suffers setbacks and fails.” *They were thus being told that by challenging Hua’s leadership they were risking the defeat of the revolution. The same article took a big step in building up the personality cult of Hua, who was now lauded as a man of vision and revolutionary

mettle. His actions showed his "wisdom and insight, his far-sightedness and resolution.” The fulsome praise was acquiring the characteristic overtones of commun’ ist leader worship. Hua was modest and prudent, selfless and open, straightforward and loyal to the party. Against this background, the Peking posters which

have repeatedly announced the appointment, of Li Hsiennien, the Politburo's economic expert, as the new premier, acquire a new significance. If Li becomes premier, then Hua must give up the post. Official spokesmen say that the posters are wrong, but their appearance in the streets is probably inspired by those of Hua’s associates who would like

him to give up at least the post of premier, now that he

has become the party’s chairman and the Army’s “Supreme Commander.” Even Mao did not hold all three posts. They all know, if only from China’s painful experience in recent years, that power corrupts, and they want to make sure that no-one acquires the absolute power that corrupts absolutely.

The issues in the new Peking struggle are thus as momentous as any in the previous leadership conflicts. But once again intelligence experts in the West, who have come to rely on espionage for their facts, are refusing to give due weight to the analytical evidence in the absence of what they call “collateral confirmation.”

(c) 1976, Victor Zorza.