N.A.T.O. weighs up results of detente

Press, 7 August 1976, Page 12

N.A.T.O. weighs up results of detente

By

DAVID HAWORTH

in Brussels

It is one year since the so-called Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation was signed; since then the N.A.T.O. alliance has produced two unofficial balance sheets which detail the progress, oi lack of it, of detente between the West and the Soviet Union. The conclusion of these unpublished assessments is disappointing — reflecting comments by Western statesmen about dissatisfaction with the Soviet interpretation of detente. Although there have been marginal improvements in EastWest relations, it is clear these have not fundamentally altered the confrontat'onal character of the respective blocs in Europe, say N.A.T.O. officials in Brussels. They caution, however, against drawing too pessimistic conclusions from the last 12 months’ experience of detente. It is too early, they say, for a verdict to be given. Much could be achieved during the coming year leading up to the next conference (in Belgrade) which will be the first of a series of “revision conferences” during which each side will explain to the other the improvements they want if detente is to have any meaning at all. In the Soviet-led countries satisfaction with the political situation in Europe seems to be more clear-cut. The official organ of the Hungarian Communist Party, for example, says that developments Since the Final Act was signed have been "reassuring." Although it refers to "ceitain contradictory factors and temporary setbacks,” the article concludes that ‘it can be said with

certainty that in the lor term, the factors favour! detente and full applicatic of the Final Act of Helsink predominate.” But always in the bad ground are the ominou words of Mr Leonid Brezh nev, the Soviet leader, in an address to his party Con gress earlier this year when he said: “We do not conceal the fact that we see detente as a wav of creating more favourable conditions for the peaceful building of socialism and communism.”

Of course, that is not how the West views detent. The non-c.ommunist nations believe detente is something which has to be seen and felt if it is to have any credibility at all. Midway between the Helsinki conference and the Belgrade talks, this credibility is being seriously questioned by the West The Final Act consisted of three “baskets” or lists of objectives The first basket stressed the inviolability of European frontiers plus the princ’ple that there should be no intervention by either side in the internal affairs of countries within the respective spheres of influence. Also included in this category were “confidence-build-ing measures” whereby each side would inform the other of any intention to hold manoeuvres and would invite observers to them. Basket two calls for cooperation in economic and technological fields: there was to be a reciprocity of information. Finally, basket three provides for more “humanitarian” measures such as making it easier for people to leave the Soviet Union or fo marry a Westerner, easier distribution of Western newspapers in the Eastern bloc and giving Western journalists the

same rights of movement in Communist countries which are enjoyed by diplomats. The suspicion is hardening in the West that the Russians are no longer interested in what was decided in Helsinki. In other words, they achieved — in basket one — what they wanted, which was to confirm forever the frontiers which resulted in Europe at the end of World War 11. “Pravda” considers this principle “is one of the bases for peace in Europe” and in a recent article goes on to say that “already our continent, where all territorial problems have already been solved, where all borders are recognised as unalterable, can serve as an example to other continents.”

Be that as it may, the confidence-building measures arising from the Helsinki deal have produced the most

meagre results. The West has issued notification of seven manoeuvres, including three major ones involving more than 25,000 men and four minor ones with less than that number.

The only one to which invitations were issued was a major exercise held in West Germany last October. Although many Western observers attended, no Warsaw Pact member accepted the invitation.

The East’s scoreboard shows that the Soviet Union announced to the Helsinki signatories two manoeuvres of “about 25,000 troops,” one in January and the other in June this year. Moscow sent invitations to attend the January manoeuvres, near the Turkish frontier, to Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria. All accepted.

Invitations were also sent to Fin’and, Sweden. Norway,

Poland and East Germany to watch war games along the Finnish border in June. All accepted. Hungary announced to the press “in the spirit of Helsinki” a 10,000-man manoeuvre last April. But it did not invite any of the other Helsinki signatories to attend.

The basket two provisions calling for co-operation in the fields of economy, science, technology, and environment appear to be the least contentious part of the Final Act.

However, in spite of the nearly-unrestricted Western economic statistics, information, and technology available to the East, there has been very little movement in these areas from East to West.

What the West wants most is to sell in the East’s markets. To prepare for these markets it wants to

set up permanent business offices and facilities in the East and receive from the East better economic information and industrial and agricultural statistics, which are considered as State secrets by Moscow and its partners. The main desire of the Eastern countries is to be granted "most favoured nation” treatment to get more involved in East-West trade.

Basket three is the Achilles heel of the East. The Eastern nations regard basket three as a Western vehicle for conducting ideological penetration and a violation of their internal affairs. Implementation of its provisions has been very limited — and is expected to be tne most difficult in the future. — 0.F.N.5., Copyright.