THE PEKING PUZZLE ANCIENT TALE IMPORTANT IN SINO-SOVIET QUARREL

Press, Volume CXVI, Issue 34152, 13 May 1976, Page 16

THE PEKING PUZZLE ANCIENT TALE IMPORTANT IN SINO-SOVIET QUARREL

(By

VICTOR ZORZA

WASHINGTON.—Some of the pieces which make up the Peking jigsaw puzzle are beginning to fall into place. Separately, they may seem to ma?;e no sense at all. But when they are put together, they fit.

One such piece is the attempted bombing of the Russian Embassy in Peking. Another is the olive branch held out to Peking by “Pravda” just before the bombing occurred. The bombing was obviously an attempt by one of the Peking factions to blunt the Russian initiative, and to provoke the Kremlin into an outburst of anger which would lead to an angry response from Peking, thus; halting any progress toward an agreement.

The two events, one in Moscow and the other in Peking, are linked by one of those ancient stories in the Chinese press, treating of events 2000 years ago, which has long puzzled the experts.

The story concerned Emperor Wu’s relations with China’s ancient northern neighbour, the Huns, whom the reader was obviously intended to identify with today’s northern enemy, the Russians. The Huns were threatening China’s security {and integrity, but some im- ; perial officials wanted to re- ( spond to this by “a policy of conciliation,” because ’ they feared that the enemy’s I forces were stronger than ! theirs. i It seemed from the (context that the article might be intended to denounce presentday Chinese officials who were bent on a policy of reconciliation with Russia. But at the time the article appeared, two years ago, the suggestion that there might be any Chinese leaders who favoured reconciliation with Russia seemed so outlandish that it was rejected out of hand by most Western experts. Now, however, the article constitutes an _ important piece of the jigsaw puzzle. Last week’s "Pravda” suggested that the road to reconciliation might lead through territorial adjustments on both sides of the disputed Sino-Soviet border. Moscow made it clear in public — as it had done in private to the Chinese some years ago — that it was prepared to give up some bits of territory in exchange for others.

What the Peking article made clear two years ago was that there were also those in the Chinese leadership who were willing to give some land to the Russians as a first step to a reconciliation. For the article angrily condemned imperial officials who advocated 2000 years ago the surrender of territory to bring about “the

.reconciliation of the two chiefs.” They had warned of the terrible war which might engulf the two countries if their quarrel continued. They had argued that “territory is useless” when war was the alternative. At that time the prospect of war between China and Russia was being taken quite seriously by many Western policy makers. It obviously frightened some (Chinese leaders too — but the Maoist faction would not listen to them. We now know that it was the Maoist radicals who engineered the overthrow of the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Teng Hsiao-ping, earlier this year. What these articles show is that it was the moderates, led by Teng and attacked by the radicals, who wanted a reconciliation with Russia. Last summer, with Teng already under attack from the Maoists on a whole range of policy issues, the Peking press debate about the rights and wrongs of the ancient border quarrels became more heated. At the same time, Peking! ■was coming under increasing; : pressure from Moscow to re-1 turn the Russian crew; (whose helicopter had strayed; over the border into China. The Kremlin w r as dropping hints of dire retribution if the Chinese failed to respond. The Peking "conciliators,” it would seem, were willing to return the helicopter, but the radicals were not. Radical writers in the Peking press now attacked the ancients for rewarding the northern neighbour for his incursions with gifts designed to turn away his wrath and to win his friendship. They wanted to obey his orders “with heads bent,” they were prepared to pay humiliating tributes to him, they “practised appeasement and concession,” and they were “seeking to win peace I by means of lavish gifts.” Such policies, the radicals warned, were bound to lead to the surrender of land to the enemy “without putting up a fight.” The conciliators, on the other hand, had hoped that the “intruder” might be persuaded “to form an alliance.” Translated, this meant that Teng Hsiao-ping wanted to return the helicopter crew to Russia as a sign of goodwill which, he evidently hoped, would lead to a border settlement involving the surrender of some territory. This would at first reduce and then remove the threat

iof war, and perhaps even (lead to the restoration of (friendly relations, if not to a inew "alliance” between the two countries. , Then came the return of (the helicopter crew at the (turn of the year. It was accompanied by the gratuitous I Chinese admission that the .Russian airmen had not been (spying as Peking had previously claimed. This was I virtually an apology — something unheard of m 'Chinese-Soviet relations. I A concession of this kind \vould make no sense, in the context of Sino-Soviet hostility, unless it was intended Iby ' Peking as an olive (branch. But any response (Moscow might have made I was quickly overtaken by I the rapid march of events in ; Peking, the death of Chou |En-Lai. the demotion of (Teng Hsiao-ping, and by the (continuing struggle for jpow’er between the radicals and the moderates. It is now abundantly clear, with the reappearance lof some of the politburo |members who were clojsely associated with Teng Hsiaoping, that his downfall has |not brought about the final defeat of the moderate faction as such. The struggle continues — and one of the major issues in it, as is made clear by putting some of the new pieces in the jigsaw puzzle next to some of the old ones, is the search for a reconciliation between Russia and China. But now the radicals are throwing bombs instead of writing articles about ancient Chinese emperors. — Copyright 1976, Victor Zorza.