ARMS AND THE MAN WHAT WILL THE SHAH DO WITH ALL HIS WEAPONRY?

Press, Volume CXV, Issue 33987, 30 October 1975, Page 16

ARMS AND THE MAN WHAT WILL THE SHAH DO WITH ALL HIS WEAPONRY?

(ByS

STUART McMILLAN

of the literary staff of "The Press ' >

It is easier to be impressed by the arsenal the Shah of Iran is acquiring and by the earnestness, not to mention haste, with which he is acquiring it, than it is to discover who is the enemy he has in mind.

Take tanks. When the British deliver the last of the Chieftain tanks he has on order, Iran will have 3000 tanks. By 1980 it is likely to have 5000, which is more than the British, the French, and the Italians together. Or helicopters. When all orders arrive, Iran will have 640 helicopters — the largest military helicopter force outside the super-Powers.

Or aircraft. Iran is acquiring the late American swingwing fighter, the Fl 4 Tomcat, and the E2c Hawkeye surveillance plane. By 1980 Iran will have 850 fighter aircraft.

Or hovercraft. Iran alreadv patrols the Persian Gulf'with the biggest hovercraft fleet in the world. Or personnel carriers and artillery. These have been bought in large quantities from the Soviet Union to remind United States Congressmen that embargoes on selling arms might not embarrass the Shah as much as them. Or submarines. Iran has bought three of the post-war Tang class from the United States.

Or destroyers. Iran is building a huge new naval base at Chah Bahar, on the Arabian Sea, near the Pakistan border, and has six new Spruance-class destroyers on order from the United States. As well as all this Iran is! 'acquiring an Ibex in-| I telligence gathering system, i costing about SNZ4OO million, TOW anti-tank missiles, and laser-guided Smart bombs.

There may be reasons for being feaful as well as being impressed and puzzled. When a State arms in such

! a way it looks as if it may i ;be embarking on some mili-| tary adventure. The Shah is I I openly ambitious, favours a I ireturn of some of Persia’s; past glories, and rather, | smugly offers advice to the j 'Western world on how to! run its affairs. All this seems enough fori those who do not sell arms, to keep a wary eye on the, Shah and his intentions, j Ostensibly his reason is Ito maintain the stability of the Persian Gulf. Since 23 million barrels of oil. — 85 per cent of the non-Com-munist nation's supplies —j are taken from the Persian Gulf each day, the West has! considerable interest in the stability of the area. Hence! the encouragement the Shah' has been receiving from the' Americans and the British.

sj His position in the Middle > I East is helped by Iran’s -j unique status — a Moslem 11 country and an oil producer ■jwhich is not an Arab State. >1 Other Moslem States are I concerned with the Israeli>iArab conflict. Iran is not. Plans for Iran ,| For Iran, getting tne oil; I out means revenues which • | will enable industrialisation ■ to continue. Iran’s oil supplies have been estimated to, II run out within 25 years; the [lShah plans to have a mod|ern industrialised State, not I dependent on oil, before ■I then. The Shah also believes that the United States, which has warships in the Persian Gulf, will leave one day. He is not interested in ■ hastening the day, but con-j siders it is inevitable. His own forces will ensure that there is no “power vacuum.” The Shah has given little evidence of territorial ambitions. He did seize three tiny islands in 1971. the Greater and Less Tunbs and Abu Musa, claimed by members of the Union of Arab Emirates, but these lie in the Strait of Hormaz, which controls access to the Persian Gulf (the other States; I like to call it the Arabian j j Gulf). Iran’s possession of; I these strengthens its strate-j |gic hold on the Gulf. I Able to dominate I If the Shah has no territorial ambitions, he is nevertheless in a postion to dominate the Gulf States. His formidable force, when supplied and trained, would be enough to deter even the Soviet Union, should it de- ; cide to try to cross the border. Not that that is likely, * but if the United States did take any action to secure oil supplies by military means, i say by occupying Saudi 1 Arabia (the most likely ; move), who knows whath others would be tempted top do? < Iran's most outstanding 1 action in 1975, apart from': the the continuing military 11 build-up, was to end its i long-standing support forji the Kurds in Iraq. Therein,; 1 perhaps, lies one of the) 1 clues to the Shah’s in- < tentions. ; i What the Iraqis gave in'l

y | exchange for the end to -(lran’s support of the rebel si Kurds was an end to supa I port for the Baluchistan Libs; eration Front, which dreams r| of. and works for, a separate J; State of Baluchistan, now ypart of Pakistan. The Iraqis ; whose policies are closely r| aligned with the Soviet si Union’s, have long been supexporters of the Baluchis and in February. 1973, the Pakis- ; tanis raided the Iraqi Emf bassy and found large quan--1 tities of arms which were > believed to be destined for - the Baluchis. i Iranian Baluchis Because there are Baluchis ? jin Iran and Afghanistan, as 1 ; well as in Pakistan. Iran has ‘a strong interest in discouraging the separatist , movement. It is believed to 'be helping Pakistan against b the Baluchis. r i Besides the insurgency, land 'even territorial threat, J Iran has on its eastern bor.jder, there are Soviet interjests in the area. One story has it that the Soviet Union is encouraging both the Bajluchis and another ethnic I (minority, the Pathans, in i their separatist intentions, i The Russian hope is that it ■ 'would get access through > Afghanistan, and a separate ! Baluchistan, to the Arabian • Sea at Gwadar, thus acht ieving an old Russian dream. : Iran sees no reason to assist Russian designs, and the i Shah has said that if Pakis- . tan were in danger of disintegrating, Iran would take “protective action” in Baiui chistan. I But Iran’s interest in this, 1 as in the Gulf, is not territorial ambition, but stability, and the protection of its borders. It has also shown itself interested in stability in assisting the Sultan of Oman against rebels. Gener1 ally it has been opposed to the more radical States of Yemen and Iraq in the Gulf area. Decline of West j The Shah is haunted by ' another thought: that the I West is in decline. He has no j intention of allowing Iran to I decline with it. The greatness and glory of Iran is to be there for him and his son whatever the rest of the world likes to do with itself. The indications, are, however, that though he would certainly not like to see Iran any smaller, he would not like to see it any bigger either. This does not remove all worries. The Shah is bring supplied with huge quantities of weapons. Britain and the United States appear to have decided that if anyone is going to dominate the Gulf, and they are not able to, then it should be the Shah. Even if they are right that the Shah has no territorial ambitions, who is to say what may come later, when the Shah has gone? Who is to say what dreamer of grand dreams may take over? And w’ho is to say how he could be stopped?