The Press THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 1975. The fate of Indo-China

Press, Volume CXV, Issue 33803, 27 March 1975, Page 18

The Press THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 1975. The fate of Indo-China

The agreements signed in Paris two years ago were supposed to reinforce the point that the conflict in Indo-China could not be resolved by military means. This attitude was adopted by one side or the other for years, as each in turn saw hope of a favourable negotiated settlement. Now that the Paris agreements have served their purpose of allowing the United States to withdraw from the war they have become anachronistic. After all the hostility towards the United States because, at times, its leaders sought a military solution, it has been left to the North Vietnamese and their pro-Communist allies in South Vietnam and Cambodia to demonstrate that a military solution can, indeed, be found. The plight of the South Vietnamese Government is serious: that of the Cambodians is desperate. Phnom Penh and General Lon Nol’s Government survive only because of an American air-lift which will soon be cut off for want of funds and because the airport is likely to be overrun. A coalition Government can be expected to be set up with a majority of members drawn from supporters of Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge. At best, Cambodia will settle into an ambiguous neutrality; at worst, it is likely to become an outright satellite of North Vietnam.

In South Vietnam the outcome is not likely to be as quick or as decisive. The Saigon Government, fighting alone, is not as hard-pressed yet as it was, even with American assistance, during the great Communist offensive early in 1968. Without substantial assistance from abroad President Thieu is not likely, this time, to be able to restore the situation. The South Vietnamese withdrawals from much of the hinterland of their country appear to be a sensible consolidation of resources and population. Non-Communist South Vietnam is becoming a series of enclaves along the coast and in the Mekong delta. Unless the United States Congress has a remarkable change of heart, South Vietnam will receive no more than a trickle of military and financial assistance. President Thieu can hope for no more than to hold on to the enclaves indefinitely. Cynics might claim that the latest Communist successes “ prove ” that the war has been kept going only by American assistance to the South: more realistic observers will note that the majority of South Vietnamese continue to “ vote with their feet ” against the possibility of liberation bv North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. The people of Hue. the city which was all but overrun by the Communists in 1968. have a special reason for fleeing this time. Thousands of Vietnamese civilians were slaughtered by their Communist “ liberators ” in Hue seven years ago. Life as a refugee in President Thieu’s coastal enclaves is still preferable for the survivors.

Perhaps the American Congress is justified in not throwing even a few hundred million more dollars after the thousands of millions which have already been spent in Indo-China. The outcome can be delayed, but ever since the American withdrawal it has seemed unlikely that South Vietnam could survive for very long a determined Communist attack. Distaste for the war ought not to conceal the 'act that Communist pursuit of a military victory is being sought at the price of a huge and inhumane forced migration of the very people the North Vietnamese and their supporters profess to be attempting to save.