ARAB MISSILE THREAT

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33694, 18 November 1974, Page 17

ARAB MISSILE THREAT

(By

DREW MIDDLETON,

, of the New York Times News Service, through N.Z.P.A.)

WASHINGTON, November 17. Any evaluation of the possibility of renewed war in the Middle East must take into account two important military factors, according to Israeli and Western military sources. One is Egypt’s ability to get spare parts from the Soviet Union, and the other is Israel’s assessment of her capability to destroy Scud missile batteries in the Arab States.

At present, Israeli sources believe Egypt will obtain the necessary spare parts for tanks, missiles, and aircraft, after the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party (Mr Brezhnev) visits Cairo in January, and American intelligence sources think the Israelis feel they can knock out the Arab missiles.

The sources say that the Soviet Union is continuing to pour arms to Syria. Twenty Russian merchantmen are reported to be unloading weapons at the Syrian port, of Latakia, and there are reports, confirmed by United States defence analysts, that weapons deliveries to Iraq have increased recently.

The general intelligence analysis of the present war-or-peace situation in the

Middle East focuses on these factors:

The Syrian Army and Air Force have the material required for war now. The Syrian Government, however, is not prepared to fight a onefront war against Israel. Syria has the capability of reopening a war of attrition, including bombing, shelling, and offensive patrol activity in the Golan Heights, unless the United Nations mandate for supervising the ceasefire, which will expire at the end of this

month, is renewed. Israeli occupation forces, with the aid of a tested intelligence network, will suffice to stifle an expected renewal of guerrilla activity on the west bank of the Jordan River by the Palestine

Liberation Organisation. The Israeli defence force position on the Sinai Desert front is not as favourable as it was in 1973, when the Suez Canal was the initial line of defence. The Israelis today have less room for manoeuvre.

Israel remains short of the armoured personnel carriers it requires to fight a mobile war on two fronts: the Sinai and the Golan Heights. WEATHER FACTOR

The weather is a key factor in intelligence estimates dealing with a renewal of the war.

There is evidence that the Syrians would prefer to fight in winter, when cloud cover and rain would restrict the activities of the Israeli Air Force. There are indications that the Syrians and Iraqis have offered Egypt spare parts so

that the latter would be in a position to join in a general war this winter.

However, present estimates of Egypt’s logistical situation indicate that the country could not engage in operation on a scale comparable to those of 1973 without a large infusion of spare parts. As one intelligence source put it: “The tanks are there, but the Egyptians would be fools to begin fighting without at least 15 days supply of spare parts.” Israel’s main military preoccupation is the force of Scud surface-to-surface missiles in Egypt and Syria. These missiles, Israeli sources admit, would be the object of a pre-emptive strike in a crisis.

Both the Egyptians and the Syrians, however, keep the Scud missiles on the move, ostensibly for training purposes, thus complicating the Israeli job of knocking them out by air. CITIES VULNERABLE The Arabs’ expected use of Scud missiles, according to qualified sources, ensures that a new war in the Middle East would not be an “arena war” confined to the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Israeli military sources expect that the Egyptians and Syrians, unwilling to attempt to penetrate Israeli defences with manned aircraft, would employ surface-to-surface missiles for longrange attacks on Israeli cities.

This threat, however, has not yet prompted the Israelis to plan the evacuation of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and other large centres of population. The United States assumption is that the Israelis believe they can destroy the missiles in pre-emptive air strikes before they are fired.

The Israelis—as they did in 1973—might be overestimating their capabilities. NEW FIGHTERS American and other Western sources suggest that the job of finding and destroying the mobile missile batteries might be more dangerous, because both the Syrians and the Egyptians now can deploy the latest Soviet fighter aircraft.

The Syrians have been receiving MiG23s since early this year, and the Egyptian Air Force has at least 200 MiG2l fighters with Atoll air-to-air missiles. Israeli fighter bombers, these sources believe, would fight against better aircraft than they encountered in 1967 or 1973.

The Israeli ground problem is that of not enough armoured personnel carriers to provide the mobility needed in a two-front war. The Israelis want the newest American personnel carriers, but, as an Israeli admitted ruefully, “so does the United States Army.”