Germ warfare plan in 1944

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33563, 18 June 1974, Page 9

Germ warfare plan in 1944

(.V.Z Press Assn—Copyright, LONDON. Britain briefly contemplated the use of gas and germ warfare in Europe during the Second World War, according to a war history published in London. Military chiefs who cautioned against the use of gas and germ warfare might have reached a different conclusion if a “mysterious” bacteriological strain codenamed “N” had been a year further advanced, says the author, Roger Parkinson. . Parkinson’s book, “A Day’s March Nearer Home,” is the final volume of a trilogy about the war. based on War Cabinet documents only recently released.

He also says: “Winston Churchill’s health was a continual source of concern, to military chiefs,. who at times found him a quarrelsome and 'prickly’ Prime Minister.”

Churchill gave a “glowing assessment” of the Soviedictator, Josef Stalin after their summit meeting at Yalta.

Parkinson, a journalist and military historian says that a detailed report on gas and germ warfare was drawn up in July. 1944, after being called for by Winston Churchill. RETALIATION The measures were considered as a possible means of retaliating against German rocket attacks bn Britain and of shortening the war, Parkinson says. The Joint Planning Staff completed a “chilling” report that ruled out the use of gas but hinted that germ warfare might have advantages, he says. The report concluded that British use of gas would achieve an initial tactical advantage but would restrict allied movements afterwards. If the Germans retaliated by using gas on England, public morale might be affected, it warned. The military chiefs expressed interest in a bacteriological strain codenamed “N” being developed for possible germ warfare. POSSIBLY ANTHRAX They reported that this “N” — which Parkinson says was possibly anthrax — “could probably make a substantial change in the war situation.” The military chiefs report"THE PRESS" CARRIES YOUR MESSAGE EARLY TO MORE THAN 200,000 READERS LN CITY, SUBURBS AND COUNTRY.

ed: “There seems to be little doubt that the use of bac- j teriological warfare would j cause heavy casualties, panic I and confusion in the areas affected.” They concludes ] that it was out of the ques-i tion at that moment, adding.: “There is no likelihood of aj sustained attack being pos-1 sible before the middle of! 1945.” Parkinson says that noj further references were ’ made in official documents] io this report or to sugges-] tions that Britain might initiate gas or germ warfare. Nor, he rays, are references to this or any other discussion of the subject to be found in the official war histories. BRIEF MOMENT “Yet for one brief I moment, Britain contemplated the use of these terrible weapons which the I Government had repeatedly ; declared she would never employ unless the enemy did iso first,” he says. I “And the possibility exists I that the Joint Planning Staff ■ report of July 16 might have | reached a different con-

elusion if Britain’s devel-l jopment of the mysterious] I N’ had been a year further j advanced. CHURCHILL’S HEALTH Parkinson says . that] I Churchill, then aged 69, sufTered a minor heart attack] I during a visit to Tunis, North ] Africa, on December 15, 1943, and his personal physician, Lord Moran, feared ! Churchill was close to death. I At other times Churchill ]appeared to be “rambling” at meetings with top civil I servants and military chiefs, he says. “Even the cold official War Cabinet minutes reveal a certain mental deterioration, with Churchill sometimes seemingly .unable to I reach a decision or even express his opinions in a coherent manner,” Parkinson writes. “SCHOOLMASTERLY” The “prickly” Prime Minister argued frequently with his military chiefs about strategy — and at one stage sent a “schoolmasterly” memo to the Director of Military Intelligence advis- • ing him to consult "Fowler’s

Modern English Usage” on the correct use of the words, “intense” and “intensive.” Parkinson says that the; Chief of the Imperial! General Staff (Sir Alan; Brooke) played a central! I role along with Churchill. Referring to their “partnership,” he says that the two men formed a “most efficient contrast.” He described Churchill as “romantic, ebullient, usually supremely optimistic” and Brooke as “hard-headed, careful, usually extremely pessimistic.” He notes that the military chiefs of staff remained an unknown body to the general public and that Brooke found himself unrecognised in the victory parade. Parkinson also says that Churchill gave the British War Cabinet a "glowing assessment” of Josef Stalin’s personality and intentions. It was only later as Soviet troops were pressing toward Berlin that Churchill’s apprehensions about Stalin’s intentions grew, the author says. ______