SINO-SOVIET RIFT KISSINGER’S CONCERN ABOUT IMPACT ON U.S. RELATIONS

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33534, 15 May 1974, Page 12

SINO-SOVIET RIFT KISSINGER’S CONCERN ABOUT IMPACT ON U.S. RELATIONS

(By

VICTOR ZORZA)

Eyewitnesses who claim to have seen medical experiments performed on children to “extract their blood, gouge their eyes, cut out their intestines, and boil them in oil” recently addressed a mass meeting in Paoshan, in China. The grisly details, as broadcast by the local radio, were intended to drive home the lesson that the “imperialists” who had in this way “slaughtered” 2000 Chinese children before China s liberation were no better now than they had been then. The nationality of the “imperialists” was not specified, but the broadcast left the strong impression that they were Americans.

The United States-Chinese! honeymoon arranged by Dr Henry Kissinger, during I which anti-American propaganda had virtually disappeared from the Chinese press and radio, is obviously in danger. On the SinoSoviet front, too, the Kremlin threat about the “inevitable consequences” that will follow if China fails to release the recently detained Soviet helicopter crew provides a new danger signal. Why should Peking seem to invite trouble with both Moscow and Washington at the same time? It does not make political sense, especially in the light of Dr Kissinger’s privately expressed concern about the possibility of war between Russia and China. He believes that the next three years will determine whether there will be war or peace between Russia and China. He thinks that the most dangerous time is now, because three years from now China’s nuclear arsenal will be too powerful to be attacked by Russia without risk of retaliation.

Some of Dr Kissinger’s' critics suspect that he had an ulterior political motive in leaking this estimate to ai Washington columnist. Was | he implying that this was too dangerous a time to im-[ peach President Nixon? It' certainly seems so. Dr Kissinger's argument is ] that we are now entering a crucial period which will de- ] cide not only the question of war and peace between Russia and China. It will also determine, he believes, whether the nuclear arms race will get out of control, whether peace or war could prevail in the Middle East, whether Europe will resume its partnership with the United States or provoke a United States retreat into isolation. Role of leaks The rules of the Washington game, which have to be understood in order to appreciate the political role of leaks — would normally prevent a columnist from attributing a leak directly to Dr Kissinger, and from discussing his motives. Happily, Dr Kissinger’s latest

[leak appeared in a New [York column by James Res[ton, the most respected of [Washington’s columnists. This makes it possible to i apply to it a yardstick which, as Dr Kissinger once ' confided to this writer, he [uses himself when reading [Washington columns. He [reads them, he says, not for [the information they contain, but to find out who in Washington is leading what to whom and why. It must be left to the analyst of American domestic politics to measure, in keeping with Dr Kissinger’s own yardstick, the extent, if ! any. which his leak was intended to help Mr Nixon. iWhat the foreign policy [analyst must do is point out [that Dr Kissinger’s periodic outbursts of alarm about a Soviet attack on China predate Mr Nixon’s troubles Nor have they been confined to deliberate leaks to columnists. Some Washington officials say that he harps on this theme during Government meetings too. but they maintain that the probability of any such Soviet move is very small. Moscow’s own response to such leaks in the past must not be ignored. The Kremlin sees them as attempts to perpetuate the Sino-Soviet rift by convincing Peking that it is in serious danger from Russia. This in turn makes it possible for Dr Kissinger to plav the China card in his dealings with Moscow, as he did, with considerable effect, during the S.A.LT. I negotiations. Opposite views

But Peking is not (repeat not) now moving closer to Washington. The gory broadcast from Paoshan is only the most dramatic sign of moves in the opposite direction. They first became evident last summer, but [when they were put to Dr [Kissinger, he dismissed them |as of no consequence. He insisted that the Peking Jeadlership debate was concerned with domestic issues, and that anyway it had been “essentially terminated” by September. When it became obvious recently that the quarrel, far from having ended, was becoming increasingly bitter, he asked the C.I.A. for a special estimate of the impact the debate might have on United States-Chi-nese relations. The C.I.A. could no longer maintain that the debate had been “terminated”, but it again concluded that foreign policy played no major role in it. But, as a later column will argue, the C.I.A. is wrong again. The West has repeatedly made major blunders in its view of Sino-Soviet relations. The refusal of most government and academic analysts to accept 15 years ago the evidence which pointed to the existence of the then secret MoscowPeking quarrel is now acknowledged to have been in error of historic proportions. The present refusal to abandon the new conventional wisdom could have equally far-reaching repercussions onthe whole future of EastWest relations. (Copyright 1974 Victor Zorza)