U.S.-Soviet ties: real or fake?

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33487, 19 March 1974, Page 13

U.S.-Soviet ties: real or fake?

WASHINGTON, March 18.

The United States Secretary of State (Dr Henry Kissinger) is returning to Moscow again fairly soon, to ask — and to answer — some awkward questions about the state of American - Soviet relations, writes James Reston, of the New York Times News Service (through N.Z.P.A.)

The reason for his visit is fairly obvious: he has to find out if his affair with Moscow is real or fake. Both sides have been supporting the notibn of detente, or peaceful coexistence, but increasing their military budgets while talking about reducing them. They glorify trade while differing about the terms of that trade, and proclaim their desire for peace in the Middle East while shipping arms to their belligerent clients. There is something false at the bottom of this Washing-ton-Moscow "detente” and both 'sides know it. On the surface, things are much better. Dr Kissinger and ambassador Dobrynin talk much more — and much more frankly — than in the old Cold War days. The two sides meet in Geneva to discuss the control of strategic arms, and Mr Nixon and the Soviet Communist Party General Secretary (Mr Brezhnev) will meet. again soon to discuss the peace and the world order their peoples want. In the meantime, however, President Nixon is asking for the largest peace-time military budget in history; the Soviet Union is building up its forces in Europe and urging the Arabs to maintain their oil embargo against the United States; and President Pompidou of France has been in the Soviet Union, demonstrating his "independence” of the United States, and weakening the Western alliance.

So there are obviously some awkward question to be asked on both sides before Mr Nixon makes his next appearance on satellite tele-

vision from the Kremlin. For example:

If the Soviet Union is really serious about reaching a mutual reduction of military forces in Europe, why does it now have 10 tank and 10 motor-rifle divisions with 45,000 tanks west of the Urals, an increase of 9000 in the last three years? Why some 31 or 32 Soviet divisions in Central arid Eastern Europe, with 430,000 to 450,000 men in place in these areas, and more than 4000 new armoured personnelcarriers since 1969? Why, if Moscow is really serious about the principles of the last Nixon-Brezhnev doctrine for a new world order, should there be such a frantic build-up of Soviet naval and missile! power?

The Russians also have some unanswered questions: Why a record peace-time military budget in America when the Nixon Administration is boasting about it new accommodation with Moscow, and struggling with inflation and a recession at home? Why all this talk out of Washington about expanding world trade, while denying to the Soviet Union equal trade terms with other " most favoured nations?” Why does Washington defend the principle of “noninterference” in the internal affairs of other nations, and still interfere in the Soviet Union’s policy of deciding who should be allowed to emigrate from the U.S.S.S.R.? It will not be easy for Dr

e| Kissinger to ask all these : questions, for there is obvie ously a difference between i the words and the action, a the propaganda, and the - policies on both sides. It is - good politics at home for ', both Mr Nixon and Mr - Brezhnev to talk about “det tente” and “peaceful coexistence,” but there is somef thing bogus about their pro- - testations of good faith, and , neither side is taking any s chances. J The result is that Cont gress is not going along with Mr Nixon and Dr Kissinger i In their appeals to grant - Moscow most-favoured- ; nation trading rights, or to r forget about the Soviet ■ Union’s emigration policy t governing Russian Jews. Dr Kissinger, on his forth--1 coming visit, will be looking 1 for genuine agreements on the arms talks, the Middle East talks, and the balance of power in Europe and on the oceans: and, if he can get them, Congress may cooperate on trade. But this time, -Congress will be looking for policy, and not propaganda—certainly not for a splashy diversion from the impeachment proceedings in the House —and this could be the most difficult assignment of Dr Kissinger’s career.