SOVIET SEAPOWER MINISTER ARGUES CASE FOR STRONGER NAVY IN FUTURE

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33464, 20 February 1974, Page 12

SOVIET SEAPOWER MINISTER ARGUES CASE FOR STRONGER NAVY IN FUTURE

(By VICTOR ZORZA) The Soviet. Navy Minister (Admiral Sergei Gorshkov), has written a series of articles which constitutes the most powerful open expression of the secret fight for funds now in progress in the Kremlin. He tells the Kremlin, by implication, that if it does not provide the money he wants, the Soviet Union will not be able to achieve its policy objectives.

Admiral Gorshkov tells the Kremlin that “every time the ruling circles of Russia failed to emphasise properly the development of the navy and its maintenance at a level made necessary by contemporary demands, the country either lost battles or wars, or its peace time policy failed to achieve the intended objectives”. This quotation, which gives the flavour of what has become known to intelligence analysts as “The Gorshkov Collection", also provides a clue to his method. The series of 11 articles in a Soviet naval journal is a supposedly historical study of the role of navies in peace and war, but it is history brought up to date and

even projected into the future in a way designed to assert the navy’s claims in the current Kremlin debate.

i Admiral Gorshkov says [that his series is designed to [bring about “unity of views” lon the role of the navy, i which means that no such [unity exists. He hints at an I alliance between President [Nixon and some unnamed Soviet leaders who do not want too strong a Soviet navy. He quotes a speech in which Mr Nixon pointed to the fact that the United [States was primarily a sea power, and the Soviet Union a land power, and suggested that they therefore needed different kinds of forces.

This, according to Gorshkov, was “a modern version of the old statements” designed to show that Russia did not need a strong navy. He equates Mr Nixon’s view with the arguments of internal “opponents of Russian seapower” who claimed that their country could be made powerful only by strengthening the army “at the expense of the navy”.

Rivalry for funds A whole series of similarly pointed remarks scattered throughout the Gorshkov articles point, to an army-navy rivalry for funds and for missions, but his main complaint appears to

(be directed against the political leadership. The anti[navy argument, he says. I often found ardent supporters “among influential Tsarist dignitaries”, a code he uses repeatedly to designate Kremlin politicians. These officials, he complains, used it as justification “to curtail in every way possible” the ,jexpenditures on building the I navy.

Is this what the Politburo is doing now? The build-up of the Soviet Navy which is now in progress would appear to refute any such interpretation. But Admiral Gorshkov is not arguing about the present. It is the future he is concerned about. Indeed, it now takes something like a dozen years, from the moment of decision, to design and to build a new class of warship and to introduce it into the service. What Admiral Gorshkov is saying, in effect, is that unless the right decisions are made now. the Soviet Union will be reduced to the rank of a second-class power in the eighties.

< Economic planning [ It may seem a remote [prospect, but the issue is a [real one. Some of the most important decisions being made by governments nowadays have to take into account the long lead — times which the nature of modern technology and the complexity of modern industry impose on their planning. The Soviet Navy debate, which became apparent with the publication of the Gorshkov series last year, is part and parcel of the wider Soviet debate on the new 15year economic plan which is to be announced next year.

The debate on the 15-year plan, which is now getting under way, affects every aspect of Soviet politics and economics, of foreign policy and domestic development. But the habitual secrecy with which the debate is conducted makes it possible to discern so far only its general outlines. Perhaps the most important part of the debate concerns the durability of debate, and the allocation of resources between civilian and military needs, depending on whether detente is likely to prove lasting or not. But the prospects of detente are endangered, according to the argument now being pressed strongly by Soviet hardliners, by the military build-up proceeding i the United States. Admiral Gorshkov’s reply to this is to build up Russia’s own forces — and this in turn is being used in the United States as an argument for building up United States forces. The Gorshkov series is so unique a document that it is like!, to play a major role in this controversy, both in the Soviet Union and in the United States. Th. aurrent issue of the “Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute” publishes the first of 11 monthly instalments of the. Gorshkov collection. It is a document of which much more will be heard in the future, as the great naval race begins to gathe: momentum.

Copyright 1974 Victor Zorza.