COMMENT FROM THE CAPITAL REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL AND NAVAL DEFENCE NEEDS

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33456, 11 February 1974, Page 12

COMMENT FROM THE CAPITAL REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL AND NAVAL DEFENCE NEEDS

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CEDRIC MENTIPLAY)

WELLINGTON. February 10.—The possibility of the early reopening the Suez Canal, after a closure to traffic of more than six years, may force a complete reappraisal of New Zealand's naval defence needs. Until now. though the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a non- ■ military zone has been desirable in New Zealand eyes, our political leaders i have not regarded this with the same concern as has Australia. New j Zealand’s main naval commitment has tended to remain that of convoy I and trade route protection in the Pacific area.

Australia, on the cther.b hand, has been deeply con- d cerned for some years at theli build-up of naval fleets, no- c tably that of Soviet Russia. 1 in the Indian Ocean. The ( most recent Australian < defence White Paper refers < specifically to this, and Aus- J tralian Defence Department reports indicate that plans < for defence from the Indian Ocean side have included the ( opening of extra bases (one ] in Western Australia) and , the strengthening of patrol < potential. ( I For New Zealand, the r | closing of the canal on June f 16, 1567, was a traumatic ex-|t perience though the possib- j ility of closing had been a (t factor from the time of thela Second World War to the' Egyptian take-over of the;, canal and the attempted , Franco-British intervention ■. I of 1956. i. New Zealanders, accus- ( ■ tomed to regard the Suez), Canal as Britain’s lifeline of . empire, probably failed to j note that massive quantities ) , of New Zealand primary . produce reached Britain by { other routes during the war , years when the Axis forces ■ effectively closed the Medi- , . terranean. When the canal i { was sealed in 1956, and | again in 1967, the con- 1 ) sequent rerouting of Britain- , ) bound produce was merely ; . an annoyance and an added ; ’ cost-factor in a world of ; plenteous oil supplies. Today- values have . {changed. If the canal is re- > ■ opened, it will provide a( shorter route, less ex-| penditure of oil. and at. leastH [a check on rising transport) ) costs. The New Zealand; ; Shipping Corporation and)! ! the Conference Lines would ! ; be bound to make some use 1 ! of the canal. : XT I 1 Naval power game But there have been other ] ' changes in the past few ' years. Soviet Russia has 1 ; emerged both as a maritime , trading nation and as a , 1 sea power. Immense Russian ! ) fishing fleets farm the!' ' oceans, and, as Russian com-)* • munities, are protected by!.

Russian warships. In the Indian Ocean, the {southern gateway to the (Suez Canal, the Soviet Navy I has had a continuous presence since 1968. Recent, re{ports indicate that Russia {maintains about 20 ships in, {the area, generally on lhe.) ) “floating-base" system.) [which means that they are [refuelled, provisioned and) {tended by a highly complex) I “fleet train”. ) One Russian force obiserved in the Indian Ocean [ recently comprised supply I ships, a medium-sized modlern cruiser with missile ( capacity, three destroyers, and some submarines with) two submarine mother ships in attendance, it was in; international waters, and was obviously not merely“passing through”. The Royal Australian) Navy considers its resources; are minimal to observe a[ force like this. The Com-) monwealth Government has-

been trying to reduce I defence expenditure, which is more than ten times that I of New Zealand's; but the; latest information from I Canberra suggests that naval) orders will account for another sharp increase this year. The early reopening of the Suez Canal could be a reason for this. In the Suez Canal, controlled by the Egyptian Government, Russia would have a perfect sea-lane between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, allowing swift reinforcement in either direction. It would be a lane subject to possible closure to the ships of other nations in a crisis. United States forces are in; the Mediterranean and the) Indian Ocean. Governments; of Arab States engaged in the present oil power-play { could be expected to watch the movements of American ships keenly, and to regard a Russian force as friendly I rather than neutral. Neutral zone theory During his recent sixnation Asian visit, our Prime Minister (Mr Kirk) heard frequent references to the United Nations resolution defining the Indian Ocean as a “zone of peace,” — free from naval bases or power proliferation. The Indian Prime Minister) (Mrs Gandhi) and the Prime. Minister of Bangladesh) (Sheikh Mujibur Rahman); have indicated their firm belief in this resolution. Mr I Kirk has promised New Zea-; land’s support, and there has: been agreement by mosti nations of the Western bloc. ; But. this applies to the! present situation, with ! smallish, isolated task-forces using the Indian Ocean as a highway between South-East! Asia and the African coast. What will happen when the) way is opened to the Middle, East and the Mediterranean' is not known; obviously the pressures will increase. Neither India nor Bangla-’

|desh is in a position to say |no to Russia if asked for bases in the Indian Ocean (or if an island base is established. A new Russian (strategy has brought the Soviet Union into the Asian sub-continent in the guise of ia friendly Big Brother, rather than the greedy monster of other years. To Mr Kirk's party, Mrs Gandhi expressed her appreciation of Russia’s help to India during the recent gram shortage. Russia is helping, and will continue help, by providing grain in return for products of India's increasing manufacturing industries. The situation tn the Bay of Bengal would make it (even harder for Sheikh i) Mujibur Rahman to dent a ;; Russian request. The fight - ring in and around the Bay of Bengal before the birth of i; Bangladesh left massive •wreckage in its wake. h In Chittagong today Russian salvage and port clearance teams are well-estab-lished. They have done prodigious work. Bangladesh, like India, has its own commercial shipping line in ' operation and Russia is ; helping to make it a success. ) Strategists have predicted ; a move westward of the , troubles which have beset i South-East Asia and hate {wracked Laos, Cambodia and .(Vietnam. If this occurs, the (Bay of Bengal will hate a '{special significance. Not. i many tears ago the United (States proposed a ship canal through the Kra Isthmus ((which extends from Thailand to the Malacca Strait). This ..I'Uld allow a fleet to ■ pass from the China Sea to [the Bay of Bengal. I Whatever changes occur, [it is difficult to see how New Zealand can escape injvolvement, with Australia, in Indian Ocean defence. Anil other question is whether the larger naval powers can be persuaded to regard the {ocean merely as a “zone of IpeaceF _