COMMENT FROM THE CAPITAL ASIAN ATTITUDES TO LINK WITH A.N.Z.U.S. AND S.E.A.T.O.

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33444, 28 January 1974, Page 18

COMMENT FROM THE CAPITAL ASIAN ATTITUDES TO LINK WITH A.N.Z.U.S. AND S.E.A.T.O.

/'By

CEDRIC MENTIPLAY)

' WELLINGTON. January 27.—The holding of the twenty-third meeting of the A.N.Z.U.S. Council in Wellington next month is another instance of how the world is changing. The meeting will simply He a gathering of I three men and their advisors, the United States Deputy Secretary of , State (Mr Kenneth Rush), the Australian Minister for Foreign Affair' ' (Senator D. Willesee). and our Minister of Foreign Affair.' (Mr Kirk). The A.N.Z.U.S. meeting has never been anything more than a private forum for discussion on matters of interest to the three nations, hut during Mr Kirk's recent tour of Asian nations there was evidence that opinion-formers in some of those countries regarded A.N.Z.U.S. with I doubt.

: In press conferences in Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur. New Delhi and Dacca, local journalists tended to return to the theme of New Zealand's alleged links with the SouthEast Asian Treaty OrganisaIt io n . A.N.Z.U.S. and! A.N.Z.U.K.. which were invariably described as “mili-[ tant and military.”

■ These journalists were not trying to make trouble. They |were honestly confused, for i instance, to find a relationship between New Zealand’s! continued membership of | S.E.A.T.O. and Mr Kirk’s joften-repeated wish to help, and co-operate with In-, Idonesia. For them the years' of confrontation between 1 Malaysia and Indonesia were not so far away.

To some. A.N.Z.U.S. was a kind of secret power play by which Australia. New Zealand and the United States could manoeuvre together. If this view is partially accepted in each of the countries Mr Kirk visited, attitudes could be sharply different. Malaysia and Singa-; pore might regard the asso-l ciation as an additional, [guarantee. Indonesia as a! threat, and India as something more from which to stand aloof. In each case Mr Kirk made it. clear exactly what A.N.Z.U.S. was—a guarantee given by the United States to Australia and New Zealand when the peace agreement with Japan was signed. The three powers undertake to defend each other against attack — but it is clearly understood that the power to be defended against is Japan's resurgent strength.

Common problems The greatest value of the' A.N.Z.U.S. meeting is that it! provides a forum in which! the Foreign Ministers of the! large Power and the two smaller ones can talk freely about common problems. As the portfolios relate to foreign affairs and not to ! defence, the view is through 'political and diplomatic eyes. Over the years the need for A.N.Z.U.S. has appeared differently to our Prime Ministers. The late Sir Sidney Holland regarded it as minor, perhaps he communicated this view to Sir Keith iHolvoake. Sometimes the 1 meeting was deferred forj I various reasons until the; 'last minute. Latterly a more favourable; view has been taken. How much pressure, if any, has been exerted by the United States on Australia and New Zealand through A.N.Z.U.S. cannot be assessed.

The pattern of history shows, however, that concern for security in the Pacific produced the A.N.Z.U.S. pact in 1951. Until then, Britain’s policy was the policy of Australia and New Zealand, but the calling-in of the United States suggested a doubt by both Tasman;

■ nations of Britain's ability to keep peace in the Pacific. The next happening was : significant. In 1954 New [Zealand and Australia bejeame separate parties, with ißritain, to the South-East; Asia Treaty Organisation. It iis significant also that New Zealand did not follow Britain in her recognition of I Communist China but waited until the United States formally recognised Peking and rejected Taiwan. S.E.A.T.O. involvement

It was obvious in In[donesia and India that [New Zealand’s involvement 'with S.E.A.T.O. was regarded with some suspicion. In [at least one case a question [on the subject followed on [about A.N.Z.U.S. Mr Kirk came very close to saying that A.N.Z.U.S. was ourl business.

Mr Kirk’s explanation of S.E.A.T.O. was that “When we came to power we had [every intention of dropping jthe South-East Asia Treaty [Organisation. We found on making a closer survey of [the situation, however, that! [only by retaining membership could we be sure of certain commitments being met. We accordingly moved for the dismantling of the military part of S.E.A.T.O. and then stayed on as a member.” Mr Kirk also explained that New Zealand would remain in S.E.A.T.O. until something better evolved. Perhaps the military side of S.E.A.T.O. has tended to be emphasised in the non-member Asian countries, which have lost sight of the aid projects for which the organisation is [also responsible. ; Mr Kirk was questioned by journalists in all the [countries he visited on his intentions about New Zealand membership of the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations. His firm

reply was a ways the same; New Zealand has no in- | tention of trying to become [a member of A.S.E.A.N. The [preference is to make bipartite agreement with each individual member. Some journalists were impressed by this reply. They [commented on the difference between Australian and NewZealand attitudes. Australia is obviously trying to join; New Zealand has virtually [admitted that A.S.E.A.N. (Indonesia. Malaysia. Sing- ; apore, Thailand, the Philip-

lines) is not for “outsiders.” [even if Japan is included tn [that bracket. But if other ■ countries are considered [(and Burma has been menItioned), New Zealand’s i claim would not be discarded i Inevitably there were I some strong queries in Indonesia about how long New’ [Zealand troops would remain in Malaysia and Singapore. Mr Kirk’s reply again [did not vary: “They have [been asked for. They will remain as long as they are [needed, and they will leave [very quickly afterwards." . It is doubtful whether In idonesia is deeply concerned, [for it has a large and surprisingly well-equipped army. In any event Mr Kirk w'ent from Indonesia to Singapore to announce that New Zealand forces would be independent. This was an easy way of defusing a situation which had become somewhat unbalanced after British policy changes and the Australian withdrawal. But significantly, nobody in Malaysia, in or out of authority, expressed a wish for the New' Zealanders to withdraw. Tun Abdul Razak, who once suggested they could [be withdrawn, now says he iis glad of their presence. The next move will be for the five-Power force to take its manoeuvres overseas possibly as far as New Zealand, the idea being all a matter of convivial fun and Army games.