Israeli election unpopular

Press, Volume CXIII, Issue 33417, 26 December 1973, Page 9

Israeli election unpopular

Bv

EDWARD MORTIMER.

of The Time!, through N.Z.P.A.)

Israeli voters will go to the polls next Monday for a General Election which is, by general con-; sent, the most serious; they have ever faced. \et a recent opinion poll showed that 10 per cent of them had not made up their minds how to vote.; and it is very likely that, many of them will decide nnt to vote at all. The election is unpopular for two reasons. First. Israe- ' who have just fought hard ».-.d desperately against the Arabs, and know that theirountry is still in the throes: ct a national and international, crisis, find it distasteful to' see their leaders concentrate; r n fighting each other—as. in an election campaign, they! cannot help doing. Second.; ”ere ts a widespread feeling, that the nature of the politi-i cal system deprives the voter! of any real choice. Throughout the 25 years of 'he State’s existence, the Lab-; eur Party has dominated) covernment. and there is virtually no prospect that this! "111 change The onlv altema-i ’"e gnvernm®n’ would he on® dominated b' the Right- 1 •one coalition. Likud, and led ”” Mr Menachem R®gin—''meh is not nece«sarilv the *' P“ of chance that voters a ” And unless the swing, the Right is much greater’ ’nan most peonle expect. *ven such a government would need the support of lemems from the present coalman: the National Religi-

•ous Party and probably ai splinter group from the Rightwing of the Labour Party, iled by General Dayan. There ts no doubt that the! ‘Likud will make substantial gains, if only because it is | the main Opposition. Dissatisfaction with the Government Jis intense, and in many cases it is not specifically either I “hawkish” or “dovish.” Both hawks and doves agree that The Government’s compla-l icency was largely responsible] for the nation’s being taken] by surprise on October 6, and for the confusion over: supplies. communications.! and command structures that hampered the war effort once it got going. Three people are especially blamed for this state of affairs: Mrs Meir herself. General Dayan, and Mr Israel Galili the Minister-without-!portfolio and dominant figure in Mrs Meir’s “kitchen Cab--1 inet.” Genera! Dayan’s prestige, which was the dominant force in Israeli politics beifore October 6, has slumped ; disastrously: according to •one opinion poll, fewer people i would now like him as Prime I Minister than would like Mr I Abba Eban. The Likud, however, while benefiting from this disenchantment with General Dayan, is not seeking to exploit it directly. No doubt it sees him, as a kindred spirit and hones to tempt him into a Right-wing government. The favourite butt of Right’wing attacks is the Finance Minister. Mr Pinhas Sapir. who is accused of undermining the nation’s morale bv a corrupt economics policy based on personal relation-

(ships and ad hoc arrange-; Intents, and, particularly, of! undermining the armed forces I • by paring down the Defence | 'Budget. On domestic issues, Mr i Sapir has also been attacked; by the Left, and especially! the trade unions: but for the] moment the doves in the La- ’ bour Party are prepared to j accept him as their leader, | and his position within the] party is strong. ' Some say that in mid- ! November Mr Sapir and his; friends were actually prepar-' ! ing to do this, but got cold | i feet after reading the first ] (opinion poll, which showed a massive swing to Likud. Interpreting this as the ‘sign of a hawkish mood in the electorate, they then decided that to drop General Dayan would be too dangerous. The doves believe that this was a mistake, that what the polls really showed was a lack of confidence in the Labour leadership, and that a new leadership would be able to. win back Labour support. As it was, the Labour executive on November 28 did not attempt to change the leadership, but adopted a new 14-point programme which. while reiterating Israel’s well-known stand that she “will not return to the June 4, 1967. borders, j which were a temptation to aggression,” none the less :avoided making any specific I territorial claims, and, while I rejecting the idea of a sepiarate Palestinian State, did go iso far as to recognise “the ‘national identity of the Jordanians and PalesI tinians.” This result has left the

doves with a strong sense, of; frustration, not to say out-i rage. Many people regard it as a national scandal that the! Meir-Dayan-Galili trio should! still be leading the party, and) that the party as a whole should have given neither] the electorate nor the world) any clear indication of the] peace proposals it. would put; |to the Arabs. Unfortunately, the Israeli] 'version of proportional repre-; sentation —a strict list system; I with no provision for. per-1 Isonal preferences—offers the (voters no chance to influence] I the policy of the party he! ’votes for. or to show which of its leaders he supports. In this situation, tradi-! itional Labour voters feel ‘tempted to punish their party |by voting for one of the two '"peace lists”—the Moked lone, which includes the anti(Moscow Communist Party, or (the one headed by Mr Urij lAveneri. editor of the Israeli (equivalent of “Private Eye,” (whose ultra-dovish views are I now suddenly in fashion. Both these groups are confident of gaining votes, hav- ; ing received many expressions of support, especially (from soldiers serving at he 'front. But they know that many voters will be held back by fear of splitting the • Left, and so allowing Mr Begin to win. Against this, they argue (that if Mr Begin gets in. it is I most likely to be in a "national coalition” with 'Labour under the present! hawkish leadership, and that! the best way to avoid this is] by voting for unequivocally-] dovish parties that would: support a Labour Government if it adopted a clear peace policy.