The Mers-el Kebir incident

Press, Volume CXIII, Issue 33277, 14 July 1973, Page 10

The Mers-el Kebir incident

The Deadly Stroke. By Warren Tute. Collins. 221 pp. When the French Government sued for peace terms from the Germans in June, 1940, the main subject of interest so far as the British Government was concerned was the future of the French navy, which was still a force to be reckoned with, despite the collapse of the army and air force. If the navy passed into German or Italian hands, it could alter the balance of power in the Mediterranean so radically as to make the greater part of it untenable for the small British fleet. The French naval commander, Admiral Darlan, assured his British colleagues that the ships would be scuttled if necessary to keep them out of enemy hands. But Winston Churchill and a majority of his Cabinet felt so apprehensive of a German “coup de main” that it was decided to take over or neutralise the various French naval forces scattered from the United Kingdom to Egypt, and the French West Indies to Indo-China. Units in British ports were by one means or another seized. Those in French colonial ports posed another and far greater problem. “The Deadly Stroke” is an account of how the most powerful and important of those units was dealt with; how the British came to attack their allies of a month earlier when the Royal Navy bombarded and crippled the French Mediterranean fleet at Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria. The events of July 3, 1940, make sombre reading, but dramatic. In a few minutes over 1300 French sailors were killed, and three out of four of the French capital ships sunk or immobilised. French feeling in North Africa became understandably antiBritish and remained so until the liberation of North Africa. The Royal Navy personnel involved in the action were disgusted at what they had been called on to do, and the chief negotiator, Captain Holland, expressed his feelings so strongly as to forfeit any chance of further promotion. Winston Churchill himself termed the action at Mers-el-Kebir a “Greek tragedy.” It was all the more so in that it was

unnecessary. The French proved this when they scuttled their fleet at Toulon under the noses of the invading Germans in November. 1942. In writing this highly interesting account of the Mers-el-Kebir incident and the negotiations which preceded it, Warren Tute has made the most of these tragic aspects. A former naval officer himself, fluent in French and, moreover, a francophile, he is able to present both sides of the picture with equal authority and understanding. As an accomplished writer, with novels to his credit as well as a variety of nonfiction, he brings out the human aspects of the action particularly strongly, and his portrait of Captain Holland, the reluctant negotiator, is a tribute to one who suffered more than most because of what occurred. “The Deadly Stroke” is to be recommended, not so much because it is the first book on the subject as because it is a good one.