VIETNAM PEACE TALKS HANOI’S “ WASHINGTONOLOGY HIS KISSINGER TRICKED?

Press, Volume CXII, Issue 33110, 28 December 1972, Page 8

VIETNAM PEACE TALKS HANOI’S “ WASHINGTONOLOGY HIS KISSINGER TRICKED?

By VICTOR ZORZA)

\\ hat was the dramatic decision in Hanoi which, according to Henry Kissinger, resulted overnight in a complete reversal of the Communist attitude at the Paris talks? "I really have no due." he say.-. All he knows is that when he first got back to Paris the Communists were as co-operative as before, and that three days later they suddenly turned nasty. e don t know. ’ he says, "what decisions were made in Hanoi al that point.”

Even if he does not know, his analysts should have told him by now. The original Hanoi decision to make a [whole series of concessions to the United States was reached, as was amply documented in my column, after a fight in which the "hardliners” in the North Vietnamese leadership were narrowly defeated by Communist "doves.” It took the Hanoi Politburo three days to digest the reports from Paris, and to take a new vote on the new American demands, which went far beyond what had been previously agreed. In these circumstances, the Hanoi “hardliners” would have been able to argue that they had been right all along, and to swing the politburo majority to their side.

the Hanoi vote would have been influenced, perhaps decisively, by the Communists own analysis of what had gone wrong in Washington. Had they been tricked by Kissinger? Or, they would ask. had Kissinger as well as they been tricked by Mr Nixon?

I The question must loom [even larger in their minds I now that the bombing and [mining has been resumed, [and that they have to make [ their own decision whether jto resume the offensive. Angry retort Hanoi’s own demonologists [will have taken note of the I Washington rumours of trouble between Mr Nixon and Kissinger, but they would hardly base policy; decisions on rumours. They would look for evidence, and they would find it in Kissinger’s angry retort to John Osborne of the “New Republic.” “Look,” Kissinger told him, “you’ve had a theory that I thought has been really extraordinarily mischievous, that there’s been some sort of trouble between the President and me. and that I overstepped my instructions. ... That is totally, 100 per cent: wrong.”

Osborne, who is properly regarded by Communist “Washingtonologists” as one [of the best Nixon-watchers, was puzzled by a circumI stance that would certainly have been regarded as significant by Hanoi’s own demonologists. Mr Nixon and Kissinger were recently lodged for three days within a few minutes’ drive of each other, but talked only by telephone — and Mr Nixon again confined himself to the telephone when he flew later to Washington with the announced purpose of talk-

ling with Kissinger, although i they were both at the White [House then. “It’s a fact,” [Kissinger told Osborne, "but lit doesn’t mean what you [think it means.”

I Some American political [commentators regard this [sort of analysis as unreliable, inapplicable in our open I society, but this does not make it irrelevant, because we know that it is being practised by Communist analysts, and that Communist leaders sometimes base [their decisions on it. The Nixon administration’s predilection for secrecy imposes a cost on the open society. Hanoi, too. must use the only information to which it has access.

So. Hanoi would analyse Kissinger’s public statements to see what they add to his secret remarks at the Paris [conference table. Kissinger himself has said that “we [all recognise the fact that ipolitical leaders speak to i many audiences at the same time,” and suggested that their remarks should be [analysed with this in mind. Suggestive contrasts Certainly there are some Ihighly suggestive contrasts ‘between the news conference in which Kissinger [announced that "peace is at hand,” and his latest press [briefing. In the first instance, [he was his usual confident self. taking obviously deserved credit for the Paris [agreement. He barely men[tioned the President in passling — three times in an hour’s talking. In the second [instance, he talked for about las long, and kept bringing the President into it — 14 times in all. and not in passing, either. The President “decided,” the President “ordered.” the President “reiterated,” “made clear,” “always enunciated.” The President “considers” (twice). I the President’s “proposal” [ (twice), his “manv speeches,” , his “stated conditions.”

Western analysts have derived a great deal of information by subjecting Comnist statements to this kind of content analysis. The Communists would certainly try to do the same, and might well conclude that among the audiences Kissinger was addressing the second time was the President himself. Had the President reprimanded Kissinger for overstepping his authority in the negotiations leading to the draft agree-

ment. as had been widely rumoured. Hanoi. might ask. and was Kissinger now making it clear that he was only a messenger boy — certainly in contrast to the impression he had conveyed previously? Saigon’s latest outburst against Kissinger would further convince Hanoi that he was down, if not out. When Saigon radio first began hurling insults at Kissinger. Thieu at least tried to say that this was nothing to do with him, but he has now unleashed the Saigon press hacks again. Mr Nixon’s decision to make public the results of the Paris talks. Saigon anounced with jubila tion, had undoubtedly placed Kissinger "in an embarrassed position.” Hanoi would figure that Thieu knew enough of the White House interplay on Vietnam to kick a man like Kissinger only when he was down. Thieu. in Hanoi’s view. is "the tail that wags the dog.” Message and pattern Hanoi’s analysts, trying to make sense of the demons, would get the message that Kissinger’s relatively soft line had been eclipsed by the President’s own policy of

strength. They would read the Kissinger news conference athe political signal to go with the new bombing and mining raids. The message was that if Hanoi refused to take his. Kissinger’s, friendly advice, the big bullies would take over.

Hanoi might wonder w’hether this was the good guy, bad guy routine. Or was the good guy out? Did they want to be bombed back to the stone age? What about the dikes now? Mr Nixon has always sought to impress his unpredictability on his foreign adversaries. He wants them to believe that he is capable of anything. So he marched into Cambodia, unleashed Thieu into Laos, bombed and mined Hanoi and Haiphong on the eve of the Moscow summit. He has established a pattern His very unpredictability has become predictable.

If Hanoi, or the Kremlin, or Peking, cannot cope with it now, they will take careful note of the pattern. When they see it emerging again in the future, they will have their response ready—and it is they who will have the advantage of unpredictability. It is a poor outlook.