Rennie sentenced to six months gaol

Press, Volume CXII, Issue 33046, 13 October 1972, Page 1

Rennie sentenced to six months gaol

I’.’Veio Zealand Press Association) AUCKLAND, October 12. Sentencing Donald Alexander Rennie, a stipendiary magistrate, to six months imprisonment on two charges of perjury, the Chief Justice (Sir Richard Wild) said there was no-one in the court who did not feel great compassion for Rennie “at the end of this wretched business.”

Rennie was convicted today of committing perjury in two affidavits sworn for hearings in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal concerning the custody of his two daughters.

The jury took more than seven hours and a half to reach the verdicts. The foreman added that the jury wished to ask the Court to extend leniency to Rennie. The Solicitor-General, Mr R. C. Savage, Q.C., with him Mr J. H. C. Larsen, appeared for the Crown, and Mr L. W. Brown, Q.C., with him Mr R. L. Maclaren, appeared for Rennie. Mr Maclaren said tonight there was a distinct possibility that an appeal would be lodged on Rennie’s behalf. "We will have to make up our minds in the cold light of day,” he said. "Tonight is not the time.” As far as he knew Rennie was being held tonight in Mount Eden Prison. Rennie, aged 42. had denied two charges of perjury, allegedly committed in

affidavits he swore on October 8, 1969, and September 3, 1970. Before sentence was imposed, he addressed the Court from the dock.

“During the whole of my working life,” he said, “I have devoted myself as well as I can to the law and have always respected the law. “I have now been found guilty of perjury, which goes to the very root of the law. 1 can honestly say I had no intention to deceive the Court in those affidavits and my concern throughout has been for the welfare of my children and respect of the law.” Earlier, Mr Brown said it would be almost superfluous to say what tragic consequences the verdict must have to Rennie.

“From the position of a respected, esteemed, and able magistrate in the city where he lives, in one blow his position has been lost and his position as a father has been placed in immediate jeopardy. “He has been reduced in the eyes of his profession, in the eyes of the public. You may feel that any further punishment is superfluous when one has regard to the inevitable suffering that this man must endure.” Rennie’s motivations had been the interest and protection of his children. His Honour told Rennie: “I believe you know, and I know, what my duty requires. I take full account of what has been said and of the request by the jury, but I cannot escape my duty.” Rennie was sentenced to six months imprisonment on both charges, to be served concurrently.

The jurors—three women and nine men—who had been told they could consider each particular in the indictment separately, found him guilty on the first particular in each charge but not guilty on the other parts of the charges. “Unusual case” The Rennie case was unusual in several respects, said his Honour summing up. It was unique in that Rennie was a magistrate, one of a group of men appointed because of their integrity, knowledge, and ability to do justice in the court system of this country. “But in our system when a person is charged with a crime it doesn’t matter what his status is,” said his Honour. “From the lowest to the highest in the land, all are equal before the law. The law is no respecter of person.” His Honour said that another feature of the case was the obvious background of bitterness, matrimonial disj cord, and squabbling over the ■ children.

“All of this you might understand, but deplore,” he said. “But it is no part of your job to decide on these matters, or apportion blame.” The jury had before it evidence of Rennie’s good character. But this did not mean that a person of high character could not commit a crime. Everyone who came before the Court appealed once for the first time. “So, I ask you to put aside any feelings of prejudice or sympathy,” he said. “You

must reach your verdict conscientiously and dispassionately.” He said that there were two allegations of perjury, which the law said was an assertion as to a matter of fact made by a witness in judical proceedings, whether in open court in affidavit or otherwise, on oath, and known to be false and intended to mislead the Court. Five elements He said that there were five elements in perjury—an assertion of fact, a witness in judical proceedings, statements made on oath, statements known by the witness to be false, and whether made with an intention to mislead.

The first three of these elements were admitted by the defence and there was no dispute about them. The defence had already said Rennie did not tell lies or intend to mislead and that, in a nutshell, was the defence argument.

He said that the jury might find Rennie guilty or not guilty in respect of each particular in the charges. “The law says no-one shall be convicted of perjury by the evidence of one person, unless the evidence is corroborated by some material in the particular,” he said. He said that in November, 1968, Rennie obtained a divorce on the ground of his| wife’s adultery with Mr de! Vryer and almost immediately! a judge had to decide the question of custody of the two little girls.

Passage read During this hearing Mr Justice Haslam had Rennie in the witness box to give evidence. A passage of Rennie’s evidence under crossexamination by Mrs de Vryer’s counsel was read to the jury by the Chief Justice. In this passage Rennie had denied having any intention of marrying, any affection, or keeping company with Mrs Burkinshaw. Mr Justice Haslam, having regard to that evidence, gave custody of the children to Rennie. Sir Richard Wild said that even if, as the Crown said, that first affidavit related only to the early period of May until November, 1968, when Rennie said he could not return to his home, it was still perjury because Mrs Burkinshaw had given evidence that sexual intercourse occurred back in May. He said that the Crown case was that perjury was committed by Rennie in the second affidavit because he was repeating emphatically what he had told Mr Justice Haslam before.

He told the jury that, when considering the defence case, it was important that the fullest consideration be given to ail that Rennie had said and what witnesses and counsel had said bn his' behalf. The defence said Rennie’s statement in the first affidavit related to May to November and there was no perjury because no misconduct had occurred. “Bitter woman” His Honour said that Mr Brown had already put it that Mrs Burkinshaw was a bitter, jealous, jilted woman, and

had said, “Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned.” It could be said that she was a spiteful woman.

If the jury accepted what Mrs Burkinshaw had said it might find Rennie guilty in that he committed perjury in the affidavits. The Crown case did not depend entirely on what Mrs Burkinshaw had said, because, putting her evidence aside, the Crown contended there was still evidence of perjury in Rennie’s evidence in the witness box.