THe Press FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1972. General Giap’s strategy

Press, Volume CXII, Issue 32902, 28 April 1972, Page 8

THe Press FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1972. General Giap’s strategy

Almost a month after the invasion by North Vietnam began, the Communist strategy in South Vietnam can now be discerned. The main Communist advances have been directed at gaining control of highways between important towns and military bases. In the far north and in the Central Highlands towns and Government strong-points are being isolated. Once highways are blocked, the airfields which might be used to fly in support and relief are being brought under heavy fire. The result is a series of little sieges, each relatively insignificant, but with the cumulative effect of cutting parts of South Vietnam into small and barely defensible segments. The hand of Hanoi’s Minister of Defence (General Giap) is all too clear; this is the strategy which won him the battie of Dien Bien Phu—and the war—against the French 18 years ago. A series of “ little Dien Bien “Phus” would greatly strengthen North Vietnam’s hand at the Paris peace talks, just as the original battle forced the issue of a settlement at the Geneva conference in 1954. But the sieges are only just getting under way. North Vietnam is operating on long supply lines with relatively small amounts of heavy equipment. It might well subdue a few towns —Kontum in the Central Highlands, for example—but this need not signal the collapse of South Vietnam’s resistance. It might even strengthen the South’s will to fight. The enemy is now clearly to be seen; this is less a war of guerrilla pinpricks and more a war of regular battles. American air power—and South Vietnamese air power, for that matter —can play their part. The real test will be whether the South Vietnamese retain confidence in their Government. South Vietnam's morale is one of North Vietnam’s principal targets.

In some areas the South Vietnamese, with South Korean help, are keeping crucial supply routes open. But there have been enough cases of hurried retreat, even of rout, for North Vietnam to have some hopes still of a general collapse of its enemy. Seen in this light, the half-hearted threats of an advance on Saigon are no more than a means of tying down Government reserves for the defence of the capital and denying their dispatch to more critical areas. In the meantime, the North appears sure enough of its strength to agree to return to the negotiating table; and South Vietnam and the United States are concerned enough to accept

The agreement to resume the talks in Paris, boycotted at different times in the last month by both sides, suggests a growing sense of stalemate in the fighting. North Vietnam might not be able to sustain its offensive for much longer: the bombing of North Vietnam is no more decisive now than in the past; the South Vietnamese Army has not performed well, but it has not collapsed. The resumption of the bombing and Communist gains in the South have given both sides something to talk about; concessions —even the first real progress in the talks—might just be possible.