STRATEGY CHANGE THE AIRCRAFT-CARRIER MAY STAGE A COME-BACK

Press, Volume CXII, Issue 32838, 11 February 1972, Page 8

STRATEGY CHANGE THE AIRCRAFT-CARRIER MAY STAGE A COME-BACK

(By

DAVID FAIRHALL,

in the "Guardian," Manchester)

(Reprinted by arrangement) It begins to look as if by an historic technological coincidence the I’s three great navies—American, Russian and British—mav Jtaneously be embarking on the development of an entire!}’ new tvpe warship, the small earner operating vertical take-off. fixed-wino-raft.

i the British and Ameri.a cases, the latest events merely serve to confirm a known interest in this concept. But if intelligence reports suggesting that the Russians are building an aircraft carrier turn out to be correct, we shall be witnessing a fundamental shift in Soviet naval strategy. And the Russian Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Gorshkov, must surely eat some, at least, of the many thousand words he has spoken on the subject of the aircraft carrier’s vulnerability and obsolescence.

Intelligence reports To summarise the unconfirmed intelligence reports that have been leaked from Washington over the past week: American reconnaissance satellites have evidently photographed a large ship, of perhaps 30,000 tons displacement, in the early stages of construction in a naval shipyard at Nikolayev on the Black Sea; it could turn out to be some sort of fleet auxiliary, but the large wells in the structure suggest to the Pentagon analysts that it may be a flat-topped carrier. It is extremely unlikely, on past evidence, that this would then be equipped as a conventional attack carrier with catapults for normal fixedwing aircraft. But it would seem logical for the Soviet naval planners to build a larger version of the Moskva class helicopter cruisers — this time with an uninterrupted flight deck — from which it would be possible to operate a mixture of anti-sub-marine and assault helicopters. And this would leave open the option to fly vertical take-off fixed-wing aircraft, which need to roll for a few hundred feet to make the best use of their limited range/payload ability. The Russians demonstrated the prototype of such an aircraft, designed by Yakovlev, at the Domodedovo air show in 1967, but nothing has been heard of its development since then.

The prospect of a conventional aircraft carrier seems unlikely because it would mean creating a whole new operational technology in a navy which has never possessed carriers and whose influential strategists have so often dismissed them as ineffective. Writing in “Morskoi Sbornik” in 1967, Admiral Gorshkov had this to say on the subject: In decline “An analysis of the military potential of the fleet’s various forms of power in the dawn of the nuclear missile era led us to the conclusion that the carriers were irreversibly in decline. Although they were powerful then, and could for some time to come pose a serious threat to out country’s security, there was

nevertheless clearly no point in looking for a way to use! them as main Striking forces in naval warfare. The fleets! of the imperialist countries, with the help of carriers,! have been able to carry out! major missions in local wars; against the peoples of the underdeveloped countries who do not possess modern means of waging war. It is also true that in the West major tasks have still been assigned to carriers in a nuclear missile war. “Even now some people, yielding to the hypnosis—if I may say so—of this contemporary naval experience, continue to campaign for the

construction of carriers. But t this leaves out of. account the 1 important fact that the mili- ] tary ability of carriers, even I with nuclear energy, does I not stand comparison with I the striking potential of i submarine-air forces.” i The weakness of Gorsh- i kov’s argument is that it appears to take account of the carrier’s usefulness in non-nuclear and otherwise ; limited wars without—at least by American standards ! —giving these roles anything like their due importance. Of course such a ship ; is hopelessly vulnerable in 1 all-out war, though its air- ' craft may nonetheless do a 1 great deal of damage. But , one would think that the Soviet Navy, moving out ' into the open oceans for the 1 first time, without its own 1 air cover and without even ' the scattered land bases which the traditionally ' imperialist navies of Britain and the United States have ’ available, would nevertheless ' find plenty of use for car- ■ riers if it could only afford 1 them. Daunted by expense l Even the Americans, with all the technology to hand, ! are daunted by the expense of new attack carriers: hence their interest in a cheap platform for vertical take-off aircraft. Bearing in mind Gorshkov’s remark that “some people . . . continue to campaign for the construction of carriers," it therefore seems reasonable to me that the Russians might be looking for a similar compromise. A lot depends on whether they 1 have managed to develop | their Yakovlev prototype < into something nearer the j Hawker Siddeley Harrier. And even if the fixed-wing < aircraft is still a good many 1 years away a flat topped < ship makes an ideal plat- 1 form for helicopters in the 1 meantime. ] Where Soviet plans are ’ concerned, we can only ' speculate. But within i N.A.T.O. the signs are that the “Harrier carrier” will soon become a reality. Within the next few days the Royal Navy will be submitting a formal proposal to the

[joint services operational requirements committee that a maritime version of • [the R.A.F.’s vertical take,l off aircraft should be developed for use aboard a new class of “through : deck “command cruise ■ The idea is that it should >be based on the Rolls-Royce i Pegasus 11 engine chosen for > the United Marine Corps : Harriers—that is rather i more powerful than the i engine at present fitted in the R.A.F.’s aircraft, but not ,so powerful as the Pegasus fl 5 which the United States - Navy is likely to want if it , buys the Harrier. The point : about the Pegasus 15 is that

although ground testing has been funded, it will require perhaps another £4O millions to develop fully, and the fuselage would then have to be modified, first to accommodate its bigger fan and then to make use of its potential performance. R.A.F. pilots The navy’s view is that such a programme could not be justified for the small number of aircraft it requires and is therefore happy to settle for a maritime version of the existing aircraft. Present thinking is that this should be flown by R.A.F. pilots, but whether they will actually be happy to go to sea when the time I comes remains to be seen. In any case this issue is no more than a political red herring left lying around from the days of the carrier controversy in Whitehall. To make the Harrier suitable for a sea-going role, it will need additional corrosion protection, possibly a modified undercarriage and a small radar in the nose. It will probably be armed with Sidewinder missiles for air-to-air combat with the Martel in the ground strike role. If a Pegasus 15 Harrier eventually emerges as an Anglo-American collaborative project it can of course be purchased by the Royal Navy at a later stage. But its development now depends on the outcome of the competition among American aircraft manufacturers (of whom McDonnell Douglas has a licence agreement with Hawker Siddeley) to provide a suitable aircraft quickly for the “sea control ship” proposed by the United States Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt. A preliminary evaluation of the ship itself—envisaged by the admiral as an austere cheap, and deliberately limited vessel of no more than about 10,000-ton displacement—is now underway in the United States. It will involve trials aboard the amphibious assault ship, U.S.S. Guam. My guess is that nothing will now stop the Harrier from going to sea with the United States Navy as well as the United States Marines.