The Press WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1971. Air strikes against North Vietnam

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32801, 29 December 1971, Page 12

The Press WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1971. Air strikes against North Vietnam

The sustained bombing of military targets in North Vietnam since Christmas should not be regarded as marking a change in American policy on the conduct of the Indo-China war. The raids are designed to warn North Vietnam that while the United States is reducing the scale of the fighting in the South and the degree of American involvement, it expects North Vietnam to maintain a corresponding reduction in its part in the war. The raids are a warning to Hanoi that the United States believes that unwritten agreements in force since the large-scale bombing of the North ended in November, 1968, are being violated by North Vietnam. American reconnaissance aircraft have been shot down; Communist strikes against civilian targets in South Vietnam are said to be increasing; North Vietnamese reinforcements have been moving through Laos into central South Vietnam; progress at the Paris peace talks has virtually stopped.

The rate of withdrawal of American troops is slightly ahead of President Nixon’s timetable. Only 158,000 Americans remain, the smallest number for more than six years. The American Government is attempting to protect those who remain while the withdrawals continue. To keep casualties to a minimum during this period the United States must show that it is able, and willing, to hit back hard against North Vietnam if Hanoi attempts to increase the intensity of the war. No doubt some of the raids, especially those against infiltration routes in Laos and the anti-aircraft installations which defend them, will ease Communist pressure on Cambodia and Laos. Not too much should be expected from the bombing. The war in Indo-China has demonstrated the limitations of air power as a means of attacking a dispersed and highly mobile enemy in the jungle; bombing, indeed, has tended to harden public opinion in North Vietnam and to increase the determination of the people to fight. In the United States and throughout much of the West the raids will no doubt provide an excuse for a new round of anti-war demonstrations. President Nixon could hardly be eager to provoke such embarrassing hostility at this time; he must have good reason to believe that the bombing is necessary to forestall a new Communist offensive in South Vietnam.

The raids probably will not be continued for long. Once their strategic purpose has been served, the United States can expect to derive most benefit from their early discontinuance, which might encourage the North Vietnamese to reduce their infiltration, or even persuade them to begin useful talks in Paris. Prolonged bombing would only harden attitudes without changing significantly the military balance in Indo-China.