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WHAT CHINA THINKS-I Prime Minister discusses President Nixon’s visit

This question-and-answer interview, given by the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr Chou En-iai, to Neville Maxwell, of the “Sunday Times, London, began at 11.30 p.m. in Peking. Maxwell had been waiting for some davs when the summons came.

The two men talked for five hours, while Chinese shorthand writers recorded the Prime Minister’s remarks, and the interpreter recorded the questions.

During the marathon session Mr Chou ranged widely over the world scene. His statements have the full weight of official statements for the Government of China. MAXWELL: Prime Minister, could I ask you first to give me your views on the postwar historical trends?

CHOU EN-LAI: Soon after the conclusion of the Second World War, Churchill made his anti-Communist and antiSoviet speech at Fulton (Missouri), hoping to mobilise the West, and indeed the whole world, against the: Soviet Union and thereby maintain the rule of the British Empire. His speech exercised considerable influence in the United States. Using the tune of that speech, the United States made anti-Soviet and anti-Communist propaganda in a big way.

There was at that time a prevalent view than an antiSoviet war would soon break out. But Chairman Mao discerned something behind the whole affair, so he wrote an article, published under another name, in which he disagreed with the view that the anti-Soviet stance would lead to the outbreak of an anti-Soviet war.

He pointed out that the United States, in fact, intended to use antiCommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda as a smokescreen under which it could forcibly occupy all the vast, intermediate zones situated between the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, no new world war has broken out in the 26 years since the last one, but small wars have never stopped in the first intermediate zone—Asia, Africa. Latin America—and the civil war in China was the first and the biggest of them. After the conclusion of the Second World War. the United States played the high and mighty overlord of the world. Wherever the people wanted liberation,' it dispatched troops to suppress them. Marshall Plan It established many military bases and sent out large numbers of troops. Wherever there was economic difficulty and money was asked for, it gave money.

It employed two methods: One was the Marshall Plan and the other investment. The total sum of the Marshall Plan was around $30,000 million, while the total investment of the United States far exceeded even this figure. What was the result? The United States not only invaded and occupied many parts of the first intermediate zone of Asia, Africa and Latin America but also poked its hands into th e Western countries—(the second intermediate zone) between the United States and the Soviet Union.

But what is the world situation today? President Nixon made a speech in Kansas City on July 6 this year and the British Prime Minister, Mr Heath, made the summing up speech at the Conservatives’ annual conference on October 16. These two speeches echoed each other.

The message of Heath’s speech was that for more than 20 years since the war Britain had followed the United States and given up Europe. The British Empire had ultimately disintegrated and Britain had become a second-rate country. Now Britain should return to Europe and join the Common Market. , Nixon’s speech

As a result, the British Parliament adopted the decision for Britain to join the Common Market. After that, the Foreign Ministers of Britain and France met in London and proclaimed AngloFrench co-operation that would shape Western Europe! into a force. Even President Nixon has to acknowledge this force. In his Kansas City speech. Nixon said that the United States had gone down in the past 26 years to a position such as he did not even dream of immediately after the war. The Soviet Union has, since the war, gradually become a super-Power too, and is contending with the United States for hegemony. In Western Europe, in the second intermediate zone, there has further appeared the Common Market, which makes the industrially developed European countries unite to stand up to and rival the United States. This is the third Power. The fourth Power is Japan. I have said to many American friends that it is the United States which has fattened Japan. Japan’s steel output may approach or surpass *:hat of the United States this year or next.

I It is in these circumI stances that Nixon’s “new I economic programme” was bom. It is a blow at the intermediate zone, first of all at Japan and then the West European countries, and at the same time it has affected the Western world as a ! whole. President Nixon further said that there is a fifth Power—that is. China—but China, he said, is a potential Power. Heath made a similar statement.

No super-power We admit that we can • develop in some decades (into a strong and prosperous country. But we have declared that we will never be a super-Power, neither today nor even in the future. Taking the world as a whole, the fact that countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution has become an irresistible historical trend. Such are the changes in the world situation in the 26 years since the Second World War. But isn’t there a profound contradiction in American policy at the moment? President Nixon’s coming trip to China is hardly in harmony with the continued bombing of Vietnam.

But as soon as he said he would come, many countries followed suit and this affected the outcome of the voting in the United Nations. Have you thought about this?

No, but in terms of American domestic politics, Mr Nixon’s popularity seems to have increased sharply since you said he could come here—and another effect is that the American peace movement seems to have been pretty well put to sleep. Surely both those consequences must be seen as disadvantageous from China’s point of view?

That is not necessarily the case. I will take a recent event to illustrate this. Look at the outcome of the voting in the United Nations. We did not expect it so quickly and it is possible that the United States, too, did not expect such a disastrous defeat for its (“two Chinas” formula. The result is that the door has been opened. People say, “Since Nixon may go to China, why can’t we, too?”

There is no logic in saying that it is all right to talk with people of second or third rank but not with the head. Take another instance. At the 1955 Bandung conference, I said that the Chinese people and the American people had always been friendly but the United iStates had occupied Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and that we were willing to solve this problem with it through negotiations. Geneva talks

The United States Government agreed and the talks started on August 1, 1955, in Geneva. Britain used her good offices. Then Hammarskjold also made his contribution. The talks took place, but the talks at ambassadorial level failed to solve any problem. The talks went on for 16 years and we suspended them when the United States expanded its war against Vietnam and launched aggression against Cambodia. Finally President Nixon himself knocked on the door, saying that he wished to come to Peking for talks. So well and good, we invited him to come for talks. Now the talks have not yet started, but we are already in the United Nations. This is a victory, and we have not bartered away any principles. The United Nations defeated the United States draft resolution by 59 votes to 55. Among the 59 countries I which opposed the United States draft resolution, 10 had no diplomatic relations with i China. After that they also ( voted for the Albanian- : Algerian draft resolution. Change revealed If these 10 countries had not voted against the American draft resolution but abstained instead, the result would have been 49 to 55 and the United States draft resolution on procedure would have been passed. This event indicated the change after President Nixon expressed his wish to come to China. This is the first point. I Second, some of the coun- : tries which had just established diplomatic relations with China were still under American pressure. Among the 15 countries II which abstained on the proI cedural motion, the majority : were those which had estab- : I lished diplomatic relations (with China only recently. They could not but cast ab-

stention votes under United States pressure. Their abstentions also meant support for China, because with more abstentions the total number of votes was reduced and a simple majority was easier to gain. As a result, the situation I have just mentioned, the defeat of the American draft resolution, occurred. And what immediately > followed as a result? A 76-to-35 vote. It was not merely in excess of a two-thirds majority, but a landslide in favour of the resolution put forward by Albania, Algeria and 21 other countries. Altered stance How did the 76 votes come about? There was no change in the American resolution. But 12 out'of the original 15 abstentions on that resolution turned to support the Albanian-Algerian resolution.

Most of them had diplomatic relations with China. That was one characteristic. Another was that some countries which formerly supported the United States resolution turned to support .the Albanian-Algerian resolution.

Among these there were again two categories. First, take Mexico. Once the Albanian-Algerian resolution was adopted, it broke off diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai-shek. This shows that what is supported was the United States procedural motion, not the United States position or Chiang Kai-shek. This had been made clear by the Mexican President in his address at the United Nations.

The second category consists of Israel and Portugal. The result was an increase of 17 votes. There was also an increase in the abstentions from 15 to 17. Only 35 were against the Albariian-Algerian resolution.

Thus the situation in the United Nations was suddenly changed. That, of course, had an element of the accidental, yet an inevitable; trend is often manifested through accidental phenomena. This shows the trend that China can no longer be sealed off. “Just demand” At first w e did not intend to go to the United Nations immediately. But when we heard that there were 76 votes supporting us there we (could not but go, otherwise most of the countries supportI ing China would be disappointed.

The 76 votes not only reflect the just demand of the world to restore to the People’s Republic of China the rights she has been deprived of for 22 years and for expelling the Chiang Kai-shek clique. They also prove that the United State's position in the past 22 years was wrong. Fifty-seven countries came forward to make speeches at the welcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly on November 15. The United States, being the host country, spoke earlier and so the Soviet Union felt it had to speak, too. Following this, Mongolia and Japan spoke. Of the 57 countries that spoke, eight do not yet have diplomatic relations with China. And Ghana has not yet resumed diplomatic relations with China. Some countries having diplomatic relations with China did not have the time to speak, as the meeting had alreadylasted too long.

Solved at the top You have already read our delegation’s first speech in the United Nations. It has been reported that some people were surprised at this speech, saying they did not expect that we would table all questions of principle so clearly in the very first speech. Why should we talk with President Nixon? Chairman Mao has openly explained this to Edgar Snow: because Nixon is President of the United States of America. The present issues between China and the United States can only be solved with President Nixon. Since he wants to come, we will talk with him. Because if you do not talk with the head, who else should you talk with? If you talk with people of second or third rank,’ instead of the head, the issues cannot be solved. For instance, in the past we talked with Chiang Kaishek in solving China’s problem of resisting Japanese aggression. At the beginning we talked with his representatives, but matters could not be cleared up and they did not dare to shoulder the responsibility. If Mr Nixon’s present policies in Asia are as rigid as they seem, his coming here may well turn out to have been a waste of time? That is also my view. But we should not expect too much to come out of it. How could all problems be solved at once? There can be no ! i such thing. But if he solves (nothing, will the American (people agree to it? . But he may try to shift the blame on to you. 1 He may not be able to do

that. We have already placed the questions before the United Nations. We have made known our stand on the major international problems on all questions, including Taiwan. Such are our principles, and we will struggle for their realisation. We are not at all like the Soviet Union, which dares not speak up openly, but makes deals behind the backs of others. That is unfavourable to small countries. Therefore we made our positions clear as soon as we went to the United Nations. (To be continued).

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19711214.2.197

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32789, 14 December 1971, Page 23

Word Count
2,246

WHAT CHINA THINKS-I Prime Minister discusses President Nixon’s visit Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32789, 14 December 1971, Page 23

WHAT CHINA THINKS-I Prime Minister discusses President Nixon’s visit Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32789, 14 December 1971, Page 23

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