U.S. remains ‘pivot’ of Japan’s foreign policy

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32703, 4 September 1971, Page 17

U.S. remains ‘pivot’ of Japan’s foreign policy

(By

JAMES RESTON

of the "Netv York Times," through N.Z.P.A.)

TOKYO, Sept. 3. The Prime Minister (Mr Eisaku Sato) said in an interview that the political repercussions of President Nixon’s new economic policy were “serious” but that the United States remained the “pivot” of Japan’s foreign policy.

Nothing that had happened in Washington’s recent moves toward China or its dramatic action in defence of the dollar could change the fundamentals of Japan’s relations with the United States, the Prime Minister said in the first press interview he had granted since the announcement of the new United States economic policies. “One can certainly not deny that repercussions will be far-reaching.” He added . . but Japan and the i United States are in the same ship together. If the United States is shipwrecked, ,so is Japan ... so that there can be no misunderstanding about basic policy, I would like to repeat this: the basis of our foreign policy is our.

close relationship with the United States . . Mr Sato, who has been hurt politically by seeming to be treated rather casually by an American Government he has usually tried to support, appeared to be more concerned about the political than the economic consequences of Washington’s China and economic policies —particularly in the emotional atmosphere of next year’s elections in both Japan and the United States.

“The situation is serious. I am not trying to play political games with you,” Mr Sato said. “1 am politically in charge of this Government, of this country, and my responsibility is that the people should understand the problem . . .

"It is quite true that those in the export trade (in Japan) in the shipbuilding industry, for instance, will be affected quite seriously by the new economic policy (of the United States). The imposition of a surcharge also will have a far-reaching effect on export industries. “Yet, on the other hand, I think the present situation enables us to promote imports quite actively, so ithe merit side should be

weighed against the demerit side ...”

Mr Sato, at no time, criticised President Nixon’s policies, timing or tactics. Indeed, he praised the President highly for ordering a freeze on ’ prices and wages, but he was clearly hoping that Mr Nixon’s actions would be temporary. “These measures taken by Washington,” he said, “are extraordinary measures and I am sure they will not be carried on indefinitely.” Meanwhile, he added, Japan would stimulate its domestic economy in the hope Of increasing business activity and enabling Japan to buy more from the United States, including, , he observed, sophisticated military equipment. At the same time, he alluded to the danger that the United States in its present difficulties, might be tempted to withdraw too much from the world. He said that it was one thing for the people of America to want to withdraw from the Vietnam war—“l think it must be shared by the entire nation,” he said—but to withdraw the United States completely from the world scene was quite another thing and would not

be good in the present international situation. The Prime Minister was relaxed and almost casual during the 90 : minute interview, and joked about recently having made his first hole-in-one on what he described as a less-than-perfect golf shot.

When asked whether there had been a breakdown in communications over Japanese textile exports to the United States and even a lack- of candour as well as consultation, he merely turned Die question to tlfe future meeting in Washington between Cabinet members of the two Governments. “I. put great expectations on the results of the forthcoming Cabinet level meeting,” he said. “I think that the most important thing there is to have a frank exchange of Views. “There is no point in mincing words, in assuming that the other side is going to understand. The most important thing is to communicate to each other in the most candid manner possible.” Similarly, in discussing the changing world situation, he was optimistic about what he termed the basic trends toward world peace, and he took a conciliatory attitude toward the Government of

China, which has • recently been complaining that Japan was going “militaristic” and showing aggressive ambitions in Taiwan and Korea. Mr Sato denied that militarism was rising in Japan or that Japan had any covetous ambitions in either Taiwan or Korea. "We have the' potential to become a military power,” he said, “but we have no intentions of doing so, and the monfey we would otherwise spend on bigger military budgets will go for economic aid to Underdeveloped nations.”

The Prime Minister referred to a recent interview this reporter had with Mr Choir En-lai, the Prime Minister of China, in which, while praising Japan as “a great nation,” Mr Chou vigorously charged the Sato Government with pursuing a militarist and expansionist policy. Mr Sato said that Japan had committed itself to a non-nuclear policy, had renounced all claims, to Taiwan, had a fixed policy of not sending soldiers outside its own borders, and was a democracy in which these policies could not easily be' changed. “At the same time,” he added, “I am conscious of the depth of the scars left

by the claws of (Japanese) militarists of the past, and I am really disheartened when I think that these scars are so deep that allegations of this kind should still be made today. “But the new Japan, as I have explained to you, certainly has no intention of doing such things, and I would hope that you will have confidence in our word on this point.” Mr Sato said that he felt there was “only one China.” Peking and Taiwan both agreed on this principle, he said, but there were practical difficulties and his hope was that this could be recognised as an internal Chinese matter and, on the principle “that China is one,” settled by the leaders in Peking and Taipei without outside interference.

The Prime Minister did not sound very hopeful that any non-aggression pact could be arranged in the foreseeable future by the United States, the Spvjet Union, China and Japan, or hopeful either about any immediate change for the better in Soviet-Japanese relations.

Mr Sato kept coming back to relations between the United. States and Japan. In summary, he agreed he was not too worried about

these relations, that he did not think there had been any great shock to confidence and that in general he thought the trends in the world were moving toward common sense and peace. “I think that I have a very close relationship with President Nixon,” .he said, “and I think that even if I had been consulted beforehand (on President Nixon’s new China policy) I couldn’t have done a thing about it, whether I’d been told six hours in advance or even a week. “There’s really no need to make a big fuss about such things.” He added the wish that the press could see things a little more in that light. Finally, he said, he was not going to Washington with his Cabinet this month, but that ; he hoped for a formal State ■ visit by Emperor Hirohito to Washington to be followed by a visit by President Nixon to Japan. i But not, he added, while i President Nixon was on his ' way to Peking. “It’s best not to get one thing mixed up with an-, other,” he said. 1